Daily Papers

Inference-time planning with large language models frequently breaks under partial observability: when task-critical preconditions are not specified at query time, models tend to hallucinate missing facts or produce plans that violate hard constraints. We introduce Self-Querying Bidirectional Categorical Planning (SQ-BCP), which explicitly represents precondition status (Sat/Viol/Unk) and resolves unknowns via (i) targeted self-queries to an oracle/user or (ii) bridging hypotheses that establish the missing condition through an additional action. SQ-BCP performs bidirectional search and invokes a pullback-based verifier as a categorical certificate of goal compatibility, while using distance-based scores only for ranking and pruning. We prove that when the verifier succeeds and hard constraints pass deterministic checks, accepted plans are compatible with goal requirements; under bounded branching and finite resolution depth, SQ-BCP finds an accepting plan when one exists. Across WikiHow and RecipeNLG tasks with withheld preconditions, SQ-BCP reduces resource-violation rates to 14.9\% and 5.8\% (vs.\ 26.0\% and 15.7\% for the best baseline), while maintaining competitive reference quality.

To achieve reliable, robust, and safe AI systems, it is vital to implement fallback strategies when AI predictions cannot be trusted. Certifiers for neural networks are a reliable way to check the robustness of these predictions. They guarantee for some predictions that a certain class of manipulations or attacks could not have changed the outcome. For the remaining predictions without guarantees, the method abstains from making a prediction, and a fallback strategy needs to be invoked, which typically incurs additional costs, can require a human operator, or even fail to provide any prediction. While this is a key concept towards safe and secure AI, we show for the first time that this approach comes with its own security risks, as such fallback strategies can be deliberately triggered by an adversary. In addition to naturally occurring abstains for some inputs and perturbations, the adversary can use training-time attacks to deliberately trigger the fallback with high probability. This transfers the main system load onto the fallback, reducing the overall system's integrity and/or availability. We design two novel availability attacks, which show the practical relevance of these threats. For example, adding 1% poisoned data during training is sufficient to trigger the fallback and hence make the model unavailable for up to 100% of all inputs by inserting the trigger. Our extensive experiments across multiple datasets, model architectures, and certifiers demonstrate the broad applicability of these attacks. An initial investigation into potential defenses shows that current approaches are insufficient to mitigate the issue, highlighting the need for new, specific solutions.

Verifiers are auxiliary models that assess the correctness of outputs generated by base large language models (LLMs). They play a crucial role in many strategies for solving reasoning-intensive problems with LLMs. Typically, verifiers are LLMs themselves, often as large (or larger) than the base model they support, making them computationally expensive. In this work, we introduce a novel lightweight verification approach, LiLaVe, which reliably extracts correctness signals from the hidden states of the base LLM. A key advantage of LiLaVe is its ability to operate with only a small fraction of the computational budget required by traditional LLM-based verifiers. To demonstrate its practicality, we couple LiLaVe with popular meta-generation strategies, like best-of-n or self-consistency. Moreover, we design novel LiLaVe-based approaches, like conditional self-correction or conditional majority voting, that significantly improve both accuracy and efficiency in generation tasks with smaller LLMs. Our work demonstrates the fruitfulness of extracting latent information from the hidden states of LLMs, and opens the door to scalable and resource-efficient solutions for reasoning-intensive applications.

The evolution of machine learning has increasingly prioritized the development of powerful models and more scalable supervision signals. However, the emergence of foundation models presents significant challenges in providing effective supervision signals necessary for further enhancing their capabilities. Consequently, there is an urgent need to explore novel supervision signals and technical approaches. In this paper, we propose verifier engineering, a novel post-training paradigm specifically designed for the era of foundation models. The core of verifier engineering involves leveraging a suite of automated verifiers to perform verification tasks and deliver meaningful feedback to foundation models. We systematically categorize the verifier engineering process into three essential stages: search, verify, and feedback, and provide a comprehensive review of state-of-the-art research developments within each stage. We believe that verifier engineering constitutes a fundamental pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence.

Verifying the success of computer use agent (CUA) trajectories is a critical challenge: without reliable verification, neither evaluation nor training signal can be trusted. In this paper, we present lessons learned from building a best-in-class verifier for web tasks we call the Universal Verifier. We design the Universal Verifier around four key principles: 1) constructing rubrics with meaningful, non-overlapping criteria to reduce noise; 2) separating process and outcome rewards that yield complementary signals, capturing cases where an agent follows the right steps but gets blocked or succeeds through an unexpected path; 3) distinguishing between controllable and uncontrollable failures scored via a cascading-error-free strategy for finer-grained failure understanding; and 4) a divide-and-conquer context management scheme that attends to all screenshots in a trajectory, improving reliability on longer task horizons. We validate these findings on CUAVerifierBench, a new set of CUA trajectories with both process and outcome human labels, showing that our Universal Verifier agrees with humans as often as humans agree with each other. We report a reduction in false positive rates to near zero compared to baselines like WebVoyager (geq 45\%) and WebJudge (geq 22\%). We emphasize that these gains stem from the cumulative effect of the design choices above. We also find that an auto-research agent achieves 70\% of expert quality in 5\% of the time, but fails to discover all strategies required to replicate the Universal Verifier. We open-source our Universal Verifier system along with CUAVerifierBench; available at https://github.com/microsoft/fara.

Verifiers can improve language model capabilities by scoring and ranking responses from generated candidates. Currently, high-quality verifiers are either unscalable (e.g., humans) or limited in utility (e.g., tools like Lean). While LM judges and reward models have become broadly useful as general-purpose verifiers, a significant performance gap remains between them and oracle verifiers (verifiers with perfect accuracy). To help close this gap, we introduce Weaver, a framework for designing a strong verifier by combining multiple weak, imperfect verifiers. We find weighted ensembles of verifiers, which typically require learning from labeled data, significantly outperform unweighted combinations due to differences in verifier accuracies. To reduce dependency on labeled data, Weaver leverages weak supervision to estimate each verifier's accuracy and combines outputs into a unified score that better reflects true response quality. However, directly applying weak supervision algorithms poses challenges, including inconsistent verifier output formats and handling low-quality verifiers. Weaver addresses these using dataset statistics to normalize outputs and filter specific verifiers. We study Weaver's effectiveness in test-time repeated sampling, where a model generates multiple candidate responses and selects one. Our evaluations show Weaver significantly improves over Pass@1-performance when selecting the first candidate-across reasoning and math tasks, achieving o3-mini-level accuracy with Llama 3.3 70B Instruct as generator, and an ensemble of 70B or smaller judge and reward models as verifiers (87.7% average). This gain mirrors the jump between GPT-4o and o3-mini (69.0% vs. 86.7%), which required extensive finetuning and post-training. To reduce computational costs of verifier ensembles, we train a 400M cross-encoder using Weaver's combined output scores.

Automated formal verification remains challenging for large language models because data for proof assistants and verification-aware languages is scarce, and correctness depends on satisfying precise machine-checkable specifications rather than producing plausible code. This thesis studies how verifier environments can improve LLM generation of verified programs and proofs through reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) and verifier-guided inference-time search. First, we train open-source models in Dafny with RLVR using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) and related variants, assembling generated candidates into complete programs and scoring them with compiler and verifier outcomes. Initial experiments on an APPS-derived Dafny dataset increased verified reward from 2.2% to 58.1%, but revealed specification hacking, where models exploit weak formal specifications instead of implementing the intended solutions. After filtering underspecified and vulnerable tasks, multi-turn RLVR on the refined benchmark improves the verified pass rate from 9.7% to 31.1%. Second, we develop a verifier-guided inference scaffold in Lean that treats proof generation as structured search over decomposed subgoals, verifier feedback, diagnostics, and repair. With a fixed base model, the full scaffold with proof reviser improves pass rate on an initial VeriCoding pilot set from 46.2% under direct repair to 69.2%. On the larger VERINA dataset, whole-task decomposition plus proof reviser solves 7 of 42 previously unsolved tasks. We also introduce Dalek-Bench, a repository-scale Lean benchmark derived from the Rust curve25519-dalek verification project; preliminary results remain weak, indicating that stronger progress evaluation and task-specific tool-use policies are still needed.

Large language models (LLMs) struggle with multi-step reasoning, where inference-time scaling has emerged as a promising strategy for performance improvement. Verifier-guided search outperforms repeated sampling when sample size is limited by selecting and prioritizing valid reasoning paths. However, we identify a critical limitation: scaling flaws, prevalent across different models (Mistral 7B and DeepSeekMath 7B), benchmarks (GSM8K and MATH), and verifiers (outcome value models and process reward models). As sample size increases, verifier-guided search exhibits diminishing advantages and eventually underperforms repeated sampling. Our analysis attributes this to verifier failures, where imperfect verifiers misrank candidates and erroneously prune all valid paths. These issues are further exacerbated in challenging and out-of-distribution problems, restricting search effectiveness. To mitigate verifier failures, we explore reducing reliance on verifiers and conduct preliminary investigations using two simple methods. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in verifier-guided search and suggest future directions.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) trains policies against automated verifiers to avoid costly human labeling. To reduce vulnerability to verifier hacking, many RLVR systems collapse rewards to binary {0,1} during training. This choice carries a cost: it introduces false negatives (rejecting correct answers, FNs) and false positives (accepting incorrect ones, FPs). For instance, a rule-based checker may mark the correct fraction 12{36} as wrong when compared against the canonical 1{3} due to brittle parsing/equivalence rules (FN), while a large language model (LLM) judges can be gamed by superficial cues or even a single adversarial token, yielding inflated correctness for wrong solutions (FP). We formalize verifier unreliability by modeling the verifier as a stochastic reward channel with asymmetric noise rates. From this abstraction, we derive two correction algorithms for verifier errors. The first is a backward correction that de-biases the observed binary reward to recover an unbiased estimator of the clean policy gradient. The second is a forward correction that reweights score-function terms so that the expected update direction aligns with the clean gradient; notably, it requires only the FN rate. We implement both as lightweight hooks in a group relative policy optimization (GRPO)-based RLVR pipeline and evaluate them on math-reasoning models and benchmarks. Across models and datasets, both corrections improve over uncorrected training; the forward variant converges faster and remains stable under heavier noise. Finally, we show a practical appeal mechanism in which a lightweight LLM verifier estimates the FN rate online by rechecking rule-based negatives, obtaining outperformance compared with other state-of-the-art contenders.

Backdoor mechanisms have traditionally been studied as security threats that compromise the integrity of machine learning models. However, the same mechanism -- the conditional activation of specific behaviors through input triggers -- can also serve as a controllable and auditable interface for trustworthy model behavior. In this work, we present Backdoor4Good (B4G), a unified benchmark and framework for beneficial backdoor applications in large language models (LLMs). Unlike conventional backdoor studies focused on attacks and defenses, B4G repurposes backdoor conditioning for Beneficial Tasks that enhance safety, controllability, and accountability. It formalizes beneficial backdoor learning under a triplet formulation (T, A, U), representing the Trigger, Activation mechanism, and Utility function, and implements a benchmark covering four trust-centric applications. Through extensive experiments across Llama3.1-8B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-7B, and Llama2-13B, we show that beneficial backdoors can achieve high controllability, tamper-resistance, and stealthiness while preserving clean-task performance. Our findings demonstrate new insights that backdoors need not be inherently malicious; when properly designed, they can serve as modular, interpretable, and beneficial building blocks for trustworthy AI systems. Our code and datasets are available at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM/B4G.

Speculative decoding (SD) addresses the high inference costs of LLMs by having lightweight drafters generate candidates for large verifiers to validate in parallel. Existing draft-verify methods use binary decisions: accept or fully recompute. Yet we find that many rejected tokens can be verified correctly by a slim submodel derived from the full verifier via intra-model routing, instead of the full verifier. This motivates our slim-verifier to handle tokens requiring moderate verification resources, reducing expensive large-model calls. We propose Verification via Intra-Model Routing for Speculative Decoding (VIA-SD), a multi-tier framework using a routed slim-verifier. Draft tokens are processed hierarchically: direct acceptance for high-confidence cases, slim-verifier regeneration for medium-confidence cases, and full-model verification for uncertain cases. Across four representative tasks and multiple model families, VIA-SD reduces rejection rates by 0.10-0.22 and delivers 10-20% speedups over strong SD baselines, while achieving 2.5-3x acceleration over non-drafting decoding. Moreover, VIA-SD is compatible with existing SD frameworks without modifying their training procedures. Our results suggest multi-tier SD as a general paradigm for scalable and efficient LLM inference. Project page: https://zju-xyc.github.io/VIA-SD-Project-Page/

Backdoor inversion, the process of finding a backdoor trigger inserted into a machine learning model, has become the pillar of many backdoor detection and defense methods. Previous works on backdoor inversion often recover the backdoor through an optimization process to flip a support set of clean images into the target class. However, it is rarely studied and understood how large this support set should be to recover a successful backdoor. In this work, we show that one can reliably recover the backdoor trigger with as few as a single image. Specifically, we propose the SmoothInv method, which first constructs a robust smoothed version of the backdoored classifier and then performs guided image synthesis towards the target class to reveal the backdoor pattern. SmoothInv requires neither an explicit modeling of the backdoor via a mask variable, nor any complex regularization schemes, which has become the standard practice in backdoor inversion methods. We perform both quantitaive and qualitative study on backdoored classifiers from previous published backdoor attacks. We demonstrate that compared to existing methods, SmoothInv is able to recover successful backdoors from single images, while maintaining high fidelity to the original backdoor. We also show how we identify the target backdoored class from the backdoored classifier. Last, we propose and analyze two countermeasures to our approach and show that SmoothInv remains robust in the face of an adaptive attacker. Our code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/smoothinv .

Trustworthy verifiers are essential for the success of reinforcement learning with verifiable reward (RLVR), which is the core methodology behind various large reasoning models such as DeepSeek-R1. In complex domains like mathematical reasoning, rule-based verifiers have been widely adopted in previous works to train strong reasoning models. However, the reliability of these verifiers and their impact on the RL training process remain poorly understood. In this work, we take mathematical reasoning as a case study and conduct a comprehensive analysis of various verifiers in both static evaluation and RL training scenarios. First, we find that current open-source rule-based verifiers often fail to recognize equivalent answers presented in different formats across multiple commonly used mathematical datasets, resulting in non-negligible false negative rates. This limitation adversely affects RL training performance and becomes more pronounced as the policy model gets stronger. Subsequently, we investigate model-based verifiers as a potential solution to address these limitations. While the static evaluation shows that model-based verifiers achieve significantly higher verification accuracy, further analysis and RL training results imply that they are highly susceptible to hacking, where they misclassify certain patterns in responses as correct (i.e., false positives). This vulnerability is exploited during policy model optimization, leading to artificially inflated rewards. Our findings underscore the unique risks inherent to both rule-based and model-based verifiers, aiming to offer valuable insights to develop more robust reward systems in reinforcement learning.

We present a novel defense, against backdoor attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), wherein adversaries covertly implant malicious behaviors (backdoors) into DNNs. Our defense falls within the category of post-development defenses that operate independently of how the model was generated. The proposed defense is built upon a novel reverse engineering approach that can directly extract backdoor functionality of a given backdoored model to a backdoor expert model. The approach is straightforward -- finetuning the backdoored model over a small set of intentionally mislabeled clean samples, such that it unlearns the normal functionality while still preserving the backdoor functionality, and thus resulting in a model (dubbed a backdoor expert model) that can only recognize backdoor inputs. Based on the extracted backdoor expert model, we show the feasibility of devising highly accurate backdoor input detectors that filter out the backdoor inputs during model inference. Further augmented by an ensemble strategy with a finetuned auxiliary model, our defense, BaDExpert (Backdoor Input Detection with Backdoor Expert), effectively mitigates 17 SOTA backdoor attacks while minimally impacting clean utility. The effectiveness of BaDExpert has been verified on multiple datasets (CIFAR10, GTSRB and ImageNet) across various model architectures (ResNet, VGG, MobileNetV2 and Vision Transformer).

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance their reasoning capabilities through feedback. A critical challenge is verifying the consistency of model-generated responses and reference answers, since these responses are often lengthy, diverse, and nuanced. Rule-based verifiers struggle with complexity, prompting the use of model-based verifiers. However, specialized verifiers lack flexibility, while general LLM judges can be inconsistent. Existing research primarily focuses on building better verifiers, yet a systematic evaluation of different types of verifiers' performance across domains remains lacking, severely constraining the reliable development of Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Reward (RLVR). To address this, we propose VerifyBench--a cross-domain comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating verifiers. We construct 4,000 expert-level questions covering mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology. Each question is equipped with reference answers and diverse responses. The reliability of the evaluation is ensured through a rigorous annotation process conducted by a multidisciplinary expert team. We design a four-dimensional experimental framework to comprehensively compare the performance boundaries of specialized verifiers and general LLMs under combined conditions of extracted answers vs. complete responses, and short vs. long outputs. Our evaluation uncovers fundamental trade-offs in verifiers: while specialized verifiers achieve leading accuracy, they exhibit deficiencies in recall; general models show stronger inclusivity but unstable precision. More importantly, we discover verifiers' high sensitivity to input structure and inherent limitations in cross-domain generalization, providing critical insights into the bottlenecks of current verifier technology.

Test-time scaling (TTS) has emerged as a new frontier for scaling the performance of Large Language Models. In test-time scaling, by using more computational resources during inference, LLMs can improve their reasoning process and task performance. Several approaches have emerged for TTS such as distilling reasoning traces from another model or exploring the vast decoding search space by employing a verifier. The verifiers serve as reward models that help score the candidate outputs from the decoding process to diligently explore the vast solution space and select the best outcome. This paradigm commonly termed has emerged as a superior approach owing to parameter free scaling at inference time and high performance gains. The verifiers could be prompt-based, fine-tuned as a discriminative or generative model to verify process paths, outcomes or both. Despite their widespread adoption, there is no detailed collection, clear categorization and discussion of diverse verification approaches and their training mechanisms. In this survey, we cover the diverse approaches in the literature and present a unified view of verifier training, types and their utility in test-time scaling. Our repository can be found at https://github.com/elixir-research-group/Verifierstesttimescaling.github.io.

Federated Language Model (FedLM) allows a collaborative learning without sharing raw data, yet it introduces a critical vulnerability, as every untrustworthy client may leak the received functional model instance. Current watermarking schemes for FedLM often require white-box access and client-side cooperation, providing only group-level proof of ownership rather than individual traceability. We propose EmbTracker, a server-side, traceable black-box watermarking framework specifically designed for FedLMs. EmbTracker achieves black-box verifiability by embedding a backdoor-based watermark detectable through simple API queries. Client-level traceability is realized by injecting unique identity-specific watermarks into the model distributed to each client. In this way, a leaked model can be attributed to a specific culprit, ensuring robustness even against non-cooperative participants. Extensive experiments on various language and vision-language models demonstrate that EmbTracker achieves robust traceability with verification rates near 100\%, high resilience against removal attacks (fine-tuning, pruning, quantization), and negligible impact on primary task performance (typically within 1-2\%).

Multi-domain thinking verifiers trained via Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) are a cornerstone of modern post-training. However, their adoption in code generation has lagged behind that of execution feedback due to the prohibitive costs of the full RLVR pipeline. In this work, we ablate three primary choices along the performance-cost trade-off in RLVR: intermediate thinking traces, learning from negative samples, and on-policy training. We introduce Aletheia, a controlled, execution-grounded testbed to facilitate a contamination-free analysis of code verifier training recipes across disparate model sizes and covariate shifts across two common verifier application scenarios. Our analysis reveals that the optimal training recipe is scale-dependent: on-policy learning is the primary performance driver for small verifiers, whereas the thinking budget becomes the most vital factor at larger scales. While leveraging negative samples has a consistent impact on top-1 selection accuracy across sizes, their contribution to ranking reconstruction increases monotonically with scale and plays a key role in stabilizing training at large sizes. Our Pareto optimality analysis demonstrates that eliminating on-policy training at larger model scales yields a verifier that performs comparably to the full RLVR recipe. Furthermore, we find that eschewing thinking traces serves as a compute-efficient strategy at lower budgets, offering a strong trade-off between training cost and verifier accuracy. Ultimately, our work provides the empirical foundation necessary to efficiently deploy robust code verifiers, thereby enabling their wider adoption in post-training pipelines for large code generation models.

We present DafnyPro, an inference-time framework that enhances LLMs for generating verification annotations in Dafny. DafnyPro comprises three key components: a diff-checker that prevents modifications to base program logic, a pruner that removes unnecessary invariants, and a hint-augmentation system that retrieves and applies predefined, problem-independent proof strategies. We evaluate DafnyPro using Claude Sonnet 3.5 and 3.7 on four benchmarks: Clover, MBPP-Dafny, HumanEval-Dafny, and DafnyBench, achieving consistent performance gains in all cases. Notably, on DafnyBench, the most challenging benchmark, Claude Sonnet 3.5 enhanced with DafnyPro achieves 86% correct proofs, a 16 pp improvement over the base model. We also fine-tune two Qwen models on training data derived from verification attempts by larger models enhanced with DafnyPro. Our 7B and 14B models achieve 68% and 70% correct proofs on DafnyBench, respectively, demonstrating that smaller models can maintain high verification accuracy.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has enabled strong post-training gains in domains such as math and coding, though many open-ended settings rely on rubric-based rewards. We study reward hacking in rubric-based RL, where a policy is optimized against a training verifier but evaluated against a cross-family panel of three frontier judges, reducing dependence on any single evaluator. Our framework separates two sources of divergence: verifier failure, where the training verifier credits rubric criteria that reference verifiers reject, and rubric-design limitations, where even strong rubric-based verifiers favor responses that rubric-free judges rate worse overall. Across medical and science domains, weak verifiers produce large proxy-reward gains that do not transfer to the reference verifiers; exploitation grows over training and concentrates in recurring failures such as partial satisfaction of compound criteria, treating implicit content as explicit, and imprecise topical matching. Stronger verifiers substantially reduce, but do not eliminate, verifier exploitation. We also introduce a self-internalization gap, a verifier-free diagnostic based on policy log-probabilities, which tracks reference-verifier quality, detecting when the policy trained using the weak verifier stops improving. Finally, in our setting, stronger verification does not prevent reward hacking when the rubric leaves important failure modes unspecified: rubric-based verifiers prefer the RL checkpoint, while rubric-free judges prefer the base model. These disagreements coincide with gains concentrated in completeness and presence-based criteria, alongside declines in factual correctness, conciseness, relevance, and overall quality. Together, these results suggest that stronger verification reduces reward hacking, but does not by itself ensure that rubric gains correspond to broader quality gains.

In recent years, many neural network (NN) verifiers have been developed to formally verify certain properties of neural networks such as robustness. Although many benchmarks have been constructed to evaluate the performance of NN verifiers, they typically lack a ground-truth for hard instances where no current verifier can verify and no counterexample can be found, which makes it difficult to check the soundness of a new verifier if it claims to verify hard instances which no other verifier can do. We propose to develop a soundness benchmark for NN verification. Our benchmark contains instances with deliberately inserted counterexamples while we also try to hide the counterexamples from regular adversarial attacks which can be used for finding counterexamples. We design a training method to produce neural networks with such hidden counterexamples. Our benchmark aims to be used for testing the soundness of NN verifiers and identifying falsely claimed verifiability when it is known that hidden counterexamples exist. We systematically construct our benchmark and generate instances across diverse model architectures, activation functions, input sizes, and perturbation radii. We demonstrate that our benchmark successfully identifies bugs in state-of-the-art NN verifiers, as well as synthetic bugs, providing a crucial step toward enhancing the reliability of testing NN verifiers. Our code is available at https://github.com/MVP-Harry/SoundnessBench and our benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/SoundnessBench/SoundnessBench.

The widespread adoption of deep neural networks (DNNs) requires efficient techniques for verifying their safety. DNN verifiers are complex tools, which might contain bugs that could compromise their soundness and undermine the reliability of the verification process. This concern can be mitigated using proofs: artifacts that are checkable by an external and reliable proof checker, and which attest to the correctness of the verification process. However, such proofs tend to be extremely large, limiting their use in many scenarios. In this work, we address this problem by minimizing proofs of unsatisfiability produced by DNN verifiers. We present algorithms that remove facts which were learned during the verification process, but which are unnecessary for the proof itself. Conceptually, our method analyzes the dependencies among facts used to deduce UNSAT, and removes facts that did not contribute. We then further minimize the proof by eliminating remaining unnecessary dependencies, using two alternative procedures. We implemented our algorithms on top of a proof producing DNN verifier, and evaluated them across several benchmarks. Our results show that our best-performing algorithm reduces proof size by 37%-82% and proof checking time by 30%-88%, while introducing a runtime overhead of 7%-20% to the verification process itself.

As demand for LLM inference grows, it is becoming increasingly important that providers and their customers can verify that inference processes are performed correctly, without errors or tampering. However, re-running the same inference process twice often leads to different results due to benign numerical noise, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate variation from actual problems. To address this problem, we introduce Token-DiFR (Token-Divergence-From-Reference), a method for verifying inference outputs by comparing generated tokens against predictions made by a trusted reference implementation conditioned on the same random seed. Sampling seed synchronization tightly constrains valid outputs, leaving providers minimal room to deviate from correct inference, which allows output tokens themselves to serve as auditable evidence of correctness at zero additional cost to the provider. Token-DiFR reliably identifies sampling errors, simulated bugs, and model quantization, detecting 4-bit quantization with AUC > 0.999 within 300 output tokens. For applications requiring sample-efficient forward-pass verification, we additionally introduce Activation-DiFR, a scheme that uses random orthogonal projections to compress activations into compact fingerprints for subsequent verification. Activation-DiFR detects 4-bit quantization with AUC > 0.999 using just 2 output tokens, while reducing communication overhead by 25-75% relative to existing methods. We release an open-source integration with vLLM to accelerate practical deployment of verifiable inference.

A rule-based logic solver resolves every instance in our benchmark in under 50 microseconds with 100% accuracy; the best frontier language model reaches 65% at best and drops to 23.5% under rendering-robust evaluation (worst case over four surface renderings). We introduce DeFAb (Defeasible Abduction Benchmark), a dataset and generation pipeline that converts four decades of publicly funded knowledge bases into formally grounded instances for defeasible abduction: constructing hypotheses that explain anomalies by overriding defaults while preserving unrelated expectations. Because every hypothesis must pass polynomial-time checks for valid derivation, conservativity, and minimality, DeFAb makes logical rigor the instrument for measuring creativity and theoretical reasoning, scoring the disciplined construction of theory revisions rather than fluent but theory-destroying prose. The pipeline pairs taxonomic hierarchies (OpenCyc, YAGO, Wikidata) with behavioral property graphs (ConceptNet, UMLS) to produce 372,648+ instances across 33.75M materialized rules from 18 sources, in three levels with polynomial-time verifiable gold standards. Four frontier models do not reliably internalize defeasible reasoning: rendering-robust Level 2 accuracy is 7.8-23.5%; chain-of-thought variance (~36 pp) exceeds any inter-model gap; and a matched contamination control isolates a +19.4 pp Level 3 gap. We further release DeFAb-Hard (a 235-instance Level 3 difficulty variant; best model 53.3% vs 100% symbolic) and CONJURE (a kernel-verified transformative-creativity variant of 560 Lean 4/Mathlib instances whose gold answers are definitions the proof kernel did not previously contain, judge-free verifier; a pilot finds zero novel concepts). The same verifier doubles as an exact reward for preference optimization (DPO, RLVR/GRPO). Released under MIT at https://huggingface.co/datasets/PatrickAllenCooper/DeFAb.

Code verifiers play a critical role in post-verification for LLM-based code generation, yet existing supervised fine-tuning methods suffer from data scarcity, high failure rates, and poor inference efficiency. While reinforcement learning (RL) offers a promising alternative by optimizing models through execution-driven rewards without labeled supervision, our preliminary results show that naive RL with only functionality rewards fails to generate effective unit tests for difficult branches and samples. We first theoretically analyze showing that branch coverage, sample difficulty, syntactic and functional correctness can be jointly modeled as RL rewards, where optimizing these signals can improve the reliability of unit-test-based verification. Guided by this analysis, we design syntax- and functionality-aware rewards and further propose branch- and sample-difficulty--aware RL using exponential reward shaping and static analysis metrics. With this formulation, CVeDRL achieves state-of-the-art performance with only 0.6B parameters, yielding up to 28.97% higher pass rate and 15.08% higher branch coverage than GPT-3.5, while delivering over 20times faster inference than competitive baselines. Code is available at https://github.com/LIGHTCHASER1/CVeDRL.git

Recent advances have shown that scaling test-time computation enables large language models (LLMs) to solve increasingly complex problems across diverse domains. One effective paradigm for test-time scaling (TTS) involves LLM generators producing multiple solution candidates, with LLM verifiers assessing the correctness of these candidates without reference answers. In this paper, we study generative verifiers, which perform verification by generating chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning followed by a binary verdict. We systematically analyze verification dynamics across three dimensions - problem difficulty, generator capability, and verifier generation capability - with empirical studies on 12 benchmarks across mathematical reasoning, knowledge, and natural language reasoning tasks using 14 open-source models (2B to 72B parameter range) and GPT-4o. Our experiments reveal three key findings about verification effectiveness: (1) Easy problems allow verifiers to more reliably certify correct responses; (2) Weak generators produce errors that are easier to detect than strong generators; (3) Verification ability is generally correlated with the verifier's own problem-solving capability, but this relationship varies with problem difficulty. These findings reveal opportunities to optimize basic verification strategies in TTS applications. First, given the same verifier, some weak generators can nearly match stronger ones in post-verification TTS performance (e.g., the Gemma2-9B to Gemma2-27B performance gap shrinks by 75.5%). Second, we identify cases where strong verifiers offer limited advantage over weak ones, as both fail to provide meaningful verification gains, suggesting that verifier scaling alone cannot overcome fundamental verification challenges.

Answer verification methods are widely employed in language model training pipelines spanning data curation, evaluation, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). While prior work focus on developing unified verifiers applicable across multiple reasoning scenarios, significant challenges remain in computation-oriented scientific domains, such as algebraic equivalence checking and physical constant substitution. In this paper, we introduce \model, a tool-augmented verifier that leverages external executors to perform precise computations and symbolic simplifications. \model enables robust verification that goes beyond simple semantic matching. We propose a novel two-stage pipeline, which begin with cold-start fine-tuning and followed by multi-turn reinforcement learning with tool integration. Extensive experiments conducted on STEM subjects, general QA, and long-form reasoning tasks demonstrates strong generalization of \model. The results shows that the \model achieves state-of-the-art performance on VerifyBench-Hard and SCI-Bench. And we also employ our \model in RLVR as a reward model, the results show that it consistently outperforms both rubric-based and model-based verifiers on AIME'24 and AIME'25, demonstrating strong potential to enhance reasoning capabilities of LLM. Our model is released at https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B{https://huggingface.co/Nanbeige/CoSineVerifier-Tool-4B}.

Large language model (LLM)-based reasoning systems have recently achieved gold medal-level performance in the IMO 2025 competition, writing mathematical proofs where, to receive full credit, each step must be not only correct but also sufficiently supported. To train LLM-based reasoners in such challenging, open-ended settings, strong verifiers capable of catching step-level mistakes are necessary prerequisites. We introduce Hard2Verify, a human-annotated, step-level verification benchmark produced with over 500 hours of human labor. Hard2Verify is designed to rigorously assess step-level verifiers at the frontier: Verifiers must provide step-level annotations or identify the first error in responses generated by frontier LLMs for very recent, challenging, and open-ended math questions. We evaluate 29 generative critics and process reward models, demonstrating that, beyond a few standouts, open-source verifiers lag closed source models. We subsequently analyze what drives poor performance in step-level verification, the impacts of scaling verifier compute, as well as fundamental questions such as self-verification and verification-generation dynamics.

The proliferation of face forgery techniques has raised significant concerns within society, thereby motivating the development of face forgery detection methods. These methods aim to distinguish forged faces from genuine ones and have proven effective in practical applications. However, this paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models and incorporating specific trigger patterns into the input, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. To achieve this goal, this paper proposes Poisoned Forgery Face framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors. Our approach involves constructing a scalable trigger generator and utilizing a novel convolving process to generate translation-sensitive trigger patterns. Moreover, we employ a relative embedding method based on landmark-based regions to enhance the stealthiness of the poisoned samples. Consequently, detectors trained on our poisoned samples are embedded with backdoors. Notably, our approach surpasses SoTA backdoor baselines with a significant improvement in attack success rate (+16.39\% BD-AUC) and reduction in visibility (-12.65\% L_infty). Furthermore, our attack exhibits promising performance against backdoor defenses. We anticipate that this paper will draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks in face forgery detection scenarios. Our codes will be made available at https://github.com/JWLiang007/PFF

Mathematical verfier achieves success in mathematical reasoning tasks by validating the correctness of solutions. However, existing verifiers are trained with binary classification labels, which are not informative enough for the model to accurately assess the solutions. To mitigate the aforementioned insufficiency of binary labels, we introduce step-wise natural language feedbacks as rationale labels (i.e., the correctness of the current step and the explanations). In this paper, we propose Math-Minos, a natural language feedback enhanced verifier by constructing automatically-generated training data and a two-stage training paradigm for effective training and efficient inference. Our experiments reveal that a small set (30k) of natural language feedbacks can significantly boost the performance of the verifier by the accuracy of 1.6\% (86.6\% rightarrow 88.2\%) on GSM8K and 0.8\% (37.8\% rightarrow 38.6\%) on MATH. We have released our code and data for further exploration.

Test-time reinforcement learning (TTRL) has emerged as a promising paradigm for self-evolving large reasoning models (LRMs), enabling online adaptation on unlabeled test inputs via self-induced rewards through majority voting. However, a spurious yet high-frequency unverified consensus can become a biased and reinforced reward signal, leading to incorrect mode collapse. We address this failure mode with T^3RL (Tool-Verification for Test-Time Reinforcement Learning), which introduces test-time tool verification into reward estimation. Concretely, a verifier uses an external tool as evidence (e.g., from code execution) to upweight verified rollouts in a verification-aware voting, producing more reliable pseudo-labels for training. Across various math difficulties (MATH-500, AMC, and AIME 2024) and diverse backbone types, T^3RL significantly improves over TTRL, with larger gains on harder problems. More broadly, T^3RL can be viewed as verified online data synthesis, highlighting test-time tool verification as a key mechanism for stabilizing self-evolution.

Despite substantial advances in scaling test-time compute, an ongoing debate in the community is how it should be scaled up to enable continued and efficient improvements with scaling. There are largely two approaches: first, distilling successful search or thinking traces; and second, using verification (e.g., 0/1 outcome rewards, reward models, or verifiers) to guide reinforcement learning (RL) and search algorithms. In this paper, we prove that finetuning LLMs with verifier-based (VB) methods based on RL or search is far superior to verifier-free (VF) approaches based on distilling or cloning search traces, given a fixed amount of compute/data budget. Further, we show that as we scale test-time compute (measured as the output token length) and training data, suboptimality of VF methods scales poorly compared to VB when the base pre-trained LLM presents a heterogeneous distribution over correct solution traces (e.g., different lengths, styles, etc.) and admits a non-sharp distribution over rewards on traces sampled from it. We formalize this condition using anti-concentration [Erdos, 1945]. This implies a stronger result that VB methods scale better asymptotically, with the performance gap between VB and VF methods widening as test-time budget grows. We corroborate our theory empirically on both didactic and math reasoning problems with 3/8/32B-sized pre-trained LLMs, where we find verification is crucial for scaling test-time compute.

Despite significant advancements in the general capability of large language models (LLMs), they continue to struggle with consistent and accurate reasoning, especially in complex tasks such as mathematical and code reasoning. One key limitation is that LLMs are trained primarily on correct solutions, reducing their ability to detect and learn from errors, which hampers their ability to reliably verify and rank outputs. To address this, we scale up the inference-time computation by generating multiple reasoning paths and employing verifiers to assess and rank the generated outputs by correctness. To facilitate this, we introduce a comprehensive dataset consisting of correct and incorrect solutions for math and code tasks, generated by multiple LLMs. This diverse set of solutions enables verifiers to more effectively distinguish and rank correct answers from erroneous outputs. The training methods for building verifiers were selected based on an extensive comparison of existing approaches. Moreover, to leverage the unique strengths of different reasoning strategies, we propose a novel collaborative method integrating Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Program-of-Thought (PoT) solutions for verification. CoT provides a clear, step-by-step reasoning process that enhances interpretability, while PoT, being executable, offers a precise and error-sensitive validation mechanism. By taking both of their strengths, our approach significantly improves the accuracy and reliability of reasoning verification. Our verifiers, Math-Rev and Code-Rev, demonstrate substantial performance gains to existing LLMs, achieving state-of-the-art results on benchmarks such as GSM8k and MATH and even outperforming GPT-4o with Qwen-72B-Instruct as the reasoner.

Large language models can generate fluent answers that are unfaithful to the provided context, while many safeguards rely on external verification or a separate judge after generation. We introduce internal flow signatures that audit decision formation from depthwise dynamics at a fixed inter-block monitoring boundary. The method stabilizes token-wise motion via bias-centered monitoring, then summarizes trajectories in compact moving readout-aligned subspaces constructed from the top token and its close competitors within each depth window. Neighboring window frames are aligned by an orthogonal transport, yielding depth-comparable transported step lengths, turning angles, and subspace drift summaries that are invariant to within-window basis choices. A lightweight GRU validator trained on these signatures performs self-checking without modifying the base model. Beyond detection, the validator localizes a culprit depth event and enables a targeted refinement: the model rolls back to the culprit token and clamps an abnormal transported step at the identified block while preserving the orthogonal residual. The resulting pipeline provides actionable localization and low-overhead self-checking from internal decision dynamics. Code is available at github.com/EavnJeong/Internal-Flow-Signatures-for-Self-Checking-and-Refinement-in-LLMs.

Post-hoc explainability methods typically associate each output score of a deep neural network with an input-space direction, most commonly instantiated as the gradient and visualized as a saliency map. However, these approaches often yield explanations that are noisy, lack perceptual alignment and, thus, offer limited interpretability. While many explanation methods attempt to address this issue via modified backward rules or additional heuristics, such approaches are often difficult to justify theoretically and frequently fail basic sanity checks. We introduce Semantic Pullbacks (SP), a faithful and effective post-hoc explanation method for deep neural networks. Semantic Pullbacks address the limitations above by isolating the network's effective linear action via a principled pullback formulation and refining it to recover coherent local structures learned by the target neuron. As a result, SP produces perceptually aligned, class-conditional explanations that highlight meaningful features, support compelling counterfactual perturbations, and admit a clear theoretical motivation. Across standard faithfulness benchmarks, Semantic Pullbacks significantly outperform established attribution methods on both classical convolutional architectures (ResNet50, VGG) and transformer-based models (PVT), while remaining general and computationally efficient. Our method can be easily plugged into existing deep learning pipelines and extended to other modalities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate strong capabilities for solving scientific and mathematical problems, yet they struggle to produce valid, challenging, and novel problems - an essential component for advancing LLM training and enabling autonomous scientific research. Existing problem generation approaches either depend on expensive human expert involvement or adopt naive self-play paradigms, which frequently yield invalid problems due to reward hacking. This work introduces VHG, a verifier-enhanced hard problem generation framework built upon three-party self-play. By integrating an independent verifier into the conventional setter-solver duality, our design constrains the setter's reward to be jointly determined by problem validity (evaluated by the verifier) and difficulty (assessed by the solver). We instantiate two verifier variants: a Hard symbolic verifier and a Soft LLM-based verifier, with evaluations conducted on indefinite integral tasks and general mathematical reasoning tasks. Experimental results show that VHG substantially outperforms all baseline methods by a clear margin.

Verifiers have been demonstrated to enhance LLM reasoning via test-time scaling (TTS). Yet, they face significant challenges in complex domains. Error propagation from incorrect intermediate reasoning can lead to false positives for seemingly plausible solutions, while lacking external grounding makes verifiers unreliable on computation or knowledge-intensive tasks. To address these challenges, we propose Agentic Verifier, a framework that transforms reward modeling into a multi-turn, tool-augmented deliberative process. We introduce complementary forward and backward agents: one traces solutions from premises to conclusions, while the other re-checks conclusions against their underlying premises. This bidirectional process enables a comprehensive, reliable, and interpretable assessment of solutions. To facilitate practical deployment, we propose AgentV-RL. Through proactive exploration and reinforcement learning, the verifier autonomously interleaves tool-use with internal reasoning. Extensive experiments show that Agentic Verifier yields consistent performance gains under both parallel and sequential TTS. Notably, our 4B variant surpasses state-of-the-art ORMs by 25.2%, positioning it as a promising paradigm for agentic reward modeling.

Multi-path speculative decoding accelerates lossless sampling from a target model by using a cheaper draft model to generate a draft tree of tokens, and then applies a verification algorithm that accepts a subset of these. While prior work has proposed various verification algorithms for i.i.d rollouts, their relative performance under matched settings remains unclear. In this work, we firstly present a systematic evaluation of verification strategies across model families, tasks, and sampling regimes, and find that Traversal Verification dominates consistently, with OT-based methods lagging far behind. Our analysis uncovers that this occurs because OT-based methods achieve high multi-token acceptance near the root of the draft tree, while multi-token gains are most impactful deeper in the draft tree, where draft and target distributions diverge. Based on this insight, we propose delayed tree expansion, which drafts a partial single path, delaying the i.i.d. branching point. We show that delayed tree expansion preserves the target distribution and improves on root-node i.i.d rollouts. Further, we develop a dynamic neural selector that estimates the expected block efficiency of optimal-transport-based verification methods from draft and target features, enabling context-dependent expansion decisions. Our neural selector allows OT-based methods like SpecInfer to outperform Traversal Verification for the first time, achieving 5% higher average throughput across a wide range of models, datasets, and sampling settings.

Scaling pre-training, post-training, and test-time compute have become the central paradigms for improving the capabilities of LLMs. In this work, we identify verification, the ability to determine the correctness of a solution, as a new scaling axis. To unlock this and demonstrate its effectiveness, we introduce LLM-as-a-Verifier, a general-purpose verification framework that provides fine-grained feedback for agentic tasks without requiring additional training. Unlike standard LM judges that prompt LLMs to produce discrete scores for candidate solutions, LLM-as-a-Verifier computes the expectation over the distribution of scoring token logits to generate continuous scores. This probabilistic formulation enables verification to scale along multiple dimensions: (1) score granularity, (2) repeated evaluation, and (3) criteria decomposition. In particular, we show that scaling the scoring granularity leads to better separation between positive and negative solutions, resulting in more calibrated comparisons. Moreover, scaling repeated evaluation and criteria decomposition consistently lead to additional gains in verification accuracy through variance and complexity reduction. We further introduce a cost-efficient ranking algorithm for selecting the best solution among candidates using the verifier's continuous scores. LLM-as-a-Verifier achieves state-of-the-art performance on Terminal-Bench V2 (86.5%), SWE-Bench Verified (78.2%), RoboRewardBench (87.4%), and MedAgentBench (73.3%). Beyond verification, the fine-grained signals from LLM-as-a-Verifier can also serve as a proxy for estimating task progress. We build an extension for Claude Code, enabling developers to monitor and improve their own agentic systems. Finally, we show that LLM-as-a-Verifier can provide dense feedback for RL, improving the sample efficiency of SAC and GRPO on robotics and mathematical reasoning benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited impressive capabilities across a myriad of tasks, yet they occasionally yield undesirable outputs. We posit that these limitations are rooted in the foundational autoregressive architecture of LLMs, which inherently lacks mechanisms for differentiating between desirable and undesirable results. Drawing inspiration from the dual-process theory of human cognition, we introduce LLM2, a novel framework that combines an LLM (System 1) with a process-based verifier (System 2). Within LLM2, the LLM is responsible for generating plausible candidates, while the verifier provides timely process-based feedback to distinguish desirable and undesirable outputs. The verifier is trained with a pairwise comparison loss on synthetic process-supervision data generated through our token quality exploration strategy. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning benchmarks substantiate the efficacy of LLM2, exemplified by an accuracy enhancement from 50.3 to 57.8 (+7.5) for Llama3-1B on GSM8K. Furthermore, when combined with self-consistency, LLM2 achieves additional improvements, boosting major@20 accuracy from 56.2 to 70.2 (+14.0).

Recent Language Models (LMs) have shown impressive capabilities in generating texts with the knowledge internalized in parameters. Yet, LMs often generate the factually incorrect responses to the given queries, since their knowledge may be inaccurate, incomplete, and outdated. To address this problem, previous works propose to augment LMs with the knowledge retrieved from an external knowledge source. However, such approaches often show suboptimal text generation performance due to two reasons: 1) the model may fail to retrieve the knowledge relevant to the given query, or 2) the model may not faithfully reflect the retrieved knowledge in the generated text. To overcome these, we propose to verify the output and the knowledge of the knowledge-augmented LMs with a separate verifier, which is a small LM that is trained to detect those two types of errors through instruction-finetuning. Then, when the verifier recognizes an error, we can rectify it by either retrieving new knowledge or generating new text. Further, we use an ensemble of the outputs from different instructions with a single verifier to enhance the reliability of the verification processes. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed verification steps on multiple question answering benchmarks, whose results show that the proposed verifier effectively identifies retrieval and generation errors, allowing LMs to provide more factually correct outputs. Our code is available at https://github.com/JinheonBaek/KALMV.

Test-time scaling is a powerful strategy for boosting the performance of large language models on complex reasoning tasks. While state-of-the-art approaches often employ generative verifiers to select the best solution from a pool of candidates, this method incurs prohibitive computational costs, limiting its practicality. In this work, we shift the focus to a more budget-aware paradigm: discriminative verification. We conduct a thorough empirical analysis and demonstrate that while discriminative verifiers may underperform in isolation, combining them with self-consistency in a hybrid approach creates a powerful and efficient test-time scaling mechanism. Notably, under a fixed compute budget, this hybrid approach surpasses state-of-the-art generative verification by a significant margin: achieving up to 15.3\% higher accuracy on AIME2025. Our findings establish that for practical, real-world applications, budget-aware scaling with discriminative verifiers is not only a "free" upgrade over self-consistency, but also a more effective and efficient alternative to costly generative techniques. Code is available at https://github.com/wang-research-lab/verification.

State-of-the-art neural network (NN) verifiers demonstrate that applying the branch-and-bound (BaB) procedure with fast bounding techniques plays a key role in tackling many challenging verification properties. In this work, we introduce the linear constraint-driven clipping framework, a class of scalable and efficient methods designed to enhance the efficacy of NN verifiers. Under this framework, we develop two novel algorithms that efficiently utilize linear constraints to 1) reduce portions of the input space that are either verified or irrelevant to a subproblem in the context of branch-and-bound, and 2) directly improve intermediate bounds throughout the network. The process novelly leverages linear constraints that often arise from bound propagation methods and is general enough to also incorporate constraints from other sources. It efficiently handles linear constraints using a specialized GPU procedure that can scale to large neural networks without the use of expensive external solvers. Our verification procedure, Clip-and-Verify, consistently tightens bounds across multiple benchmarks and can significantly reduce the number of subproblems handled during BaB. We show that our clipping algorithms can be integrated with BaB-based verifiers such as α,β-CROWN, utilizing either the split constraints in activation-space BaB or the output constraints that denote the unverified input space. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our procedure on a broad range of benchmarks where, in some instances, we witness a 96% reduction in the number of subproblems during branch-and-bound, and also achieve state-of-the-art verified accuracy across multiple benchmarks. Clip-and-Verify is part of the α,β-CROWN verifier (http://abcrown.org), the VNN-COMP 2025 winner. Code available at https://github.com/Verified-Intelligence/Clip_and_Verify.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have emerged as a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, representing a specialized class of large language models (LLMs) designed to tackle complex reasoning tasks. The defining characteristic of LRMs lies in their extensive chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. In this paper, we identify a previously unexplored attack vector against LRMs, which we term "overthinking backdoors". We advance this concept by proposing a novel tunable backdoor, which moves beyond simple on/off attacks to one where an attacker can precisely control the extent of the model's reasoning verbosity. Our attack is implemented through a novel data poisoning methodology. It pairs a tunable trigger-where the number of repetitions signals the desired intensity-with a correspondingly verbose CoT response. These responses are programmatically generated by instructing a teacher LLM to inject a controlled number of redundant refinement steps into a correct reasoning process. The approach preserves output correctness, which ensures stealth and establishes the attack as a pure resource-consumption vector. Extensive empirical results on various LRMs demonstrate that our method can reliably trigger a controllable, multi-fold increase in the length of the reasoning process, without degrading the final answer's correctness. Our source code is available at https://github.com/FZaKK/BadReasoner.

Large language models (LLMs) can act as both problem solvers and solution verifiers, where the latter select high-quality answers from a pool of solver-generated candidates. This raises the question of under what conditions verification pays off in solver-verifier systems. Prior work has conducted only limited studies of the factors influencing verification performance, focusing primarily on self-verification and examining neither the relationship between solver and verifier model families nor the effects of reasoning post-training. To rectify this, we present a systematic study across 37 models spanning multiple families, sizes, and base vs. post-trained variants, evaluated on 9 benchmarks covering logical reasoning, structured puzzles, symbolic computation, mathematics, commonsense, factual recall, and domain knowledge. In order to support our analysis, we introduce and empirically validate verifier gain, a metric that predicts the performance improvements from test-time verifier-based rejection sampling. Our experiments find that 1) verification across model families is more effective than either self-verification or verification within the same family, and more generally that the benefits of verification decrease as the solver and verifier become more similar, 2) reasoning post-training weakens self-improvement abilities but strengthens cross-family improvement, and 3) some tasks are inherently more amenable to improvement through verification, particularly mathematical and logical tasks.

Answer verification is crucial not only for evaluating large language models (LLMs) by matching their unstructured outputs against standard answers, but also serves as the reward model to guide LLM optimization. Most evaluation frameworks rely on regularized matching or employ general LLMs for answer verification, which demands extensive, repetitive customization for regex rules or evaluation prompts. Two fundamental limitations persist in current methodologies: 1) the absence of comprehensive benchmarks that systematically evaluate verification capabilities across different LLMs; and 2) the nascent stage of verifier development, where existing approaches lack both the robustness to handle complex edge cases and the generalizability across different domains. In this work, we develop CompassVerifier, an accurate and robust lightweight verifier model for evaluation and outcome reward. It demonstrates multi-domain competency spanning math, knowledge, and diverse reasoning tasks, with the capability to process various answer types, including multi-subproblems, formulas, and sequence answers, while effectively identifying abnormal/invalid responses. We introduce VerifierBench benchmark comprising model outputs collected from multiple data sources, augmented through manual analysis of metaerror patterns to enhance CompassVerifier. We anticipate that CompassVerifier and VerifierBench will facilitate answer verification, evaluation protocols, and reinforcement learning research. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/open-compass/CompassVerifier.

As reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has become the dominant paradigm for scaling reasoning capabilities in LLMs, a new failure mode emerges: LLMs gaming verifiers. We study this phenomenon on inductive reasoning tasks, where models must induce and output logical rules. We find that RLVR-trained models systematically abandon rule induction. Instead of learning generalizable patterns (e.g., ``trains carrying red cars go east''), they enumerate instance-level labels, producing outputs that pass verifiers without capturing the relational patterns required by the task. We show that this behavior is not a failure of understanding but a form of reward hacking: imperfect verifiers that check only extensional correctness admit false positives. To detect such shortcuts, we introduce Isomorphic Perturbation Testing (IPT), which evaluates a single model output under both extensional and isomorphic verification, where the latter enforces invariance under logically isomorphic tasks. While genuine rule induction remains invariant, shortcut strategies fail. We find that shortcut behavior is specific to RLVR-trained reasoning models (e.g., GPT-5, Olmo3) and absent in non-RLVR models (e.g., GPT-4o, GPT-4.5, Ministral). Moreover, shortcut prevalence increases with task complexity and inference-time compute. In controlled training experiments, extensional verification directly induces shortcut strategies, while isomorphic verification eliminates them. These results show that RLVR can incentivize reward hacking not only through overt manipulation but also by exploiting what the verifier fails to enforce.

By utilizing more computational resources at test-time, large language models (LLMs) can improve without additional training. One common strategy uses verifiers to evaluate candidate outputs. In this work, we propose a novel scaling dimension for test-time compute: scaling the number of verifiers. We introduce Multi-Agent Verification (MAV) as a test-time compute paradigm that combines multiple verifiers to improve performance. We propose using Aspect Verifiers (AVs), off-the-shelf LLMs prompted to verify different aspects of outputs, as one possible choice for the verifiers in a MAV system. AVs are a convenient building block for MAV since they can be easily combined without additional training. Moreover, we introduce BoN-MAV, a simple multi-agent verification algorithm that combines best-of-n sampling with multiple verifiers. BoN-MAV demonstrates stronger scaling patterns than self-consistency and reward model verification, and we demonstrate both weak-to-strong generalization, where combining weak verifiers improves even stronger LLMs, and self-improvement, where the same base model is used to both generate and verify outputs. Our results establish scaling the number of verifiers as a promising new dimension for improving language model performance at test-time.

Large language models (LLMs) continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, and common post-training pipelines often reduce each generated solution to a binary outcome: correct or incorrect. This perspective is limiting in practice, as failures in chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning are frequently structured; solutions may appear convincing while containing subtle logical, algebraic, or numerical flaws. Meanwhile, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) variants that rely on large reward models or LLM-as-a-judge signals are often expensive, difficult to scale, and unstable to iterate. We propose a lightweight and pragmatic post-training pipeline that targets such structured errors under realistic compute budgets. Starting from supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on MetaMathQA-style CoT data, we introduce a compact MathVerifier that decomposes a candidate solution into a six-dimensional error profile and aggregates it into interpretable wrongness and absurdity scores. These verifier signals serve two roles: (i) mining hard negatives that are near-correct yet structurally flawed, and (ii) defining per-sample importance weights that emphasize the most informative preference pairs. We integrate both into an offline Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) objective via a verifier-guided weighted formulation. Experiments on a 1.5B-parameter Qwen2.5 model show that verifier-guided, weighted DPO yields more targeted improvements than vanilla SFT and unweighted DPO, particularly on problems where solutions are numerically close to correct but logically inconsistent, while avoiding the overhead of training large reward models or relying on external judges.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate exceptional capability in tackling complex mathematical, logical, and coding tasks by leveraging extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. Test-time scaling methods, such as prolonging CoT with explicit token-level exploration, can push LRMs' accuracy boundaries, but they incur significant decoding overhead. A key inefficiency source is LRMs often generate redundant thinking CoTs, which demonstrate clear structured overthinking and underthinking patterns. Inspired by human cognitive reasoning processes and numerical optimization theories, we propose TrimR, a verifier-based, training-free, efficient framework for dynamic CoT compression to trim reasoning and enhance test-time scaling, explicitly tailored for production-level deployment. Our method employs a lightweight, pretrained, instruction-tuned verifier to detect and truncate redundant intermediate thoughts of LRMs without any LRM or verifier fine-tuning. We present both the core algorithm and asynchronous online system engineered for high-throughput industrial applications. Empirical evaluations on Ascend NPUs and vLLM show that our framework delivers substantial gains in inference efficiency under large-batch workloads. In particular, on the four MATH500, AIME24, AIME25, and GPQA benchmarks, the reasoning runtime of Pangu Pro MoE, Pangu-R-38B, QwQ-32B, and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B is improved by up to 70% with negligible impact on accuracy.

The releases of powerful open-weight large language models (LLMs) are often not accompanied by access to their full training data. Existing interpretability methods, particularly those based on activations, often require or assume distributionally similar data. This is a significant limitation when detecting and defending against novel potential threats like backdoors, which are by definition out-of-distribution. In this work, we introduce a new method for understanding, monitoring and controlling fine-tuned LLMs that interprets weights, rather than activations, thereby sidestepping the need for data that is distributionally similar to the unknown training data. We demonstrate that the top singular vectors of the weight difference between a fine-tuned model and its base model correspond to newly acquired behaviors. By monitoring the cosine similarity of activations along these directions, we can detect salient behaviors introduced during fine-tuning with high precision. For backdoored models that bypass safety mechanisms when a secret trigger is present, our method stops up to 100% of attacks with a false positive rate below 1%. For models that have undergone unlearning, we detect inference on erased topics with accuracy up to 95.42% and can even steer the model to recover "unlearned" information. Besides monitoring, our method also shows potential for pre-deployment model auditing: by analyzing commercial instruction-tuned models (OLMo, Llama, Qwen), we are able to uncover model-specific fine-tuning focus including mathematical problem solving, emoji usage, and Midjourney prompt generation.

Synthesizing inductive loop invariants is fundamental to automating program verification. In this work, we observe that Large Language Models (such as gpt-3.5 or gpt-4) are capable of synthesizing loop invariants for a class of programs in a 0-shot setting, yet require several samples to generate the correct invariants. This can lead to a large number of calls to a program verifier to establish an invariant. To address this issue, we propose a {\it re-ranking} approach for the generated results of LLMs. We have designed a ranker that can distinguish between correct inductive invariants and incorrect attempts based on the problem definition. The ranker is optimized as a contrastive ranker. Experimental results demonstrate that this re-ranking mechanism significantly improves the ranking of correct invariants among the generated candidates, leading to a notable reduction in the number of calls to a verifier.

Retrieval-enhanced methods have become a primary approach in fact verification (FV); it requires reasoning over multiple retrieved pieces of evidence to verify the integrity of a claim. To retrieve evidence, existing work often employs off-the-shelf retrieval models whose design is based on the probability ranking principle. We argue that, rather than relevance, for FV we need to focus on the utility that a claim verifier derives from the retrieved evidence. We introduce the feedback-based evidence retriever(FER) that optimizes the evidence retrieval process by incorporating feedback from the claim verifier. As a feedback signal we use the divergence in utility between how effectively the verifier utilizes the retrieved evidence and the ground-truth evidence to produce the final claim label. Empirical studies demonstrate the superiority of FER over prevailing baselines.

The recent paradigm shift towards training large language models (LLMs) using DeepSeek-R1-Zero-style reinforcement learning (RL) on verifiable rewards has led to impressive advancements in code and mathematical reasoning. However, this methodology is limited to tasks where rule-based answer verification is possible and does not naturally extend to real-world domains such as chemistry, healthcare, engineering, law, biology, business, and economics. Current practical workarounds use an additional LLM as a model-based verifier; however, this introduces issues such as reliance on a strong verifier LLM, susceptibility to reward hacking, and the practical burden of maintaining the verifier model in memory during training. To address this and extend DeepSeek-R1-Zero-style training to general reasoning domains, we propose a verifier-free method (VeriFree) that bypasses answer verification and instead uses RL to directly maximize the probability of generating the reference answer. We compare VeriFree with verifier-based methods and demonstrate that, in addition to its significant practical benefits and reduced compute requirements, VeriFree matches and even surpasses verifier-based methods on extensive evaluations across MMLU-Pro, GPQA, SuperGPQA, and math-related benchmarks. Moreover, we provide insights into this method from multiple perspectives: as an elegant integration of training both the policy and implicit verifier in a unified model, and as a variational optimization approach. Code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/VeriFree.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable potential in handling complex reasoning tasks by generating step-by-step rationales.Some methods have proven effective in boosting accuracy by introducing extra verifiers to assess these paths. However, existing verifiers, typically trained on binary-labeled reasoning paths, fail to fully utilize the relative merits of intermediate steps, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the feedback provided. To overcome this limitation, we propose Tree-based Preference Learning Verifier (Tree-PLV), a novel approach that constructs reasoning trees via a best-first search algorithm and collects step-level paired data for preference training. Compared to traditional binary classification, step-level preferences more finely capture the nuances between reasoning steps, allowing for a more precise evaluation of the complete reasoning path. We empirically evaluate Tree-PLV across a range of arithmetic and commonsense reasoning tasks, where it significantly outperforms existing benchmarks. For instance, Tree-PLV achieved substantial performance gains over the Mistral-7B self-consistency baseline on GSM8K (67.55% to 82.79%), MATH (17.00% to 26.80%), CSQA (68.14% to 72.97%), and StrategyQA (82.86% to 83.25%).Additionally, our study explores the appropriate granularity for applying preference learning, revealing that step-level guidance provides feedback that better aligns with the evaluation of the reasoning process.

Deep learning-based techniques have achieved state-of-the-art performance on a wide variety of recognition and classification tasks. However, these networks are typically computationally expensive to train, requiring weeks of computation on many GPUs; as a result, many users outsource the training procedure to the cloud or rely on pre-trained models that are then fine-tuned for a specific task. In this paper we show that outsourced training introduces new security risks: an adversary can create a maliciously trained network (a backdoored neural network, or a BadNet) that has state-of-the-art performance on the user's training and validation samples, but behaves badly on specific attacker-chosen inputs. We first explore the properties of BadNets in a toy example, by creating a backdoored handwritten digit classifier. Next, we demonstrate backdoors in a more realistic scenario by creating a U.S. street sign classifier that identifies stop signs as speed limits when a special sticker is added to the stop sign; we then show in addition that the backdoor in our US street sign detector can persist even if the network is later retrained for another task and cause a drop in accuracy of {25}\% on average when the backdoor trigger is present. These results demonstrate that backdoors in neural networks are both powerful and---because the behavior of neural networks is difficult to explicate---stealthy. This work provides motivation for further research into techniques for verifying and inspecting neural networks, just as we have developed tools for verifying and debugging software.

Recent advances in natural language processing and the increased use of large language models have exposed new security vulnerabilities, such as backdoor attacks. Previous backdoor attacks require input manipulation after model distribution to activate the backdoor, posing limitations in real-world applicability. Addressing this gap, we introduce a novel Claim-Guided Backdoor Attack (CGBA), which eliminates the need for such manipulations by utilizing inherent textual claims as triggers. CGBA leverages claim extraction, clustering, and targeted training to trick models to misbehave on targeted claims without affecting their performance on clean data. CGBA demonstrates its effectiveness and stealthiness across various datasets and models, significantly enhancing the feasibility of practical backdoor attacks. Our code and data will be available at https://github.com/PaperCGBA/CGBA.

The increasing sophistication of large vision-language models (LVLMs) has been accompanied by advances in safety alignment mechanisms designed to prevent harmful content generation. However, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated adversarial attacks. Existing jailbreak methods typically rely on direct and semantically explicit prompts, overlooking subtle vulnerabilities in how LVLMs compose information over multiple reasoning steps. In this paper, we propose a novel and effective jailbreak framework inspired by Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques from software security. Our approach decomposes a harmful instruction into a sequence of individually benign visual gadgets. A carefully engineered textual prompt directs the sequence of inputs, prompting the model to integrate the benign visual gadgets through its reasoning process to produce a coherent and harmful output. This makes the malicious intent emergent and difficult to detect from any single component. We validate our method through extensive experiments on established benchmarks including SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench, targeting popular LVLMs. Results show that our approach consistently and substantially outperforms existing baselines on state-of-the-art models, achieving near-perfect attack success rates (over 0.90 on SafeBench) and improving ASR by up to 0.39. Our findings reveal a critical and underexplored vulnerability that exploits the compositional reasoning abilities of LVLMs, highlighting the urgent need for defenses that secure the entire reasoning process.

Automated detection of vulnerabilities in source code is an essential cybersecurity challenge, underpinning trust in digital systems and services. Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have emerged as a promising approach as they can learn structural and logical code relationships in a data-driven manner. However, their performance is severely constrained by training data imbalances and label noise. GNNs often learn 'spurious' correlations from superficial code similarities, producing detectors that fail to generalize well to unseen real-world data. In this work, we propose a unified framework for robust and interpretable vulnerability detection, called VISION, to mitigate spurious correlations by systematically augmenting a counterfactual training dataset. Counterfactuals are samples with minimal semantic modifications but opposite labels. Our framework includes: (i) generating counterfactuals by prompting a Large Language Model (LLM); (ii) targeted GNN training on paired code examples with opposite labels; and (iii) graph-based interpretability to identify the crucial code statements relevant for vulnerability predictions while ignoring spurious ones. We find that VISION reduces spurious learning and enables more robust, generalizable detection, improving overall accuracy (from 51.8% to 97.8%), pairwise contrast accuracy (from 4.5% to 95.8%), and worst-group accuracy (from 0.7% to 85.5%) on the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)-20 vulnerability. We further demonstrate gains using proposed metrics: intra-class attribution variance, inter-class attribution distance, and node score dependency. We also release CWE-20-CFA, a benchmark of 27,556 functions (real and counterfactual) from the high-impact CWE-20 category. Finally, VISION advances transparent and trustworthy AI-based cybersecurity systems through interactive visualization for human-in-the-loop analysis.

We study inference-time pattern-memory gating in a production-scale clinical natural language processing (NLP) pipeline. The pipeline pairs a generator (Llama-3.3 70B) proposing extractions with a verifier (MMed-Llama-3.1 70B) accepting or rejecting them, over 167,034 PMC-Patients narratives, and adds a lightweight memory that learns at deployment which extractions to filter, so the verifier need not re-examine candidates already seen to fail. We report four findings. First, learning filtering rules directly from the verifier's rejections failed at full scale: the relation-extraction filter stayed empty despite 785,797 logged rejections, because they were spread too thinly across too many distinct forms to accumulate. Second, a simpler rule using a fixed clinical ontology produced the same filtering without the verifier, capturing 49,734 ontology-violating relations on a held-out 5,000-patient set. Third, of five versions of the question-answering filter, four failed for distinct, instructive reasons; the fifth succeeded by checking whether a patient's extracted entities support the question asked, and where it applies was 1.84 times likelier to flag an answer the verifier would reject than one it would accept. Fourth, one pattern held across all five: a filter is selective only when it tests the same evidence the verifier weighs, not when it imitates the verifier's output. Together these give a transferable result for any generator-verifier pipeline: the most natural memory design can fail silently at scale, and whether a pre-generation gate is selective is decided before any engineering effort, by whether its signal probes the question the verifier itself answers. Throughout, the system flags suspect extractions rather than deleting them, so every decision stays visible for clinical review. All code and test artefacts are released openly.

Backdoor attacks targeting text-to-image diffusion models have advanced rapidly. However, current backdoor samples often exhibit two key abnormalities compared to benign samples: 1) Semantic Consistency, where backdoor prompts tend to generate images with similar semantic content even with significant textual variations to the prompts; 2) Attention Consistency, where the trigger induces consistent structural responses in the cross-attention maps. These consistencies leave detectable traces for defenders, making backdoors easier to identify. In this paper, toward stealthy backdoor samples, we propose Trigger without Trace (TwT) by explicitly mitigating these consistencies. Specifically, our approach leverages syntactic structures as backdoor triggers to amplify the sensitivity to textual variations, effectively breaking down the semantic consistency. Besides, a regularization method based on Kernel Maximum Mean Discrepancy (KMMD) is proposed to align the distribution of cross-attention responses between backdoor and benign samples, thereby disrupting attention consistency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves a 97.5% attack success rate while exhibiting stronger resistance to defenses. It achieves an average of over 98% backdoor samples bypassing three state-of-the-art detection mechanisms, revealing the vulnerabilities of current backdoor defense methods. The code is available at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/TwT.

For nearly a decade the academic community has investigated backdoors in neural networks, primarily focusing on classification tasks where adversaries manipulate the model prediction. While demonstrably malicious, the immediate real-world impact of such prediction-altering attacks has remained unclear. In this paper we introduce a novel and significantly more potent class of backdoors that builds upon recent advancements in architectural backdoors. We demonstrate how these backdoors can be specifically engineered to exploit batched inference, a common technique for hardware utilization, enabling large-scale user data manipulation and theft. By targeting the batching process, these architectural backdoors facilitate information leakage between concurrent user requests and allow attackers to fully control model responses directed at other users within the same batch. In other words, an attacker who can change the model architecture can set and steal model inputs and outputs of other users within the same batch. We show that such attacks are not only feasible but also alarmingly effective, can be readily injected into prevalent model architectures, and represent a truly malicious threat to user privacy and system integrity. Critically, to counteract this new class of vulnerabilities, we propose a deterministic mitigation strategy that provides formal guarantees against this new attack vector, unlike prior work that relied on Large Language Models to find the backdoors. Our mitigation strategy employs a novel Information Flow Control mechanism that analyzes the model graph and proves non-interference between different user inputs within the same batch. Using our mitigation strategy we perform a large scale analysis of models hosted through Hugging Face and find over 200 models that introduce (unintended) information leakage between batch entries due to the use of dynamic quantization.

In LLM inference, the same prompt may yield different outputs across different runs. At the system level, this non-determinism arises from floating-point non-associativity combined with dynamic batching and GPU kernels whose reduction orders vary with batch size. A straightforward way to eliminate non-determinism is to disable dynamic batching during inference, but doing so severely degrades throughput. Another approach is to make kernels batch-invariant; however, this tightly couples determinism to kernel design, requiring new implementations. This coupling also imposes fixed runtime overheads, regardless of how much of the workload actually requires determinism. Inspired by ideas from speculative decoding, we present LLM-42, a scheduling-based approach to enable determinism in LLM inference. Our key observation is that if a sequence is in a consistent state, the next emitted token is likely to be consistent even with dynamic batching. Moreover, most GPU kernels use shape-consistent reductions. Leveraging these insights, LLM-42 decodes tokens using a non-deterministic fast path and enforces determinism via a lightweight verify-rollback loop. The verifier replays candidate tokens under a fixed-shape reduction schedule, commits those that are guaranteed to be consistent across runs, and rolls back those violating determinism. LLM-42 mostly re-uses existing kernels unchanged and incurs overhead only in proportion to the traffic that requires determinism.

The increasing use of generative models such as diffusion models for synthetic data augmentation has greatly reduced the cost of data collection and labeling in downstream perception tasks. However, this new data source paradigm may introduce important security concerns. Publicly available generative models are often reused without verification, raising a fundamental question of their safety and trustworthiness. This work investigates backdoor propagation in such emerging generative data supply chain, namely, Data-Chain Backdoor (DCB). Specifically, we find that open-source diffusion models can become hidden carriers of backdoors. Their strong distribution-fitting ability causes them to memorize and reproduce backdoor triggers in generation, which are subsequently inherited by downstream models, resulting in severe security risks. This threat is particularly concerning under clean-label attack scenarios, as it remains effective while having negligible impact on the utility of the synthetic data. We study two attacker choices to obtain a backdoor-carried generator, training from scratch and fine-tuning. While naive fine-tuning leads to weak inheritance of the backdoor, we find that novel designs in the loss objectives and trigger processing can substantially improve the generator's ability to preserve trigger patterns, making fine-tuning a low-cost attack path. We evaluate the effectiveness of DCB under the standard augmentation protocol and further assess data-scarce settings. Across multiple trigger types, we observe that the trigger pattern can be consistently retained in the synthetic data with attack efficacy comparable to the conventional backdoor attack.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Autonomous GUI agents face two fundamental challenges: early stopping, where agents prematurely declare success without verifiable evidence, and repetitive loops, where agents cycle through the same failing actions without recovery. We present VLAA-GUI, a modular GUI agentic framework built around three integrated components that guide the system on when to Stop, Recover, and Search. First, a mandatory Completeness Verifier enforces UI-observable success criteria and verification at every finish step -- with an agent-level verifier that cross-examines completion claims with decision rules, rejecting those lacking direct visual evidence. Second, a mandatory Loop Breaker provides multi-tier filtering: switching interaction mode after repeated failures, forcing strategy changes after persistent screen-state recurrence, and binding reflection signals to strategy shifts. Third, an on-demand Search Agent searches online for unfamiliar workflows by directly querying a capable LLM with search ability, returning results as plain text. We additionally integrate a Coding Agent for code-intensive actions and a Grounding Agent for precise action grounding, both invoked on demand when required. We evaluate VLAA-GUI across five top-tier backbones, including Opus 4.5, 4.6 and Gemini 3.1 Pro, on two benchmarks with Linux and Windows tasks, achieving top performance on both (77.5% on OSWorld and 61.0% on WindowsAgentArena). Notably, three of the five backbones surpass human performance (72.4%) on OSWorld in a single pass. Ablation studies show that all three proposed components consistently improve a strong backbone, while a weaker backbone benefits more from these tools when the step budget is sufficient. Further analysis also shows that the Loop Breaker nearly halves wasted steps for loop-prone models.

We introduce our Leanabell-Prover-V2, a 7B large language models (LLMs) that can produce formal theorem proofs in Lean 4, with verifier-integrated Long Chain-of-Thoughts (CoT). Following our previous work Leanabell-Prover-V1, we continual to choose to posttrain existing strong prover models for further performance improvement. In our V2 version, we mainly upgrade the Reinforcement Learning (RL) with feedback provided by the Lean 4 verifier. Crucially, verifier feedback, such as indicating success or detailing specific errors, allows the LLM to become ``self-aware'' of the correctness of its own reasoning process and learn to reflexively correct errors. Leanabell-Prover-V2 directly optimizes LLM reasoning trajectories with multi-turn verifier interactions, together with feedback token masking for stable RL training and a simple reward strategy. Experiments show that Leanabell-Prover-V2 improves performance by 3.2% (pass@128) with Kimina-Prover-Preview-Distill-7B and 2.0% (pass@128) with DeepSeek-Prover-V2-7B on the MiniF2F test set. The source codes, curated data and models are available at: https://github.com/Leanabell-LM/Leanabell-Prover-V2.

Tool-augmented LLM agents increasingly rely on multi-step, multi-tool workflows to complete real tasks. This design expands the attack surface, because data produced by one tool can be persisted and later reused as input to another tool, enabling exploitable source-to-sink dataflows that only emerge through tool composition. We study this risk as multi-tool vulnerabilities in LLM agents, and show that existing discovery efforts focused on single-tool or single-hop testing miss these long-horizon behaviors and provide limited debugging value. We present ChainFuzzer, a greybox framework for discovering and reproducing multi-tool vulnerabilities with auditable evidence. ChainFuzzer (i) identifies high-impact operations with strict source-to-sink dataflow evidence and extracts plausible upstream candidate tool chains based on cross-tool dependencies, (ii) uses Trace-guided Prompt Solving (TPS) to synthesize stable prompts that reliably drive the agent to execute target chains, and (iii) performs guardrail-aware fuzzing to reproduce vulnerabilities under LLM guardrails via payload mutation and sink-specific oracles. We evaluate ChainFuzzer on 20 popular open-source LLM agent apps (998 tools). ChainFuzzer extracts 2,388 candidate tool chains and synthesizes 2,213 stable prompts, confirming 365 unique, reproducible vulnerabilities across 19/20 apps (302 require multi-tool execution). Component evaluation shows tool-chain extraction achieves 96.49% edge precision and 91.50% strict chain precision; TPS increases chain reachability from 27.05% to 95.45%; guardrail-aware fuzzing boosts payload-level trigger rate from 18.20% to 88.60%. Overall, ChainFuzzer achieves 3.02 vulnerabilities per 1M tokens, providing a practical foundation for testing and hardening real-world multi-tool agent systems.

We describe a verification pipeline that takes production Rust cryptographic code and produces machine-checked correctness proofs in Lean 4. The pipeline combines three components: symbolic extraction tools (Charon and Aeneas, or Hax) that lift Rust into Lean 4; formal cryptographic specification libraries (ArkLib and CompPoly, from the Verified zkEVM project) that provide the mathematical targets; and AI provers (Aristotle from Harmonic AI and Aleph from Logical Intelligence) that close the resulting proof obligations. Every proof is checked by the Lean kernel, so AI output cannot compromise soundness. Within the scope of the Ethereum Foundation's zkEVM Verification Project, we applied the pipeline to cryptographic primitives in Plonky3 (FRI folding, Mersenne31 and KoalaBear field arithmetic, Horner polynomial evaluation) and RISC Zero (Merkle inclusion verification). In addition, Aleph authored proofs of two bounds-style theorems in Plonky3's compute_log_arity_for_round that previously stood as sorry. The paper describes the architecture, walks through a running example based on Aleph's two proofs, reports which classes of proof obligations AI closed and which required manual work, and discusses the engineering gaps we encountered: Lean 4 toolchain drift across tools and specific Aeneas/Hax extraction limits. We also document concrete missing lemmas, tactic gaps, and code-generation friction points discovered during proof development. We hope this contribution lowers the barrier to adoption of formal verification and facilitates more effective use of AI in this pipeline. The result is a working pipeline for formal verification of Rust, with kernel-checked proofs and reproducible artefacts.

Verifiers or reward models are often used to enhance the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs). A common approach is the Best-of-N method, where N candidate solutions generated by the LLM are ranked by a verifier, and the best one is selected. While LLM-based verifiers are typically trained as discriminative classifiers to score solutions, they do not utilize the text generation capabilities of pretrained LLMs. To overcome this limitation, we instead propose training verifiers using the ubiquitous next-token prediction objective, jointly on verification and solution generation. Compared to standard verifiers, such generative verifiers (GenRM) can benefit from several advantages of LLMs: they integrate seamlessly with instruction tuning, enable chain-of-thought reasoning, and can utilize additional inference-time compute via majority voting for better verification. We demonstrate that when using Gemma-based verifiers on algorithmic and grade-school math reasoning tasks, GenRM outperforms discriminative verifiers and LLM-as-a-Judge, showing a 16-64% improvement in the percentage of problems solved with Best-of-N. Furthermore, we show that GenRM scales favorably across dataset size, model capacity, and inference-time compute.

We show that LoRA adapters, the dominant distribution format for fine-tuned LLMs, can be reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy-preserving backdoor to saturation. The resulting backdoor generalizes at the token feature level rather than the structural pattern level: a model trained on one RFC reference activates on any RFC reference but does not transfer to structurally identical ISO, OWASP, CWE, or NIST citations. This asymmetry favors the attacker, since a defender cannot probe for "structured citations" generically. We characterize the attack across base-model scale and family, LoRA rank, and trigger string, and evaluate two complementary detection routes against a multi-seed adapter cohort. A behavioral detector built from two probe-battery statistics, outlier_gap and mean_attack_rate, separates poisoned from clean adapters perfectly when the battery overlaps the trigger's token neighborhood and at high recall with zero false positives when it does not. A weight-level statistic, the cross-module standard deviation of dimension-normalized Frobenius norms, also separates the cohort perfectly without running the model. Combined, the two routes are robust to probe composition. Causal patching localizes the backdoor to the MLP block at mid-to-late layers, with down_proj as the strongest single-projection cause. Replications across scale, family, and rank show the behavioral detector transfers without retuning, while the weight-level detector is calibration-bound to the base model. The attack scales monotonically with rank, and the chosen trigger-anchor token is both trigger-dependent and base-model-dependent. Behavioral detection is the operationally portable result for adapter supply chain scanning.

This report presents solutions to three machine learning challenges developed as part of the Rayan AI Contest: compositional image retrieval, zero-shot anomaly detection, and backdoored model detection. In compositional image retrieval, we developed a system that processes visual and textual inputs to retrieve relevant images, achieving 95.38% accuracy and ranking first with a clear margin over the second team. For zero-shot anomaly detection, we designed a model that identifies and localizes anomalies in images without prior exposure to abnormal examples, securing second place with a 73.14% score. In the backdoored model detection task, we proposed a method to detect hidden backdoor triggers in neural networks, reaching an accuracy of 78%, which placed our approach in second place. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of our methods in addressing key challenges related to retrieval, anomaly detection, and model security, with implications for real-world applications in industries such as healthcare, manufacturing, and cybersecurity. Code for all solutions is available online (https://github.com/safinal/rayan-ai-contest-solutions).

Recent reasoning-based safety guardrails for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as deliberative alignment, have shown strong defense against jailbreak attacks. By leveraging LRMs' reasoning ability, these guardrails help the models to assess the safety of user inputs before generating final responses. The powerful reasoning ability can analyze the intention of the input query and will refuse to assist once it detects the harmful intent hidden by the jailbreak methods. Such guardrails have shown a significant boost in defense, such as the near-perfect refusal rates on the open-source gpt-oss series. Unfortunately, we find that these powerful reasoning-based guardrails can be extremely vulnerable to subtle manipulation of the input prompts, and once hijacked, can lead to even more harmful results. Specifically, we first uncover a surprisingly fragile aspect of these guardrails: simply adding a few template tokens to the input prompt can successfully bypass the seemingly powerful guardrails and lead to explicit and harmful responses. To explore further, we introduce a bag of jailbreak methods that subvert the reasoning-based guardrails. Our attacks span white-, gray-, and black-box settings and range from effortless template manipulations to fully automated optimization. Along with the potential for scalable implementation, these methods also achieve alarmingly high attack success rates (e.g., exceeding 90% across 5 different benchmarks on gpt-oss series on both local host models and online API services). Evaluations across various leading open-source LRMs confirm that these vulnerabilities are systemic, underscoring the urgent need for stronger alignment techniques for open-sourced LRMs to prevent malicious misuse. Code is open-sourced at https://chenxshuo.github.io/bag-of-tricks.

Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.

Federated learning (FL) enables multiple parties to collaboratively train a machine learning model without sharing their data; rather, they train their own model locally and send updates to a central server for aggregation. Depending on how the data is distributed among the participants, FL can be classified into Horizontal (HFL) and Vertical (VFL). In VFL, the participants share the same set of training instances but only host a different and non-overlapping subset of the whole feature space. Whereas in HFL, each participant shares the same set of features while the training set is split into locally owned training data subsets. VFL is increasingly used in applications like financial fraud detection; nonetheless, very little work has analyzed its security. In this paper, we focus on robustness in VFL, in particular, on backdoor attacks, whereby an adversary attempts to manipulate the aggregate model during the training process to trigger misclassifications. Performing backdoor attacks in VFL is more challenging than in HFL, as the adversary i) does not have access to the labels during training and ii) cannot change the labels as she only has access to the feature embeddings. We present a first-of-its-kind clean-label backdoor attack in VFL, which consists of two phases: a label inference and a backdoor phase. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack on three different datasets, investigate the factors involved in its success, and discuss countermeasures to mitigate its impact.

Visual object tracking (VOT) has been widely adopted in mission-critical applications, such as autonomous driving and intelligent surveillance systems. In current practice, third-party resources such as datasets, backbone networks, and training platforms are frequently used to train high-performance VOT models. Whilst these resources bring certain convenience, they also introduce new security threats into VOT models. In this paper, we reveal such a threat where an adversary can easily implant hidden backdoors into VOT models by tempering with the training process. Specifically, we propose a simple yet effective few-shot backdoor attack (FSBA) that optimizes two losses alternately: 1) a feature loss defined in the hidden feature space, and 2) the standard tracking loss. We show that, once the backdoor is embedded into the target model by our FSBA, it can trick the model to lose track of specific objects even when the trigger only appears in one or a few frames. We examine our attack in both digital and physical-world settings and show that it can significantly degrade the performance of state-of-the-art VOT trackers. We also show that our attack is resistant to potential defenses, highlighting the vulnerability of VOT models to potential backdoor attacks.

We present OpenComputer, a verifier-grounded framework for constructing verifiable software worlds for computer-use agents. OpenComputer integrates four components: (1) app-specific state verifiers that expose structured inspection endpoints over real applications, (2) a self-evolving verification layer that improves verifier reliability using execution-grounded feedback, (3) a task-generation pipeline that synthesizes realistic and machine-checkable desktop tasks, and (4) an evaluation harness that records full trajectories and computes auditable partial-credit rewards. In its current form, OpenComputer covers 33 desktop applications and 1,000 finalized tasks spanning browsers, office tools, creative software, development environments, file managers, and communication applications. Experiments show that OpenComputer's hard-coded verifiers align more closely with human adjudication than LLM-as-judge evaluation, especially when success depends on fine-grained application state. Frontier agents struggle with end-to-end completion despite partial progress, and open-source models exhibit sharp drops from their OSWorld-Verified scores, exposing a persistent gap in robust computer automation.

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables different parties to train a model together for high quality and strong privacy protection. In this scenario, individual participants may get compromised and perform backdoor attacks by poisoning the data (or gradients). Existing work on robust aggregation and certified FL robustness does not study how hardening benign clients can affect the global model (and the malicious clients). In this work, we theoretically analyze the connection among cross-entropy loss, attack success rate, and clean accuracy in this setting. Moreover, we propose a trigger reverse engineering based defense and show that our method can achieve robustness improvement with guarantee (i.e., reducing the attack success rate) without affecting benign accuracy. We conduct comprehensive experiments across different datasets and attack settings. Our results on eight competing SOTA defense methods show the empirical superiority of our method on both single-shot and continuous FL backdoor attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/KaiyuanZh/FLIP.

In this paper, we present the first comprehensive empirical study of specialized LLM-based detectors and compare them with traditional static analyzers at the project scale. Specifically, our study evaluates five latest and representative LLM-based methods and two traditional tools using: 1) an in-house benchmark of 222 known real-world vulnerabilities (C/C++ and Java) to assess detection capability, and 2) 24 active open-source projects, where we manually inspected 385 warnings to assess their practical usability and underlying root causes of failures. Our evaluation yields three key findings: First, while LLM-based detectors exhibit low recall on the in-house benchmark, they still uncover more unique vulnerabilities than traditional tools. Second, in open-source projects, both LLM-based and traditional tools generate substantial warnings but suffer from very high false discovery rates, hindering practical use. Our manual analysis further reveals shallow interprocedural reasoning and misidentified source/sink pairs as primary failure causes, with LLM-based tools exhibiting additional unique failures. Finally, LLM-based methods incurs substantial computational costs-hundreds of thousands to hundreds of millions of tokens and multi-hour to multi-day runtimes. Overall, our findings underscore critical limitations in the robustness, reliability, and scalability of current LLM-based detectors. We ultimately summarize a set of implications for future research toward more effective and practical project-scale vulnerability detection.

Transferable backdoors pose a severe threat to the Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) supply chain, yet defensive research remains nascent, primarily relying on detecting anomalies in the output feature space. We identify a critical flaw that fine-tuning on downstream tasks inevitably modifies model parameters, shifting the output distribution and rendering pre-computed defense ineffective. To address this, we propose Patronus, a novel framework that use input-side invariance of triggers against parameter shifts. To overcome the convergence challenges of discrete text optimization, Patronus introduces a multi-trigger contrastive search algorithm that effectively bridges gradient-based optimization with contrastive learning objectives. Furthermore, we employ a dual-stage mitigation strategy combining real-time input monitoring with model purification via adversarial training. Extensive experiments across 15 PLMs and 10 tasks demonstrate that Patronus achieves geq98.7% backdoor detection recall and reduce attack success rates to clean settings, significantly outperforming all state-of-the-art baselines in all settings. Code is available at https://github.com/zth855/Patronus.

One way to increase confidence in the outputs of Large Language Models (LLMs) is to support them with reasoning that is clear and easy to check -- a property we call legibility. We study legibility in the context of solving grade-school math problems and show that optimizing chain-of-thought solutions only for answer correctness can make them less legible. To mitigate the loss in legibility, we propose a training algorithm inspired by Prover-Verifier Game from Anil et al. (2021). Our algorithm iteratively trains small verifiers to predict solution correctness, "helpful" provers to produce correct solutions that the verifier accepts, and "sneaky" provers to produce incorrect solutions that fool the verifier. We find that the helpful prover's accuracy and the verifier's robustness to adversarial attacks increase over the course of training. Furthermore, we show that legibility training transfers to time-constrained humans tasked with verifying solution correctness. Over course of LLM training human accuracy increases when checking the helpful prover's solutions, and decreases when checking the sneaky prover's solutions. Hence, training for checkability by small verifiers is a plausible technique for increasing output legibility. Our results suggest legibility training against small verifiers as a practical avenue for increasing legibility of large LLMs to humans, and thus could help with alignment of superhuman models.

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their deployment often involves fine-tuning to enhance performance on specific downstream tasks. However, this customization is sometimes accompanied by misleading claims about the origins, raising significant concerns about transparency and trust within the open-source community. Existing model verification techniques typically assess functional, representational, and weight similarities. However, these approaches often struggle against obfuscation techniques, such as permutations and scaling transformations. To address this limitation, we propose a novel detection method Origin-Tracer that rigorously determines whether a model has been fine-tuned from a specified base model. This method includes the ability to extract the LoRA rank utilized during the fine-tuning process, providing a more robust verification framework. This framework is the first to provide a formalized approach specifically aimed at pinpointing the sources of model fine-tuning. We empirically validated our method on thirty-one diverse open-source models under conditions that simulate real-world obfuscation scenarios. We empirically analyze the effectiveness of our framework and finally, discuss its limitations. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and indicate its potential to establish new benchmarks for model verification.

As backdoor attacks become more stealthy and robust, they reveal critical weaknesses in current defense strategies: detection methods often rely on coarse-grained feature statistics, and purification methods typically require full retraining or additional clean models. To address these challenges, we propose DUP (Detection-guided Unlearning for Purification), a unified framework that integrates backdoor detection with unlearning-based purification. The detector captures feature-level anomalies by jointly leveraging class-agnostic distances and inter-layer transitions. These deviations are integrated through a weighted scheme to identify poisoned inputs, enabling more fine-grained analysis. Based on the detection results, we purify the model through a parameter-efficient unlearning mechanism that avoids full retraining and does not require any external clean model. Specifically, we innovatively repurpose knowledge distillation to guide the student model toward increasing its output divergence from the teacher on detected poisoned samples, effectively forcing it to unlearn the backdoor behavior. Extensive experiments across diverse attack methods and language model architectures demonstrate that DUP achieves superior defense performance in detection accuracy and purification efficacy. Our code is available at https://github.com/ManHu2025/DUP.

Verification is crucial for effective mathematical reasoning. We present a new temporal consistency method where verifiers iteratively refine their judgments based on the previous assessment. Unlike one-round verification or multi-model debate approaches, our method leverages consistency in a sequence of self-reflection actions to improve verification accuracy. Empirical evaluations across diverse mathematical process error identification benchmarks (Mathcheck, ProcessBench, and PRM800K) show consistent performance improvements over baseline methods. When applied to the recent DeepSeek R1 distilled models, our method demonstrates strong performance, enabling 7B/8B distilled models to outperform all 70B/72B models and GPT-4o on ProcessBench. Notably, the distilled 14B model with our method achieves performance comparable to Deepseek-R1. Our codes are available at https://github.com/jcguo123/Temporal-Consistency

Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning for complex tasks inherently involves a trade-off between solution accuracy and computational efficiency. The subsequent step of verification, while intended to improve performance, further complicates this landscape by introducing its own challenging trade-off: sophisticated Generative Reward Models (GenRMs) can be computationally prohibitive if naively integrated with LLMs at test-time, while simpler, faster methods may lack reliability. To overcome these challenges, we introduce FlexiVe, a novel generative verifier that flexibly balances computational resources between rapid, reliable fast thinking and meticulous slow thinking using a Flexible Allocation of Verification Budget strategy. We further propose the Solve-Detect-Verify pipeline, an efficient inference-time scaling framework that intelligently integrates FlexiVe, proactively identifying solution completion points to trigger targeted verification and provide focused solver feedback. Experiments show FlexiVe achieves superior accuracy in pinpointing errors within reasoning traces on ProcessBench. Furthermore, on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks (AIME 2024, AIME 2025, and CNMO), our full approach outperforms baselines like self-consistency in reasoning accuracy and inference efficiency. Our system offers a scalable and effective solution to enhance LLM reasoning at test time.

Verifiers play a crucial role in large language model (LLM) reasoning, needed by post-training techniques such as reinforcement learning. However, reliable verifiers are hard to get for difficult coding problems, because a well-disguised wrong solution may only be detected by carefully human-written edge cases that are difficult to synthesize. To address this issue, we propose HARDTESTGEN, a pipeline for high-quality test synthesis using LLMs. With this pipeline, we curate a comprehensive competitive programming dataset HARDTESTS with 47k problems and synthetic high-quality tests. Compared with existing tests, HARDTESTGEN tests demonstrate precision that is 11.3 percentage points higher and recall that is 17.5 percentage points higher when evaluating LLM-generated code. For harder problems, the improvement in precision can be as large as 40 points. HARDTESTS also proves to be more effective for model training, measured by downstream code generation performance. We will open-source our dataset and synthesis pipeline at https://leililab.github.io/HardTests/.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become a key technique for enhancing large language models (LLMs), with verification engineering playing a central role. However, best practices for RL in instruction following remain underexplored. In this work, we explore the verification challenge in RL for instruction following and propose VerIF, a verification method that combines rule-based code verification with LLM-based verification from a large reasoning model (e.g., QwQ-32B). To support this approach, we construct a high-quality instruction-following dataset, VerInstruct, containing approximately 22,000 instances with associated verification signals. We apply RL training with VerIF to two models, achieving significant improvements across several representative instruction-following benchmarks. The trained models reach state-of-the-art performance among models of comparable size and generalize well to unseen constraints. We further observe that their general capabilities remain unaffected, suggesting that RL with VerIF can be integrated into existing RL recipes to enhance overall model performance. We have released our datasets, codes, and models to facilitate future research at https://github.com/THU-KEG/VerIF.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

Decision-based adversarial attacks construct inputs that fool a machine-learning model into making targeted mispredictions by making only hard-label queries. For the most part, these attacks have been applied directly to isolated neural network models. However, in practice, machine learning models are just a component of a much larger system. By adding just a single preprocessor in front of a classifier, we find that state-of-the-art query-based attacks are as much as seven times less effective at attacking a prediction pipeline than attacking the machine learning model alone. Hence, attacks that are unaware of this invariance inevitably waste a large number of queries to re-discover or overcome it. We, therefore, develop techniques to first reverse-engineer the preprocessor and then use this extracted information to attack the end-to-end system. Our extraction method requires only a few hundred queries to learn the preprocessors used by most publicly available model pipelines, and our preprocessor-aware attacks recover the same efficacy as just attacking the model alone. The code can be found at https://github.com/google-research/preprocessor-aware-black-box-attack.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently emerged as a compelling approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), where an LLM generator serves as a policy guided by a verifier (reward model). However, current RL post-training methods for LLMs typically use verifiers that are fixed (rule-based or frozen pretrained) or trained discriminatively via supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Such designs are susceptible to reward hacking and generalize poorly beyond their training distributions. To overcome these limitations, we propose Tango, a novel framework that uses RL to concurrently train both an LLM generator and a verifier in an interleaved manner. A central innovation of Tango is its generative, process-level LLM verifier, which is trained via RL and co-evolves with the generator. Importantly, the verifier is trained solely based on outcome-level verification correctness rewards without requiring explicit process-level annotations. This generative RL-trained verifier exhibits improved robustness and superior generalization compared to deterministic or SFT-trained verifiers, fostering effective mutual reinforcement with the generator. Extensive experiments demonstrate that both components of Tango achieve state-of-the-art results among 7B/8B-scale models: the generator attains best-in-class performance across five competition-level math benchmarks and four challenging out-of-domain reasoning tasks, while the verifier leads on the ProcessBench dataset. Remarkably, both components exhibit particularly substantial improvements on the most difficult mathematical reasoning problems. Code is at: https://github.com/kaiwenzha/rl-tango.

In this paper we present TruFor, a forensic framework that can be applied to a large variety of image manipulation methods, from classic cheapfakes to more recent manipulations based on deep learning. We rely on the extraction of both high-level and low-level traces through a transformer-based fusion architecture that combines the RGB image and a learned noise-sensitive fingerprint. The latter learns to embed the artifacts related to the camera internal and external processing by training only on real data in a self-supervised manner. Forgeries are detected as deviations from the expected regular pattern that characterizes each pristine image. Looking for anomalies makes the approach able to robustly detect a variety of local manipulations, ensuring generalization. In addition to a pixel-level localization map and a whole-image integrity score, our approach outputs a reliability map that highlights areas where localization predictions may be error-prone. This is particularly important in forensic applications in order to reduce false alarms and allow for a large scale analysis. Extensive experiments on several datasets show that our method is able to reliably detect and localize both cheapfakes and deepfakes manipulations outperforming state-of-the-art works. Code is publicly available at https://grip-unina.github.io/TruFor/

The growing dependence on machine learning in real-world applications emphasizes the importance of understanding and ensuring its safety. Backdoor attacks pose a significant security risk due to their stealthy nature and potentially serious consequences. Such attacks involve embedding triggers within a learning model with the intention of causing malicious behavior when an active trigger is present while maintaining regular functionality without it. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of any backdoor attack incorporating a constant trigger, by establishing tight lower and upper boundaries for the performance of the compromised model on both clean and backdoor test data. The developed theory answers a series of fundamental but previously underexplored problems, including (1) what are the determining factors for a backdoor attack's success, (2) what is the direction of the most effective backdoor attack, and (3) when will a human-imperceptible trigger succeed. Our derived understanding applies to both discriminative and generative models. We also demonstrate the theory by conducting experiments using benchmark datasets and state-of-the-art backdoor attack scenarios.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) achieve strong performance by generating long reasoning traces with reflection. Through a large-scale empirical analysis, we find that a substantial fraction of reflective steps consist of self-verification (recheck) that repeatedly confirm intermediate results. These rechecks occur frequently across models and benchmarks, yet the vast majority are confirmatory rather than corrective, rarely identifying errors and altering reasoning outcomes. This reveals a mismatch between how often self-verification is activated and how often it is actually useful. Motivated by this, we propose a novel, experience-driven test-time framework that reduces the overused verification. Our method detects the activation of recheck behavior, consults an offline experience pool of past verification outcomes, and estimates whether a recheck is likely unnecessary via efficient retrieval. When historical experience suggests unnecessary, a suppression signal redirects the model to proceed. Across multiple model and benchmarks, our approach reduces token usage up to 20.3% while maintaining the accuracy, and in some datasets even yields accuracy improvements.

Program verifiers play a central role in training coding agents, including selecting trajectories for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and providing rewards for reinforcement learning (RL). Standard execution-based verification requires running unit tests inside per-repository environments such as Docker images, incurring substantial environment setup costs. We propose Dockerless, an environment-free agentic patch verifier that evaluates generated code patches without executing them. Rather than simply matching candidate patches to references, Dockerless judges patch correctness using evidence gathered through agentic repository exploration. On a verifier evaluation benchmark, Dockerless outperforms the strongest open-source verifier by 14.3 AUC points. Using Dockerless as both the SFT trajectory filter and the RL reward enables a fully environment-free post-training pipeline. The resulting model reaches 62.0%, 50.0%, and 35.2% resolve rate on SWE-bench Verified, Multilingual, and Pro, respectively. It surpasses the Qwen3.5-9B baseline by 2.4, 8.7, and 2.9 points, matching environment-based post-training.

Time series classification (TSC) is a cornerstone of modern web applications, powering tasks such as financial data analysis, network traffic monitoring, and user behavior analysis. In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have greatly enhanced the performance of TSC models in these critical domains. However, DNNs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers can covertly implant triggers into models to induce malicious outcomes. Existing backdoor attacks targeting DNN-based TSC models remain elementary. In particular, early methods borrow trigger designs from computer vision, which are ineffective for time series data. More recent approaches utilize generative models for trigger generation, but at the cost of significant computational complexity. In this work, we analyze the limitations of existing attacks and introduce an enhanced method, FreqBack. Drawing inspiration from the fact that DNN models inherently capture frequency domain features in time series data, we identify that improper perturbations in the frequency domain are the root cause of ineffective attacks. To address this, we propose to generate triggers both effectively and efficiently, guided by frequency analysis. FreqBack exhibits substantial performance across five models and eight datasets, achieving an impressive attack success rate of over 90%, while maintaining less than a 3% drop in model accuracy on clean data.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Early backdoor attacks against machine learning set off an arms race in attack and defence development. Defences have since appeared demonstrating some ability to detect backdoors in models or even remove them. These defences work by inspecting the training data, the model, or the integrity of the training procedure. In this work, we show that backdoors can be added during compilation, circumventing any safeguards in the data preparation and model training stages. The attacker can not only insert existing weight-based backdoors during compilation, but also a new class of weight-independent backdoors, such as ImpNet. These backdoors are impossible to detect during the training or data preparation processes, because they are not yet present. Next, we demonstrate that some backdoors, including ImpNet, can only be reliably detected at the stage where they are inserted and removing them anywhere else presents a significant challenge. We conclude that ML model security requires assurance of provenance along the entire technical pipeline, including the data, model architecture, compiler, and hardware specification.

Standardized datasets and benchmarks have spurred innovations in computer vision, natural language processing, multi-modal and tabular settings. We note that, as compared to other well researched fields, fraud detection has unique challenges: high-class imbalance, diverse feature types, frequently changing fraud patterns, and adversarial nature of the problem. Due to these, the modeling approaches evaluated on datasets from other research fields may not work well for the fraud detection. In this paper, we introduce Fraud Dataset Benchmark (FDB), a compilation of publicly available datasets catered to fraud detection FDB comprises variety of fraud related tasks, ranging from identifying fraudulent card-not-present transactions, detecting bot attacks, classifying malicious URLs, estimating risk of loan default to content moderation. The Python based library for FDB provides a consistent API for data loading with standardized training and testing splits. We demonstrate several applications of FDB that are of broad interest for fraud detection, including feature engineering, comparison of supervised learning algorithms, label noise removal, class-imbalance treatment and semi-supervised learning. We hope that FDB provides a common playground for researchers and practitioners in the fraud detection domain to develop robust and customized machine learning techniques targeting various fraud use cases.

Supervised fine-tuning has become the predominant method for adapting large pretrained models to downstream tasks. However, recent studies have revealed that these models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where even a small number of malicious samples can successfully embed backdoor triggers into the model. While most existing defense methods focus on post-training backdoor defense, efficiently defending against backdoor attacks during training phase remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, we propose a novel defense method called Backdoor Token Unlearning (BTU), which proactively detects and neutralizes trigger tokens during the training stage. Our work is based on two key findings: 1) backdoor learning causes distinctive differences between backdoor token parameters and clean token parameters in word embedding layers, and 2) the success of backdoor attacks heavily depends on backdoor token parameters. The BTU defense leverages these properties to identify aberrant embedding parameters and subsequently removes backdoor behaviors using a fine-grained unlearning technique. Extensive evaluations across three datasets and four types of backdoor attacks demonstrate that BTU effectively defends against these threats while preserving the model's performance on primary tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/XDJPH/BTU.

In recent years, Diffusion Models (DMs) have demonstrated significant advances in the field of image generation. However, according to current research, DMs are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, which allow attackers to control the model's output by inputting data containing covert triggers, such as a specific patch or phrase. Existing defense strategies are well equipped to thwart such attacks through backdoor detection and trigger inversion because previous attack methods are constrained by limited input spaces and triggers defined by low-dimensional features. To bridge these gaps, we propose Gungnir, a novel method that enables attackers to activate the backdoor in DMs through hidden style triggers within input images. Our approach proposes using stylistic features as triggers for the first time and implements backdoor attacks successfully in image2image tasks by utilizing Reconstructing-Adversarial Noise (RAN) and Short-Term-Timesteps-Retention (STTR) of DMs. Meanwhile, experiments demonstrate that our method can easily bypass existing defense methods. Among existing DM main backdoor defense frameworks, our approach achieves a 0\% backdoor detection rate (BDR). Our codes are available at https://github.com/paoche11/Gungnir.

Cascades are a classical strategy to enable inference cost to vary adaptively across samples, wherein a sequence of classifiers are invoked in turn. A deferral rule determines whether to invoke the next classifier in the sequence, or to terminate prediction. One simple deferral rule employs the confidence of the current classifier, e.g., based on the maximum predicted softmax probability. Despite being oblivious to the structure of the cascade -- e.g., not modelling the errors of downstream models -- such confidence-based deferral often works remarkably well in practice. In this paper, we seek to better understand the conditions under which confidence-based deferral may fail, and when alternate deferral strategies can perform better. We first present a theoretical characterisation of the optimal deferral rule, which precisely characterises settings under which confidence-based deferral may suffer. We then study post-hoc deferral mechanisms, and demonstrate they can significantly improve upon confidence-based deferral in settings where (i) downstream models are specialists that only work well on a subset of inputs, (ii) samples are subject to label noise, and (iii) there is distribution shift between the train and test set.

The proliferation of generative AI poses challenges for information integrity assurance, requiring systems that connect model governance with end-user verification. We present Origin Lens, a privacy-first mobile framework that targets visual disinformation through a layered verification architecture. Unlike server-side detection systems, Origin Lens performs cryptographic image provenance verification and AI detection locally on the device via a Rust/Flutter hybrid architecture. Our system integrates multiple signals - including cryptographic provenance, generative model fingerprints, and optional retrieval-augmented verification - to provide users with graded confidence indicators at the point of consumption. We discuss the framework's alignment with regulatory requirements (EU AI Act, DSA) and its role in verification infrastructure that complements platform-level mechanisms.

We introduce behavioral fidelity -- a third evaluation dimension for synthetic tabular data that measures whether generated data preserves the temporal, sequential, and structural behavioral patterns that distinguish real-world entity activity. Existing frameworks evaluate statistical fidelity (marginal distributions and correlations) and downstream utility (classifier AUROC on synthetic-trained models), but neither tests for the behavioral signals that operational detection and analysis systems actually rely on. We formalize a taxonomy of four behavioral fraud patterns (P1-P4) covering inter-event timing, burst structure, multi-account graph motifs, and velocity-rule trigger rates; define a degradation ratio metric calibrated to a real-data noise floor (1.0 = matches real variability, k = k-times worse); and prove that row-independent generators -- the dominant paradigm -- are structurally incapable of reproducing P3 graph motifs (Proposition 1) and produce non-positive within-entity IET autocorrelation (Proposition 2), making the positive burst fingerprint of fraud sequences unachievable regardless of architecture or training data size. We benchmark CTGAN, TVAE, GaussianCopula, and TabularARGN on IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection and the Amazon Fraud Dataset. All four fail severely: on IEEE-CIS composite degradation ratios range from 24.4x (TVAE) to 39.0x (GaussianCopula); on Amazon FDB, row-independent generators score 81.6-99.7x, while TabularARGN achieves 17.2x. We document generator-specific failure modes and their resolutions. The P1-P4 framework extends to any domain with entity-level sequential tabular data, including healthcare and network security. We release our evaluation framework as open source.

Backdoor (Trojan) attack is a common threat to deep neural networks, where samples from one or more source classes embedded with a backdoor trigger will be misclassified to adversarial target classes. Existing methods for detecting whether a classifier is backdoor attacked are mostly designed for attacks with a single adversarial target (e.g., all-to-one attack). To the best of our knowledge, without supervision, no existing methods can effectively address the more general X2X attack with an arbitrary number of source classes, each paired with an arbitrary target class. In this paper, we propose UMD, the first Unsupervised Model Detection method that effectively detects X2X backdoor attacks via a joint inference of the adversarial (source, target) class pairs. In particular, we first define a novel transferability statistic to measure and select a subset of putative backdoor class pairs based on a proposed clustering approach. Then, these selected class pairs are jointly assessed based on an aggregation of their reverse-engineered trigger size for detection inference, using a robust and unsupervised anomaly detector we proposed. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and Imagenette dataset, and show that our unsupervised UMD outperforms SOTA detectors (even with supervision) by 17%, 4%, and 8%, respectively, in terms of the detection accuracy against diverse X2X attacks. We also show the strong detection performance of UMD against several strong adaptive attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in proving formal theorems using proof assistants such as Lean. However, existing methods are difficult to reproduce or build on, due to private code, data, and large compute requirements. This has created substantial barriers to research on machine learning methods for theorem proving. This paper removes these barriers by introducing LeanDojo: an open-source Lean playground consisting of toolkits, data, models, and benchmarks. LeanDojo extracts data from Lean and enables interaction with the proof environment programmatically. It contains fine-grained annotations of premises in proofs, providing valuable data for premise selection: a key bottleneck in theorem proving. Using this data, we develop ReProver (Retrieval-Augmented Prover): the first LLM-based prover that is augmented with retrieval for selecting premises from a vast math library. It is inexpensive and needs only one GPU week of training. Our retriever leverages LeanDojo's program analysis capability to identify accessible premises and hard negative examples, which makes retrieval much more effective. Furthermore, we construct a new benchmark consisting of 96,962 theorems and proofs extracted from Lean's math library. It features challenging data split requiring the prover to generalize to theorems relying on novel premises that are never used in training. We use this benchmark for training and evaluation, and experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of ReProver over non-retrieval baselines and GPT-4. We thus provide the first set of open-source LLM-based theorem provers without any proprietary datasets and release it under a permissive MIT license to facilitate further research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as powerful tools, but their inherent safety risks - ranging from harmful content generation to broader societal harms - pose significant challenges. These risks can be amplified by the recent adversarial attacks, fine-tuning vulnerabilities, and the increasing deployment of LLMs in high-stakes environments. Existing safety-enhancing techniques, such as fine-tuning with human feedback or adversarial training, are still vulnerable as they address specific threats and often fail to generalize across unseen attacks, or require manual system-level defenses. This paper introduces RepBend, a novel approach that fundamentally disrupts the representations underlying harmful behaviors in LLMs, offering a scalable solution to enhance (potentially inherent) safety. RepBend brings the idea of activation steering - simple vector arithmetic for steering model's behavior during inference - to loss-based fine-tuning. Through extensive evaluation, RepBend achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming prior methods such as Circuit Breaker, RMU, and NPO, with up to 95% reduction in attack success rates across diverse jailbreak benchmarks, all with negligible reduction in model usability and general capabilities.

Improving open-source models on real-world SWE tasks (solving GITHUB issues) faces two key challenges: 1) scalable curation of execution environments to train these models, and, 2) optimal scaling of test-time compute. We introduce AgentGym, the largest procedurally-curated executable gym environment for training real-world SWE-agents, consisting of more than 8.7K tasks. AgentGym is powered by two main contributions: 1) SYNGEN: a synthetic data curation recipe that enables scalable curation of executable environments using test-generation and back-translation directly from commits, thereby reducing reliance on human-written issues or unit tests. We show that this enables more scalable training leading to pass@1 performance of 34.4% on SWE-Bench Verified benchmark with our 32B model. 2) Hybrid Test-time Scaling: we provide an in-depth analysis of two test-time scaling axes; execution-based and execution-free verifiers, demonstrating that they exhibit complementary strengths and limitations. Test-based verifiers suffer from low distinguishability, while execution-free verifiers are biased and often rely on stylistic features. Surprisingly, we find that while each approach individually saturates around 42-43%, significantly higher gains can be obtained by leveraging their complementary strengths. Overall, our approach achieves 51% on the SWE-Bench Verified benchmark, reflecting a new state-of-the-art for open-weight SWE-agents and for the first time showing competitive performance with proprietary models such as o1, o1-preview and sonnet-3.5-v2 (with tools). We will open-source our environments, models, and agent trajectories.

Commercial LLM services often conceal internal reasoning traces while still charging users for every generated token, including those from hidden intermediate steps, raising concerns of token inflation and potential overbilling. This gap underscores the urgent need for reliable token auditing, yet achieving it is far from straightforward: cryptographic verification (e.g., hash-based signature) offers little assurance when providers control the entire execution pipeline, while user-side prediction struggles with the inherent variance of reasoning LLMs, where token usage fluctuates across domains and prompt styles. To bridge this gap, we present PALACE (Predictive Auditing of LLM APIs via Reasoning Token Count Estimation), a user-side framework that estimates hidden reasoning token counts from prompt-answer pairs without access to internal traces. PALACE introduces a GRPO-augmented adaptation module with a lightweight domain router, enabling dynamic calibration across diverse reasoning tasks and mitigating variance in token usage patterns. Experiments on math, coding, medical, and general reasoning benchmarks show that PALACE achieves low relative error and strong prediction accuracy, supporting both fine-grained cost auditing and inflation detection. Taken together, PALACE represents an important first step toward standardized predictive auditing, offering a practical path to greater transparency, accountability, and user trust.

Agent benchmarks score submissions with outcome verifiers that are typically hand-written and brittle, leaving them open to reward hacking. We audit 1,968 tasks across five terminal-agent benchmarks and find 323 (16%) hackable by frontier models given only the task description. This corrupts both leaderboard rankings and RL training signal, yet the standard response is manual and reactive. We introduce the hacker-fixer loop, a method for building exploit-resistant verifiers without per-task manual patching. The loop alternates three LLM agents: a hacker tries to pass the verifier without solving the task, a fixer patches the verifier to reject each discovered exploit, and a solver confirms the patched verifier still admits legitimate solutions. The loop iterates: each patch reshapes what the verifier rewards, surfacing the next exploit. We further add verifier access, and let patches transfer across tasks, to broaden the exploits the loop discovers. On KernelBench, the loop drives the attack success rate from 62% to 0% on a held-out corpus of publicly reported exploits. We also find that weaker agents in the loop can defend against much stronger hackers: Gemini 3 Flash's loop drives the stronger Gemini 3.1 Pro and Claude Opus 4.7's attack success rate from 76% and 61% to 0% on KernelBench, and Gemini 3.1 Pro's from 39% to 17% on Terminal Bench across 77 tasks. We release Terminal Wrench (323 hackable environments, 3,632 hack trajectories) as a snapshot of the current attack surface, our patched verifiers, the exploits the loop discovered, and our implementation as a basis for future work.

Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct information from private training data by exploiting access to machine learning models T. To evaluate such attacks, the standard evaluation framework relies on an evaluation model E, trained under the same task design as T. This framework has become the de facto standard for assessing progress in MI research, used across nearly all recent MI studies without question. In this paper, we present the first in-depth study of this evaluation framework. In particular, we identify a critical issue of this standard framework: Type-I adversarial examples. These are reconstructions that do not capture the visual features of private training data, yet are still deemed successful by T and ultimately transferable to E. Such false positives undermine the reliability of the standard MI evaluation framework. To address this issue, we introduce a new MI evaluation framework that replaces the evaluation model E with advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). By leveraging their general-purpose visual understanding, our MLLM-based framework does not depend on training of shared task design as in T, thus reducing Type-I transferability and providing more faithful assessments of reconstruction success. Using our MLLM-based evaluation framework, we reevaluate 27 diverse MI attack setups and empirically reveal consistently high false positive rates under the standard evaluation framework. Importantly, we demonstrate that many state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI methods report inflated attack accuracy, indicating that actual privacy leakage is significantly lower than previously believed. By uncovering this critical issue and proposing a robust solution, our work enables a reassessment of progress in MI research and sets a new standard for reliable and robust evaluation. Code can be found in https://github.com/hosytuyen/MI-Eval-MLLM

Open benchmarks are essential for evaluating and advancing large language models, offering reproducibility and transparency. However, their accessibility makes them likely targets of test set contamination. In this work, we introduce DyePack, a framework that leverages backdoor attacks to identify models that used benchmark test sets during training, without requiring access to the loss, logits, or any internal details of the model. Like how banks mix dye packs with their money to mark robbers, DyePack mixes backdoor samples with the test data to flag models that trained on it. We propose a principled design incorporating multiple backdoors with stochastic targets, enabling exact false positive rate (FPR) computation when flagging every model. This provably prevents false accusations while providing strong evidence for every detected case of contamination. We evaluate DyePack on five models across three datasets, covering both multiple-choice and open-ended generation tasks. For multiple-choice questions, it successfully detects all contaminated models with guaranteed FPRs as low as 0.000073% on MMLU-Pro and 0.000017% on Big-Bench-Hard using eight backdoors. For open-ended generation tasks, it generalizes well and identifies all contaminated models on Alpaca with a guaranteed false positive rate of just 0.127% using six backdoors.

A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one. For today's coding agents, this intuition is being inverted: as foundation models develop stronger reasoning capabilities and engineering harnesses grow more sophisticated, generating complex candidate solutions is no longer difficult -- reliably verifying them has become the harder problem. Every verifier we can build is only a proxy for human intent, never the intent itself. This makes verification subject to a twofold difficulty: first, intent is underspecified by nature, making it inherently hard to faithfully check whether it has been fulfilled; second, during model training, optimization widens the gap between proxy and intent -- manifesting as reward hacking or signal saturation. To address this, we characterize the quality of verification signals along three dimensions -- scalability, faithfulness, and robustness -- and argue that achieving all three simultaneously is the central challenge. We further study four reward constructions: a test verifier for general coding tasks, a rubric verifier for frontend tasks, the user as verifier for real-world agent tasks, and an automated agent verifier for long-horizon tasks. Across different task types and policy capability levels, we conduct in-depth analysis and experiments on the core challenges of reward design and how to more effectively leverage reward signals. Experiments show that targeted verification design can effectively suppress reward hacking, improve task completion quality, and achieve significant gains across multiple internal and public benchmarks. These experiences collectively point to a core observation: no fixed reward function can remain effective as policy capability continues to grow; and verification must co-evolve with the generator.

Fact verification is essential for ensuring the reliability of LLM applications. In this study, we evaluate 12 pre-trained LLMs and one specialized fact-verifier, including frontier LLMs and open-weight reasoning LLMs, using a collection of examples from 14 fact-checking benchmarks. We share three findings intended to guide future development of more robust fact verifiers. First, we highlight the importance of addressing annotation errors and ambiguity in datasets, demonstrating that approximately 16\% of ambiguous or incorrectly labeled data substantially influences model rankings. Neglecting this issue may result in misleading conclusions during comparative evaluations, and we suggest using a systematic pipeline utilizing LLM-as-a-judge to help identify these issues at scale. Second, we discover that frontier LLMs with few-shot in-context examples, often overlooked in previous works, achieve top-tier performance. We therefore recommend future studies include comparisons with these simple yet highly effective baselines. Lastly, despite their effectiveness, frontier LLMs incur substantial costs, motivating the development of small, fine-tuned fact verifiers. We show that these small models still have room for improvement, particularly on instances that require complex reasoning. Encouragingly, we demonstrate that augmenting training with synthetic multi-hop reasoning data significantly enhances their capabilities in such instances. We release our code, model, and dataset at https://github.com/just1nseo/verifying-the-verifiers

Modern machine learning models are sensitive to the manipulation of both the training data (poisoning attacks) and inference data (adversarial examples). Recognizing this issue, the community has developed many empirical defenses against both attacks and, more recently, certification methods with provable guarantees against inference-time attacks. However, such guarantees are still largely lacking for training-time attacks. In this work, we present FullCert, the first end-to-end certifier with sound, deterministic bounds, which proves robustness against both training-time and inference-time attacks. We first bound all possible perturbations an adversary can make to the training data under the considered threat model. Using these constraints, we bound the perturbations' influence on the model's parameters. Finally, we bound the impact of these parameter changes on the model's prediction, resulting in joint robustness guarantees against poisoning and adversarial examples. To facilitate this novel certification paradigm, we combine our theoretical work with a new open-source library BoundFlow, which enables model training on bounded datasets. We experimentally demonstrate FullCert's feasibility on two datasets.

Autoformalization, translating natural-language mathematics into formal proof assistants, is bottlenecked not by translation fluency but by faithfulness: a formal statement can typecheck and be provable, yet still encode a different theorem than the source intended. We introduce Bidirectional Provability Fingerprinting (), a framework that certifies faithfulness by characterizing each candidate through its forward and backward consequence neighborhoods in the ambient theory and matching these against probes derived from the natural-language statement. We further introduce four novel components: (i) Counterfactual Probe Generation (), a contrastive procedure that synthesizes probes targeting specific drift directions; (ii) the Equivalence Spectrum, a continuous faithfulness score that replaces brittle binary verdicts; (iii) Adaptive Probe Budget Allocation (), an information-theoretic budget router; and (iv) Faithfulness-Guided Decoding (), which uses signals as a reward during autoformalization. We prove a drift detection theorem and a PAC-faithfulness result establishing that the equivalence class of a natural language statement is learnable from O(log(1/δ)/varepsilon) probes under mild assumptions. We release , a benchmark of 2{,}183 NL/Lean~4 pairs with controlled drift labels across six subfields of mathlib4. \,+\, detects 89.6% of drifted formalizations at a 3.0% false-positive rate-against 41.2% for typecheck and 63.3% for LLM-judge baselines, and reduces the rate at which a state-of-the-art autoformalizer emits drifted statements by 47%. https://pmlrbd.github.io/BPF/

The vulnerability of Vision Large Language Models (VLLMs) to jailbreak attacks appears as no surprise. However, recent defense mechanisms against these attacks have reached near-saturation performance on benchmark evaluations, often with minimal effort. This dual high performance in both attack and defense raises a fundamental and perplexing paradox. To gain a deep understanding of this issue and thus further help strengthen the trustworthiness of VLLMs, this paper makes three key contributions: i) One tentative explanation for VLLMs being prone to jailbreak attacks--inclusion of vision inputs, as well as its in-depth analysis. ii) The recognition of a largely ignored problem in existing defense mechanisms--over-prudence. The problem causes these defense methods to exhibit unintended abstention, even in the presence of benign inputs, thereby undermining their reliability in faithfully defending against attacks. iii) A simple safety-aware method--LLM-Pipeline. Our method repurposes the more advanced guardrails of LLMs on the shelf, serving as an effective alternative detector prior to VLLM response. Last but not least, we find that the two representative evaluation methods for jailbreak often exhibit chance agreement. This limitation makes it potentially misleading when evaluating attack strategies or defense mechanisms. We believe the findings from this paper offer useful insights to rethink the foundational development of VLLM safety with respect to benchmark datasets, defense strategies, and evaluation methods.