Daily Papers

Backdoor (Trojan) attack is a common threat to deep neural networks, where samples from one or more source classes embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified to adversarial target classes. Existing methods for detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked are mostly designed for attacks with a single adversarial target (e.g., all-to-one attack). To the best of our knowledge, without supervision, no existing methods can effectively address the more general X2X attack with an arbitrary number of source classes, each paired with an arbitrary target class. In this paper, we propose UMD, the first Unsupervised Model Detection method that effectively detects X2X backdoor attacks via a joint inference of the adversarial (source, target) class pairs. In particular, we first define a novel transferability statistic to measure and select a subset of putative backdoor class pairs based on a proposed clustering approach. Then, these selected class pairs are jointly assessed based on an aggregation of their reverse-engineered trigger size for detection inference, using a robust and unsupervised anomaly detector we proposed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Imagenette dataset, and show that our unsupervised UMD outperforms SOTA detectors (even with supervision) by 17%, 4%, and 8%, respectively, in terms of the detection accuracy against diverse X2X attacks. We also show the strong detection performance of UMD against several strong adaptive attacks.

Recent advances in vision-language-action (VLA) models have greatly improved embodied AI, enabling robots to follow natural language instructions and perform diverse tasks. However, their reliance on uncurated training datasets raises serious security concerns. Existing backdoor attacks on VLAs mostly assume white-box access and result in task failures instead of enforcing specific actions. In this work, we reveal a more practical threat: attackers can manipulate VLAs by simply injecting physical objects as triggers into the training dataset. We propose goal-oriented backdoor attacks (GoBA), where the VLA behaves normally in the absence of physical triggers but executes predefined and goal-oriented actions in the presence of physical triggers. Specifically, based on a popular VLA benchmark LIBERO, we introduce BadLIBERO that incorporates diverse physical triggers and goal-oriented backdoor actions. In addition, we propose a three-level evaluation that categorizes the victim VLA's actions under GoBA into three states: nothing to do, try to do, and success to do. Experiments show that GoBA enables the victim VLA to successfully achieve the backdoor goal in 97 percentage of inputs when the physical trigger is present, while causing zero performance degradation on clean inputs. Finally, by investigating factors related to GoBA, we find that the action trajectory and trigger color significantly influence attack performance, while trigger size has surprisingly little effect. The code and BadLIBERO dataset are accessible via the project page at https://goba-attack.github.io/.

This paper proposes a simple method to distill and detect backdoor patterns within an image: Cognitive Distillation (CD). The idea is to extract the "minimal essence" from an input image responsible for the model's prediction. CD optimizes an input mask to extract a small pattern from the input image that can lead to the same model output (i.e., logits or deep features). The extracted pattern can help understand the cognitive mechanism of a model on clean vs. backdoor images and is thus called a Cognitive Pattern (CP). Using CD and the distilled CPs, we uncover an interesting phenomenon of backdoor attacks: despite the various forms and sizes of trigger patterns used by different attacks, the CPs of backdoor samples are all surprisingly and suspiciously small. One thus can leverage the learned mask to detect and remove backdoor examples from poisoned training datasets. We conduct extensive experiments to show that CD can robustly detect a wide range of advanced backdoor attacks. We also show that CD can potentially be applied to help detect potential biases from face datasets. Code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/CognitiveDistillation.

We introduce behavioral fidelity -- a third evaluation dimension for synthetic tabular data that measures whether generated data preserves the temporal, sequential, and structural behavioral patterns that distinguish real-world entity activity. Existing frameworks evaluate statistical fidelity (marginal distributions and correlations) and downstream utility (classifier AUROC on synthetic-trained models), but neither tests for the behavioral signals that operational detection and analysis systems actually rely on. We formalize a taxonomy of four behavioral fraud patterns (P1-P4) covering inter-event timing, burst structure, multi-account graph motifs, and velocity-rule trigger rates; define a degradation ratio metric calibrated to a real-data noise floor (1.0 = matches real variability, k = k-times worse); and prove that row-independent generators -- the dominant paradigm -- are structurally incapable of reproducing P3 graph motifs (Proposition 1) and produce non-positive within-entity IET autocorrelation (Proposition 2), making the positive burst fingerprint of fraud sequences unachievable regardless of architecture or training data size. We benchmark CTGAN, TVAE, GaussianCopula, and TabularARGN on IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection and the Amazon Fraud Dataset. All four fail severely: on IEEE-CIS composite degradation ratios range from 24.4x (TVAE) to 39.0x (GaussianCopula); on Amazon FDB, row-independent generators score 81.6-99.7x, while TabularARGN achieves 17.2x. We document generator-specific failure modes and their resolutions. The P1-P4 framework extends to any domain with entity-level sequential tabular data, including healthcare and network security. We release our evaluation framework as open source.

In search scenarios, user experience can be hindered by erroneous queries due to typos, voice errors, or knowledge gaps. Therefore, query correction is crucial for search engines. Current correction models, usually small models trained on specific data, often struggle with queries beyond their training scope or those requiring contextual understanding. While the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) offers a potential solution, they are still limited by their pre-training data and inference cost, particularly for complex queries, making them not always effective for query correction. To tackle these, we propose Trigger^3, a large-small model collaboration framework that integrates the traditional correction model and LLM for query correction, capable of adaptively choosing the appropriate correction method based on the query and the correction results from the traditional correction model and LLM. Trigger^3 first employs a correction trigger to filter out correct queries. Incorrect queries are then corrected by the traditional correction model. If this fails, an LLM trigger is activated to call the LLM for correction. Finally, for queries that no model can correct, a fallback trigger decides to return the original query. Extensive experiments demonstrate Trigger^3 outperforms correction baselines while maintaining efficiency.

In value-based deep reinforcement learning with replay memories, the batch size parameter specifies how many transitions to sample for each gradient update. Although critical to the learning process, this value is typically not adjusted when proposing new algorithms. In this work we present a broad empirical study that suggests {\em reducing} the batch size can result in a number of significant performance gains; this is surprising, as the general tendency when training neural networks is towards larger batch sizes for improved performance. We complement our experimental findings with a set of empirical analyses towards better understanding this phenomenon.