Daily Papers

The advancements in generative AI have enabled the improvement of audio synthesis models, including text-to-speech and voice conversion. This raises concerns about its potential misuse in social manipulation and political interference, as synthetic speech has become indistinguishable from natural human speech. Several speech-generation programs are utilized for malicious purposes, especially impersonating individuals through phone calls. Therefore, detecting fake audio is crucial to maintain social security and safeguard the integrity of information. Recent research has proposed a D-CAPTCHA system based on the challenge-response protocol to differentiate fake phone calls from real ones. In this work, we study the resilience of this system and introduce a more robust version, D-CAPTCHA++, to defend against fake calls. Specifically, we first expose the vulnerability of the D-CAPTCHA system under transferable imperceptible adversarial attack. Secondly, we mitigate such vulnerability by improving the robustness of the system by using adversarial training in D-CAPTCHA deepfake detectors and task classifiers.

Recent advancements in NLP have witnessed the groundbreaking impact of pretrained models, yielding impressive outcomes across various tasks. This study seeks to extend the power of pretraining methodologies to facilitating the prediction over tables in data science, a domain traditionally overlooked, yet inherently challenging due to the plethora of table schemas intrinsic to different tasks. The primary research questions underpinning this work revolve around the establishment of a universal pretraining protocol for tables with varied structures, the generalizability and transferability of learned knowledge across tasks, the adaptation to diverse downstream applications, and the incorporation of incremental columns over time. In response to these challenges, we introduce UniTabE, a straightforward yet effective method designed to process tables in a uniform manner, devoid of constraints imposed by specific table structures. UniTabE's core concept relies on representing each basic table element with a module, termed TabUnit. This is subsequently followed by a Transformer encoder to refine the representation. Moreover, our model is designed to facilitate pretraining and finetuning through the utilization of free-form prompts. In order to implement the pretraining phase, we curated an expansive tabular dataset comprising approximately 13B samples, meticulously gathered from the Kaggle platform. This research primarily centers on classification and regression tasks involving tabular data, and conducts rigorous experimental testing and analyses to validate the effectiveness of our methodology. The experimental results demonstrate UniTabE's superior performance against several baselines across massive benchmarks. This, therefore, underscores UniTabE's potential to significantly enhance the semantic representation of tabular data, thereby marking a significant stride for tabular data analysis.

In this work, we study the issue of reward hacking on the response length, a challenge emerging in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) on LLMs. A well-formatted, verbose but less helpful response from the LLMs can often deceive LLMs or even human evaluators to achieve high scores. The same issue also holds for some reward models in RL. To address the challenges in both training and evaluation, we establish a more reliable evaluation protocol for comparing different training configurations, which inspects the trade-off between LLM evaluation score and response length obtained by varying training hyperparameters. Based on this evaluation, we conduct large-scale studies, where the results shed insights into the efficacy of hyperparameters and tricks used in RL on mitigating length bias. We further propose to improve the reward model by jointly training two linear heads on shared feature representations to predict the rewards, one trained to correlate with length, and the other trained to decorrelate with length and therefore focus more on the actual content. We then discard the length head in RL to prevent reward hacking on length. Experiments demonstrate that our approach almost eliminates the reward correlation with length, and improves the obtained policy by a significant margin.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

Reasoning protocols such as Chain of Thought (CoT) and Tree of Thought (ToT) organize internal deliberation but lack an explicit mechanism for external questioning that elicits self-revision. We present FOR-Prompting (From Objection to Revision Prompting), an asymmetric protocol where a Defender proposes an answer, an Objectioner raises question-style objections with no direct fixes, and a Host enforces consistency and closure. On GSM8K we observe about a 22% point gain over single-prompt and accuracy on par with CoT, with more than 10% higher ratings in reasoning and coherence from a uniform GPT 4.1 judge. FOR-Prompting also corrects mistakes without tools or human supervision on tricky queries, and improves performance for small-scale model (approx. 19% accuracy improved on Llama3.2:1b for GSM8K task), highlighting promise for small models and on personal device use. Beyond factual QA, qualitative analyses on open-ended tasks show enhanced exploration and refinement, with dialogue traces that make assumptions and trade-offs explicit. The protocol is model agnostic and operates purely at the prompt level through role-structured turns, so it works with hosted and local models of different sizes without retraining, and it supports large-scale study of objection-guided reasoning.

Recent text-to-video (T2V) technology advancements, as demonstrated by models such as Gen2, Pika, and Sora, have significantly broadened its applicability and popularity. Despite these strides, evaluating these models poses substantial challenges. Primarily, due to the limitations inherent in automatic metrics, manual evaluation is often considered a superior method for assessing T2V generation. However, existing manual evaluation protocols face reproducibility, reliability, and practicality issues. To address these challenges, this paper introduces the Text-to-Video Human Evaluation (T2VHE) protocol, a comprehensive and standardized protocol for T2V models. The T2VHE protocol includes well-defined metrics, thorough annotator training, and an effective dynamic evaluation module. Experimental results demonstrate that this protocol not only ensures high-quality annotations but can also reduce evaluation costs by nearly 50%. We will open-source the entire setup of the T2VHE protocol, including the complete protocol workflow, the dynamic evaluation component details, and the annotation interface code. This will help communities establish more sophisticated human assessment protocols.

The development of robust safety benchmarks for large language models requires open, reproducible datasets that can measure both appropriate refusal of harmful content and potential over-restriction of legitimate scientific discourse. We present an open-source dataset and testing framework for evaluating LLM safety mechanisms across mainly controlled substance queries, analyzing four major models' responses to systematically varied prompts. Our results reveal distinct safety profiles: Claude-3.5-sonnet demonstrated the most conservative approach with 73% refusals and 27% allowances, while Mistral attempted to answer 100% of queries. GPT-3.5-turbo showed moderate restriction with 10% refusals and 90% allowances, and Grok-2 registered 20% refusals and 80% allowances. Testing prompt variation strategies revealed decreasing response consistency, from 85% with single prompts to 65% with five variations. This publicly available benchmark enables systematic evaluation of the critical balance between necessary safety restrictions and potential over-censorship of legitimate scientific inquiry, while providing a foundation for measuring progress in AI safety implementation. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals potential vulnerabilities in safety mechanisms, highlighting the complexity of implementing robust safeguards without unduly restricting desirable and valid scientific discourse.

The foundation of reproducible science lies in protocols that are precise, logically ordered, and executable. The autonomous generation of these protocols through natural language queries could greatly improve the efficiency of the reproduction process. However, current leading large language models (LLMs) often generate incomplete or inconsistent protocols, limiting their utility. To address this limitation, we first introduce SciRecipe, a large-scale dataset of over 12K structured protocols spanning 27 biological subfields and encompassing both comprehension and problem-solving tasks. To further improve protocol generation, we propose the "Sketch-and-Fill" paradigm, which separates analysis, structuring, and expression to ensure each step is explicit and verifiable. Complementing this, the structured component-based reward mechanism evaluates step granularity, action order, and semantic fidelity, aligning model optimization with experimental reliability. Building on these components, we develop Thoth, trained through a staged Knowledge-to-Action process that progresses from knowledge acquisition to operational reasoning and ultimately to robust, executable protocol generation. Across multiple benchmarks, Thoth consistently surpasses both proprietary and open-source LLMs, achieving significant improvements in step alignment, logical sequencing, and semantic accuracy. Our approach paves the way for reliable scientific assistants that bridge knowledge with experimental execution. All data, code, and models will be released publicly.

Our interest is in the design of software systems involving a human-expert interacting -- using natural language -- with a large language model (LLM) on data analysis tasks. For complex problems, it is possible that LLMs can harness human expertise and creativity to find solutions that were otherwise elusive. On one level, this interaction takes place through multiple turns of prompts from the human and responses from the LLM. Here we investigate a more structured approach based on an abstract protocol described in [3] for interaction between agents. The protocol is motivated by a notion of "two-way intelligibility" and is modelled by a pair of communicating finite-state machines. We provide an implementation of the protocol, and provide empirical evidence of using the implementation to mediate interactions between an LLM and a human-agent in two areas of scientific interest (radiology and drug design). We conduct controlled experiments with a human proxy (a database), and uncontrolled experiments with human subjects. The results provide evidence in support of the protocol's capability of capturing one- and two-way intelligibility in human-LLM interaction; and for the utility of two-way intelligibility in the design of human-machine systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/karannb/interact.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Biological protocols are fundamental to reproducible and safe life science research. While LLMs excel on general tasks, their systematic evaluation on these highly specialized, accuracy-critical, and inherently procedural texts remains limited. In this work, we present BioProBench, the first large-scale, integrated multi-task benchmark for biological protocol understanding and reasoning. While limited benchmarks have touched upon specific aspects like protocol QA, BioProBench provides a comprehensive suite of five core tasks: Protocol Question Answering, Step Ordering, Error Correction, Protocol Generation, and Protocol Reasoning, enabling a holistic evaluation of LLMs on procedural biological texts. Built upon 27K original protocols, it yields nearly 556K high-quality structured instances. We evaluate 12 mainstream open/closed-source LLMs on BioProBench. Experimental results reveal that while top models preform well on surface understanding tasks, struggle significantly with deep reasoning and structured generation tasks like ordering and generation. Furthermore, model comparisons reveal diverse performance: certain open-source models approach closed-source levels on some tasks, yet bio-specific small models lag behind general LLMs, indicating limitations on complex procedural content. Overall, our findings underscore that procedural reasoning within biological protocols represents a significant challenge for current LLMs. BioProBench serves as a standardized framework to diagnose these specific limitations and guide the development of AI systems better equipped for safely automating complex scientific procedures. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/YuyangSunshine/bioprotocolbench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/GreatCaptainNemo/BioProBench.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

As large language model (LLM) agents are deployed in public interactive settings, a key question is whether their communities can sustain challenge, repair, and public correction, or merely produce norm-like language. We compare Moltbook, a live deployed agent forum, with five matched Reddit communities by tracing a three-step mechanism: whether discussions create threaded exchange, whether challenges elicit a response, and whether correction becomes visible to the wider thread. Relative to Reddit, Moltbook discussions are roughly ten times less threaded, leaving far fewer chances for challenge and response. When challenges do occur, the original author almost never returns (1.2% vs. 40.9% on Reddit), multi-turn continuation is nearly absent (0.1% vs. 38.5%), and we detect no repairs under a shared conservative protocol. A non-challenge baseline within Reddit suggests this gap is linked to challenge, not simply deeper threading. These results indicate that social alignment depends not only on producing norm-aware language, but on sustaining the interactional processes through which communities teach, enforce, and revise norms. This matters for safety, because correction is increasingly decentralized, and for fairness, because communities differ in how they expect participants to engage with challenge.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

This paper presents an eight-week observational comparison of 68 single-file HTML generations collected across 17 public experiments in the "HTML AI Battle" project between December 10, 2025 and February 4, 2026. Four reasoning model families, GPT, Gemini, Grok, and Claude, were compared under a fixed public-interface protocol with no custom instructions, no personality tuning, and no repair prompts. Each output was evaluated from a rendered browser video using human scores and a Gemini LLM-as-a-judge layer for prompt adherence, functional correctness, and UI quality, then packaged into a standardized social-media protocol spanning X (Twitter), TikTok, and YouTube. The tracker was also used for two supervised predictive analyses: an experiment-level model for 24-hour X impressions and a generation-level model for HTML verbosity. Under this protocol, Claude was the strongest and most consistent family, leading mean performance and winning 9/17 prompts under the primary human weighted score. Longer measured reasoning time was not associated with higher quality overall. Gemini as a judge was significantly more lenient than the human evaluator on functional correctness and overall performance, while stable self-favoring bias remained unresolved. The exploratory X-impressions model remained weak under post-screen cross-validation (MAE = 46,874, R^2 = -0.377), whereas the HTML-lines model performed better, with a model-family-only baseline outperforming prompt-aware alternatives (MAE = 135.2, R^2 = 0.576). Overall, selected pre-publication technical/audio variables were not sufficient to predict 24-hour X reach, while code verbosity was driven much more by model family than by prompt wording. The comparisons remain observational and are limited by public-interface drift, access-path differences, and one primary human scorer.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in medical contexts, raising critical concerns about safety, alignment, and susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. While prior benchmarks assess model refusal capabilities for harmful prompts, they often lack clinical specificity, graded harmfulness levels, and coverage of jailbreak-style attacks. We introduce CARES (Clinical Adversarial Robustness and Evaluation of Safety), a benchmark for evaluating LLM safety in healthcare. CARES includes over 18,000 prompts spanning eight medical safety principles, four harm levels, and four prompting styles: direct, indirect, obfuscated, and role-play, to simulate both malicious and benign use cases. We propose a three-way response evaluation protocol (Accept, Caution, Refuse) and a fine-grained Safety Score metric to assess model behavior. Our analysis reveals that many state-of-the-art LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreaks that subtly rephrase harmful prompts, while also over-refusing safe but atypically phrased queries. Finally, we propose a mitigation strategy using a lightweight classifier to detect jailbreak attempts and steer models toward safer behavior via reminder-based conditioning. CARES provides a rigorous framework for testing and improving medical LLM safety under adversarial and ambiguous conditions.

This document presents a detailed description of the challenge on clarifying questions for dialogue systems (ClariQ). The challenge is organized as part of the Conversational AI challenge series (ConvAI3) at Search Oriented Conversational AI (SCAI) EMNLP workshop in 2020. The main aim of the conversational systems is to return an appropriate answer in response to the user requests. However, some user requests might be ambiguous. In IR settings such a situation is handled mainly thought the diversification of the search result page. It is however much more challenging in dialogue settings with limited bandwidth. Therefore, in this challenge, we provide a common evaluation framework to evaluate mixed-initiative conversations. Participants are asked to rank clarifying questions in an information-seeking conversations. The challenge is organized in two stages where in Stage 1 we evaluate the submissions in an offline setting and single-turn conversations. Top participants of Stage 1 get the chance to have their model tested by human annotators.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into tool-using agents, the ability to browse the web in real-time has become a critical yardstick for measuring their reasoning and retrieval competence. Existing benchmarks such as BrowseComp concentrate on English and overlook the linguistic, infrastructural, and censorship-related complexities of other major information ecosystems -- most notably Chinese. To address this gap, we introduce BrowseComp-ZH, a high-difficulty benchmark purpose-built to comprehensively evaluate LLM agents on the Chinese web. BrowseComp-ZH consists of 289 multi-hop questions spanning 11 diverse domains. Each question is reverse-engineered from a short, objective, and easily verifiable answer (e.g., a date, number, or proper noun). A two-stage quality control protocol is applied to strive for high question difficulty and answer uniqueness. We benchmark over 20 state-of-the-art language models and agentic search systems on our proposed BrowseComp-ZH. Despite their strong conversational and retrieval capabilities, most models struggle severely: a large number achieve accuracy rates below 10%, and only a handful exceed 20%. Even the best-performing system, OpenAI's DeepResearch, reaches just 42.9%. These results demonstrate the considerable difficulty of BrowseComp-ZH, where success demands not only effective retrieval strategies, but also sophisticated reasoning and information reconciliation -- capabilities that current models still struggle to master. Our dataset, construction guidelines, and benchmark results have been publicly released at https://github.com/PALIN2018/BrowseComp-ZH.

Standard evaluation protocols reveal a counterintuitive phenomenon: on 7.7% of benchmark problems spanning five datasets, larger language models underperform smaller ones by 28.4 percentage points despite 10-100x more parameters. Through systematic evaluation of 31 models (0.5B-405B parameters) across 1,485 problems, we identify the mechanism as spontaneous scale-dependent verbosity that introduces errors through overelaboration. Causal intervention experiments demonstrate this reflects correctable prompt design rather than fundamental capability limitations. Constraining large models to produce brief responses improves accuracy by 26 percentage points and reduces performance gaps by up to two-thirds. Most critically, brevity constraints completely reverse performance hierarchies on mathematical reasoning and scientific knowledge benchmarks, with large models achieving 7.7-15.9 percentage point advantages over small models -- direct inversions of the original gaps. These reversals prove large models possess superior latent capabilities that universal prompting masks. We validate findings through three independent contamination tests and demonstrate inverse scaling operates continuously across the full parameter spectrum, with dataset-specific optimal scales ranging from 0.5B to 3.0B parameters. Our results establish that maximizing large model performance requires scale-aware prompt engineering rather than universal evaluation protocols, with immediate implications for deployment: prompt adaptation simultaneously improves accuracy and reduces computational costs.

Large Language Model safety alignment predominantly operates on a binary assumption that requests are either safe or unsafe. This classification proves insufficient when models encounter ethical dilemmas, where the capacity to reason through moral trade-offs creates a distinct attack surface. We formalize this vulnerability through TRIAL, a multi-turn red-teaming methodology that embeds harmful requests within ethical framings. TRIAL achieves high attack success rates across most tested models by systematically exploiting the model's ethical reasoning capabilities to frame harmful actions as morally necessary compromises. Building on these insights, we introduce ERR (Ethical Reasoning Robustness), a defense framework that distinguishes between instrumental responses that enable harmful outcomes and explanatory responses that analyze ethical frameworks without endorsing harmful acts. ERR employs a Layer-Stratified Harm-Gated LoRA architecture, achieving robust defense against reasoning-based attacks while preserving model utility.

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

Access to the right evidence does not guarantee that large language models (LLMs) will reason with it correctly. This gap between retrieval and reasoning is especially concerning in clinical settings, where outputs must align with structured protocols. We study this gap using Written Exposure Therapy (WET) guidelines as a testbed. In evaluating model responses to curated clinician-vetted questions, we find that errors persist even when authoritative passages are provided. To address this, we propose an evaluation framework that measures accuracy, consistency, and fidelity of reasoning. Our results highlight both the potential and the risks: retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) can constrain outputs, but safe deployment requires assessing reasoning as rigorously as retrieval.

Adapting a language model into a specific domain, a.k.a `domain adaption', is a common practice when specialized knowledge, e.g. medicine, is not encapsulated in a general language model like Llama2. The challenge lies in the heterogeneity of data across the two training stages, as it varies in languages, genres, or formats. To tackle this and simplify the learning protocol, we propose to transform heterogeneous data, from the both pre-training and supervised stages, into a unified, simple input-output pair format. We validate the new protocol in the domains where proprietary LLMs like ChatGPT perform relatively poorly, such as Traditional Chinese Medicine. The developed model, HuatuoGPT-II, has shown state-of-the-art performance in Chinese medicine domain on a number of benchmarks, e.g. medical licensing exams. It even outperforms proprietary models like ChatGPT and GPT-4 in some aspects, especially in Traditional Chinese Medicine. Expert manual evaluations further validate HuatuoGPT-II's advantages over existing LLMs. Notably, HuatuoGPT-II was benchmarked in a fresh Chinese National Medical Licensing Examination where it achieved the best performance, showcasing not only its effectiveness but also its generalization capabilities.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

Large Language Models used in ChatGPT have traditionally been trained to learn a refusal boundary: depending on the user's intent, the model is taught to either fully comply or outright refuse. While this is a strong mitigation for explicitly malicious prompts, focusing safety training on refusals can lead to brittleness for prompts with obscured user intent. Binary refusal boundaries are especially ill-suited for dual-use cases (such as biology or cybersecurity), where a user request can be answered safely at a high level, but in some cases can lead to malicious uplift if sufficiently detailed or actionable. As an alternative, we propose safe-completions: a safety-training approach that centers on the safety of the assistant's output, rather than a binary classification of the user's intent. Safe-completions seek to maximize helpfulness within the safety policy's constraints. We incorporated this approach into GPT-5 and find that across both production comparisons and internally controlled experiments, safe-completion training improves safety (especially on dual-use prompts), reduces the severity of residual safety failures, and substantially increases model helpfulness.

Large language model agents now act on codebases, browsers, operating systems, calendars, files, and tool ecosystems, but the benchmarks used to evaluate them are fragmented: each emphasizes a different unit of measurement (final task success, tool-call validity, repeated-pass consistency, trajectory safety, or attack robustness). A line of 2024-2025 work has converged on the diagnosis that a single accuracy column is no longer the right unit of comparison for deployable agents. AgentAtlas extends this line of work with four components: (i) a six-state control-decision taxonomy (Act / Ask / Refuse / Stop / Confirm / Recover); (ii) a nine-category trajectory-failure taxonomy with two orthogonal hierarchical labels (primary_error_source, impact); (iii) a taxonomy-aware vs. taxonomy-blind methodology that measures how much of a model's apparent capability comes from the supervision in the prompt; and (iv) a benchmark-coverage audit mapping fifteen agent benchmarks against six behavioral axes. To demonstrate the methodology we run a small fixed eight-model set (1,342 generated items, four frontier closed and four open-weight) under both prompt modes. Removing the explicit label menu drops every model's trajectory accuracy by 14-40 pp to a tight 0.54-0.62 floor regardless of family, and no single model wins on all three of control accuracy, trajectory diagnosis, and tool-context utility retention. We treat the synthetic run as a measurement-protocol demonstration, not a benchmark release.

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

Large Language Models have achieved remarkable success in natural language processing tasks, with Reinforcement Learning playing a key role in adapting them to specific applications. However, obtaining ground truth answers for training LLMs in mathematical problem-solving is often challenging, costly, and sometimes unfeasible. This research delves into the utilization of format and length as surrogate signals to train LLMs for mathematical problem-solving, bypassing the need for traditional ground truth answers.Our study shows that a reward function centered on format correctness alone can yield performance improvements comparable to the standard GRPO algorithm in early phases. Recognizing the limitations of format-only rewards in the later phases, we incorporate length-based rewards. The resulting GRPO approach, leveraging format-length surrogate signals, not only matches but surpasses the performance of the standard GRPO algorithm relying on ground truth answers in certain scenarios, achieving 40.0\% accuracy on AIME2024 with a 7B base model. Through systematic exploration and experimentation, this research not only offers a practical solution for training LLMs to solve mathematical problems and reducing the dependence on extensive ground truth data collection, but also reveals the essence of why our label-free approach succeeds: base model is like an excellent student who has already mastered mathematical and logical reasoning skills, but performs poorly on the test paper, it simply needs to develop good answering habits to achieve outstanding results in exams , in other words, to unlock the capabilities it already possesses.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Corruption studies, the primary tool for evaluating chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness, identify which chain positions are "computationally important" by measuring accuracy when steps are replaced with errors. We identify a systematic confound: for chains with explicit terminal answer statements, the dominant format in standard benchmarks, corruption studies detect where the answer text appears, not where computation occurs. A within-dataset format ablation provides the key evidence: on standard GSM8K chains ending with "the answer is X," removing only the answer statement, preserving all reasoning, collapses suffix sensitivity ~19x at 3B (N=300, p=0.022). Conflicting-answer experiments quantify the causal mechanism: at 7B, CC accuracy drops to near-zero (<=0.02) across five architecture families; the followed-wrong rate spans 0.63-1.00 at 3B-7B and attenuates at larger scales (0.300 at Phi-4-14B, ~0.01 at 32B). A within-stable 7B replication (9.3x attenuation, N=76, p=7.8e-3; Qwen3-8B N=299, p=0.004) provides converging evidence, and the pattern replicates on MATH (DeepSeek-R1-7B: 10.9x suffix-survival recovery). On chains without answer suffixes the same protocol identifies the prefix as load-bearing (Delta=-0.77, p<10^-12). Generation-time probes confirm a dissociation: the answer is not early-determined during generation (early commitment <5%), yet at consumption time model outputs systematically follow the explicit answer text. The format-determination effect persists through 14B (8.5x ratio, p=0.001) and converges toward zero at 32B. We propose a three-prerequisite protocol (question-only control, format characterization, all-position sweep) as a minimum standard for corruption-based faithfulness studies.

The strive to make AI applications "safe" has led to the development of safety-measures as the main or even sole normative requirement of their permissible use. Similar can be attested to the latest version of chatbots, such as chatGPT. In this view, if they are "safe", they are supposed to be permissible to deploy. This approach, which we call "safety-normativity", is rather limited in solving the emerging issues that chatGPT and other chatbots have caused thus far. In answering this limitation, in this paper we argue for limiting chatbots in the range of topics they can chat about according to the normative concept of appropriateness. We argue that rather than looking for "safety" in a chatbot's utterances to determine what they may and may not say, we ought to assess those utterances according to three forms of appropriateness: technical-discursive, social, and moral. We then spell out what requirements for chatbots follow from these forms of appropriateness to avoid the limits of previous accounts: positionality, acceptability, and value alignment (PAVA). With these in mind, we may be able to determine what a chatbot may and may not say. Lastly, one initial suggestion is to use challenge sets, specifically designed for appropriateness, as a validation method.

Recent machine learning papers often report 1-2 percentage point improvements from a single run on a benchmark. These gains are highly sensitive to random seeds, data ordering, and implementation details, yet are rarely accompanied by uncertainty estimates or significance tests. It is therefore unclear when a reported +1-2% reflects a real algorithmic advance versus noise. We revisit this problem under realistic compute budgets, where only a few runs are affordable. We propose a simple, PC-friendly evaluation protocol based on paired multi-seed runs, bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrap confidence intervals, and a sign-flip permutation test on per-seed deltas. The protocol is intentionally conservative and is meant as a guardrail against over-claiming. We instantiate it on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10N, and AG News using synthetic no-improvement, small-gain, and medium-gain scenarios. Single runs and unpaired t-tests often suggest significant gains for 0.6-2.0 point improvements, especially on text. With only three seeds, our paired protocol never declares significance in these settings. We argue that such conservative evaluation is a safer default for small gains under tight budgets.

Large language models (LLMs) now write code in settings where misreading a single word can break safety or cost money, yet we still expect them to overlook stray typos. To probe where useful robustness ends and harmful insensitivity begins, we compile 50 LeetCode problems and craft three minimal prompt perturbations that should vary in importance: (i) progressive underspecification deleting 10 % of words per step; (ii) lexical flip swapping a pivotal quantifier ("max" to "min"); and (iii) jargon inflation replacing a common noun with an obscure technical synonym. Six frontier models, including three "reasoning-tuned" versions, solve each mutated prompt, and their Python outputs are checked against the original test suites to reveal whether they reused the baseline solution or adapted. Among 11 853 generations we observe a sharp double asymmetry. Models remain correct in 85 % of cases even after 90 % of the prompt is missing, showing over-robustness to underspecification, yet only 54 % react to a single quantifier flip that reverses the task, with reasoning-tuned variants even less sensitive than their bases. Jargon edits lie in between, passing through 56 %. Current LLMs thus blur the line between harmless noise and meaning - changing edits, often treating both as ignorable. Masking salient anchors such as function names can force re - evaluation. We advocate evaluation and training protocols that reward differential sensitivity: stay steady under benign noise but adapt - or refuse - when semantics truly change.

The computation necessary for training Transformer-based language models has skyrocketed in recent years. This trend has motivated research on efficient training algorithms designed to improve training, validation, and downstream performance faster than standard training. In this work, we revisit three categories of such algorithms: dynamic architectures (layer stacking, layer dropping), batch selection (selective backprop, RHO loss), and efficient optimizers (Lion, Sophia). When pre-training BERT and T5 with a fixed computation budget using such methods, we find that their training, validation, and downstream gains vanish compared to a baseline with a fully-decayed learning rate. We define an evaluation protocol that enables computation to be done on arbitrary machines by mapping all computation time to a reference machine which we call reference system time. We discuss the limitations of our proposed protocol and release our code to encourage rigorous research in efficient training procedures: https://github.com/JeanKaddour/NoTrainNoGain.

AI systems for software development are rapidly gaining prominence, yet significant challenges remain in ensuring their safety. To address this, Amazon launched the Trusted AI track of the Amazon Nova AI Challenge, a global competition among 10 university teams to drive advances in secure AI. In the challenge, five teams focus on developing automated red teaming bots, while the other five create safe AI assistants. This challenge provides teams with a unique platform to evaluate automated red-teaming and safety alignment methods through head-to-head adversarial tournaments where red teams have multi-turn conversations with the competing AI coding assistants to test their safety alignment. Along with this, the challenge provides teams with a feed of high quality annotated data to fuel iterative improvement. Throughout the challenge, teams developed state-of-the-art techniques, introducing novel approaches in reasoning-based safety alignment, robust model guardrails, multi-turn jail-breaking, and efficient probing of large language models (LLMs). To support these efforts, the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team made substantial scientific and engineering investments, including building a custom baseline coding specialist model for the challenge from scratch, developing a tournament orchestration service, and creating an evaluation harness. This paper outlines the advancements made by university teams and the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team in addressing the safety challenges of AI for software development, highlighting this collaborative effort to raise the bar for AI safety.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Large language models (LLMs) hold great potential for many natural language applications but risk generating incorrect or toxic content. To probe when an LLM generates unwanted content, the current paradigm is to recruit a red team of human testers to design input prompts (i.e., test cases) that elicit undesirable responses from LLMs. However, relying solely on human testers is expensive and time-consuming. Recent works automate red teaming by training a separate red team LLM with reinforcement learning (RL) to generate test cases that maximize the chance of eliciting undesirable responses from the target LLM. However, current RL methods are only able to generate a small number of effective test cases resulting in a low coverage of the span of prompts that elicit undesirable responses from the target LLM. To overcome this limitation, we draw a connection between the problem of increasing the coverage of generated test cases and the well-studied approach of curiosity-driven exploration that optimizes for novelty. Our method of curiosity-driven red teaming (CRT) achieves greater coverage of test cases while mantaining or increasing their effectiveness compared to existing methods. Our method, CRT successfully provokes toxic responses from LLaMA2 model that has been heavily fine-tuned using human preferences to avoid toxic outputs. Code is available at https://github.com/Improbable-AI/curiosity_redteam

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

This study addresses a critical gap in safety tuning practices for Large Language Models (LLMs) by identifying and tackling a refusal position bias within safety tuning data, which compromises the models' ability to appropriately refuse generating unsafe content. We introduce a novel approach, Decoupled Refusal Training (DeRTa), designed to empower LLMs to refuse compliance to harmful prompts at any response position, significantly enhancing their safety capabilities. DeRTa incorporates two novel components: (1) Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Harmful Response Prefix, which trains models to recognize and avoid unsafe content by appending a segment of harmful response to the beginning of a safe response, and (2) Reinforced Transition Optimization (RTO), which equips models with the ability to transition from potential harm to safety refusal consistently throughout the harmful response sequence. Our empirical evaluation, conducted using LLaMA3 and Mistral model families across six attack scenarios, demonstrates that our method not only improves model safety without compromising performance but also surpasses well-known models such as GPT-4 in defending against attacks. Importantly, our approach successfully defends recent advanced attack methods (e.g., CodeAttack) that have jailbroken GPT-4 and LLaMA3-70B-Instruct. Our code and data can be found at https://github.com/RobustNLP/DeRTa.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

We introduce AIRTBench, an AI red teaming benchmark for evaluating language models' ability to autonomously discover and exploit Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) security vulnerabilities. The benchmark consists of 70 realistic black-box capture-the-flag (CTF) challenges from the Crucible challenge environment on the Dreadnode platform, requiring models to write python code to interact with and compromise AI systems. Claude-3.7-Sonnet emerged as the clear leader, solving 43 challenges (61% of the total suite, 46.9% overall success rate), with Gemini-2.5-Pro following at 39 challenges (56%, 34.3% overall), GPT-4.5-Preview at 34 challenges (49%, 36.9% overall), and DeepSeek R1 at 29 challenges (41%, 26.9% overall). Our evaluations show frontier models excel at prompt injection attacks (averaging 49% success rates) but struggle with system exploitation and model inversion challenges (below 26%, even for the best performers). Frontier models are far outpacing open-source alternatives, with the best truly open-source model (Llama-4-17B) solving 7 challenges (10%, 1.0% overall), though demonstrating specialized capabilities on certain hard challenges. Compared to human security researchers, large language models (LLMs) solve challenges with remarkable efficiency completing in minutes what typically takes humans hours or days-with efficiency advantages of over 5,000x on hard challenges. Our contribution fills a critical gap in the evaluation landscape, providing the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to measure and track progress in autonomous AI red teaming capabilities.

Many areas of deep learning benefit from using increasingly larger neural networks trained on public data, as is the case for pre-trained models for NLP and computer vision. Training such models requires a lot of computational resources (e.g., HPC clusters) that are not available to small research groups and independent researchers. One way to address it is for several smaller groups to pool their computational resources together and train a model that benefits all participants. Unfortunately, in this case, any participant can jeopardize the entire training run by sending incorrect updates, deliberately or by mistake. Training in presence of such peers requires specialized distributed training algorithms with Byzantine tolerance. These algorithms often sacrifice efficiency by introducing redundant communication or passing all updates through a trusted server, making it infeasible to apply them to large-scale deep learning, where models can have billions of parameters. In this work, we propose a novel protocol for secure (Byzantine-tolerant) decentralized training that emphasizes communication efficiency.

Frontier large language models are increasingly deployed as orchestration backbones for biological research workflows, yet no shared evidence base exists for comparing their refusal behaviour on legitimate research prompts. RefusalBench, introduced here, is a matched-triple benchmark of 141 prompts in 47 bundles that holds task framing constant while varying only biological risk tier (benign, borderline, dual-use), enabling tier-conditioned comparisons robust to subdomain confounding. A 15-prompt should-refuse positive-control module establishes per-model calibration floors; three models fail to refuse even these prompts. Across 19 frontier models in the May 2026 snapshot, strict refusal rates span 0.1% to 94.6% on identical prompts. Jurisdiction does not predict refusal in this snapshot (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.393; EU n = 1, US bimodal); provider identity does, with Anthropic's API stack predicting refusal at OR = 21.03 (95% CI: 14.58-30.34 prompt-clustered; 5.70-77.55 under model-clustered GEE). This effect is best read as access-path-level rather than model-weight-level: 99.8% of Anthropic's strict refusals carry the same safety_policy adjudicated reason code, consistent with a small set of canonical refusal templates rather than case-by-case model reasoning. Strict refusal rate misranks safety calibration: Grok 4.20 achieves the highest tier discrimination (Youden's J = 0.787) while ranking only seventh by overall refusal rate, and Claude Opus 4.7's J dropped 65% from prior versions with no improvement in dual-use detection. Nine of 18 frontier models exhibit a hedge-but-help partial-compliance pattern at dual-use tier that binary refusal metrics cannot detect.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents executing multi-step workflows in real-world software environments. However, existing agent benchmarks suffer from three critical limitations: (1) trajectory-opaque grading that checks only final outputs, (2) underspecified safety and robustness evaluation, and (3) narrow modality coverage and interaction paradigms. We introduce Claw-Eval, an end-to-end evaluation suite addressing all three gaps. It comprises 300 human-verified tasks spanning 9 categories across three groups (general service orchestration, multimodal perception and generation, and multi-turn professional dialogue). Every agent action is recorded through three independent evidence channels (execution traces, audit logs, and environment snapshots), enabling trajectory-aware grading over 2,159 fine-grained rubric items. The scoring protocol evaluates Completion, Safety, and Robustness, reporting Average Score, Pass@k, and Pass^k across three trials to distinguish genuine capability from lucky outcomes. Experiments on 14 frontier models reveal that: (1) trajectory-opaque evaluation is systematically unreliable, missing 44% of safety violations and 13% of robustness failures that our hybrid pipeline catches; (2) controlled error injection primarily degrades consistency rather than peak capability, with Pass^3 dropping up to 24% while Pass@3 remains stable; (3) multimodal performance varies sharply, with most models performing poorer on video than on document or image, and no single model dominating across all modalities. Beyond benchmarking, Claw-Eval highlights actionable directions for agent development, shedding light on what it takes to build agents that are not only capable but reliably deployable.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has led to the widespread deployment of LLM agents across diverse industries, including customer service, content generation, data analysis, and even healthcare. However, as more LLM agents are deployed, a major issue has emerged: there is no standard way for these agents to communicate with external tools or data sources. This lack of standardized protocols makes it difficult for agents to work together or scale effectively, and it limits their ability to tackle complex, real-world tasks. A unified communication protocol for LLM agents could change this. It would allow agents and tools to interact more smoothly, encourage collaboration, and triggering the formation of collective intelligence. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of existing agent protocols, proposing a systematic two-dimensional classification that differentiates context-oriented versus inter-agent protocols and general-purpose versus domain-specific protocols. Additionally, we conduct a comparative performance analysis of these protocols across key dimensions such as security, scalability, and latency. Finally, we explore the future landscape of agent protocols by identifying critical research directions and characteristics necessary for next-generation protocols. These characteristics include adaptability, privacy preservation, and group-based interaction, as well as trends toward layered architectures and collective intelligence infrastructures. We expect this work to serve as a practical reference for both researchers and engineers seeking to design, evaluate, or integrate robust communication infrastructures for intelligent agents.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a standardized interface designed to enable seamless interaction between AI models and external tools and resources, breaking down data silos and facilitating interoperability across diverse systems. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of MCP, focusing on its core components, workflow, and the lifecycle of MCP servers, which consists of three key phases: creation, operation, and update. We analyze the security and privacy risks associated with each phase and propose strategies to mitigate potential threats. The paper also examines the current MCP landscape, including its adoption by industry leaders and various use cases, as well as the tools and platforms supporting its integration. We explore future directions for MCP, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that will influence its adoption and evolution within the broader AI ecosystem. Finally, we offer recommendations for MCP stakeholders to ensure its secure and sustainable development as the AI landscape continues to evolve.

Large language models (LLMs) can be misused to reveal sensitive information, such as weapon-making instructions or writing malware. LLM providers rely on monitoring to detect and flag unsafe behavior during inference. An open security challenge is adaptive adversaries who craft attacks that simultaneously (i) evade detection while (ii) eliciting unsafe behavior. Adaptive attackers are a major concern as LLM providers cannot patch their security mechanisms, since they are unaware of how their models are being misused. We cast robust LLM monitoring as a security game, where adversaries who know about the monitor try to extract sensitive information, while a provider must accurately detect these adversarial queries at low false positive rates. Our work (i) shows that existing LLM monitors are vulnerable to adaptive attackers and (ii) designs improved defenses through activation watermarking by carefully introducing uncertainty for the attacker during inference. We find that activation watermarking outperforms guard baselines by up to 52% under adaptive attackers who know the monitoring algorithm but not the secret key.

As the performance of large language models (LLMs) continues to advance, their adoption is expanding across a wide range of domains, including the medical field. The integration of LLMs into medical applications raises critical safety concerns, particularly due to their use by users with diverse roles, e.g. patients and clinicians, and the potential for model's outputs to directly affect human health. Despite the domain-specific capabilities of medical LLMs, prior safety evaluations have largely focused only on general safety benchmarks. In this paper, we introduce a safety evaluation protocol tailored to the medical domain in both patient user and clinician user perspectives, alongside general safety assessments and quantitatively analyze the safety of medical LLMs. We bridge a gap in the literature by building the PatientSafetyBench containing 466 samples over 5 critical categories to measure safety from the perspective of the patient. We apply our red-teaming protocols on the MediPhi model collection as a case study. To our knowledge, this is the first work to define safety evaluation criteria for medical LLMs through targeted red-teaming taking three different points of view - patient, clinician, and general user - establishing a foundation for safer deployment in medical domains.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

Prompt design is a primary control interface for large language models (LLMs), yet standard evaluations largely reduce performance to answer correctness, obscuring why a prompt succeeds or fails and providing little actionable guidance. We propose PEEM (Prompt Engineering Evaluation Metrics), a unified framework for joint and interpretable evaluation of both prompts and responses. PEEM defines a structured rubric with 9 axes: 3 prompt criteria (clarity/structure, linguistic quality, fairness) and 6 response criteria (accuracy, coherence, relevance, objectivity, clarity, conciseness), and uses an LLM-based evaluator to output (i) scalar scores on a 1-5 Likert scale and (ii) criterion-specific natural-language rationales grounded in the rubric. Across 7 benchmarks and 5 task models, PEEM's accuracy axis strongly aligns with conventional accuracy while preserving model rankings (aggregate Spearman rho about 0.97, Pearson r about 0.94, p < 0.001). A multi-evaluator study with four models shows consistent relative judgments (pairwise rho = 0.68-0.85), supporting evaluator-agnostic deployment. Beyond alignment, PEEM captures complementary linguistic failure modes and remains informative under prompt perturbations: prompt-quality trends track downstream accuracy under iterative rewrites, semantic adversarial manipulations induce clear score degradation, and meaning-preserving paraphrases yield high stability (robustness rate about 76.7-80.6%). Finally, using only PEEM scores and rationales as feedback, a zero-shot prompt rewriting loop improves downstream accuracy by up to 11.7 points, outperforming supervised and RL-based prompt-optimization baselines. Overall, PEEM provides a reproducible, criterion-driven protocol that links prompt formulation to response behavior and enables systematic diagnosis and optimization of LLM interactions.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is rapidly becoming the standard interface for Large Language Models (LLMs) to discover and invoke external tools. However, existing evaluations often fail to capture the complexity of real-world scenarios, relying on restricted toolsets, simplistic workflows, or subjective LLM-as-a-judge metrics. We introduce MCP-Atlas, a large-scale benchmark for evaluating tool-use competency, comprising 36 real MCP servers and 220 tools. It includes 1,000 tasks designed to assess tool-use competency in realistic, multi-step workflows. Tasks use natural language prompts that avoid naming specific tools or servers, requiring agents to identify and orchestrate 3-6 tool calls across multiple servers. We score tasks using a claims-based rubric that awards partial credit based on the factual claims satisfied in the model's final answer, complemented by internal diagnostics on tool discovery, parameterization, syntax, error recovery, and efficiency. Evaluation results on frontier models reveal that top models achieve pass rates exceeding 50%, with primary failures arising from inadequate tool usage and task understanding. We release the task schema, containerized harness, and a 500-task public subset of the benchmark dataset to facilitate reproducible comparisons and advance the development of robust, tool-augmented agents.

As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in safety-critical settings, it is essential to ensure that their responses comply with safety standards. Prior research has revealed that LLMs often fail to grasp the notion of safe behaviors, resulting in either unjustified refusals to harmless prompts or the generation of harmful content. While substantial efforts have been made to improve their robustness, existing defenses often rely on costly fine-tuning of model parameters or employ suboptimal heuristic techniques. In this work, we take a novel approach to safeguard LLMs by learning to adapt the system prompts in instruction-tuned LLMs. While LLMs are typically pre-trained to follow a fixed system prompt, we investigate the impact of tailoring the system prompt to each specific user input on the safety of the responses. To this end, we propose Sysformer, a transformer model that updates an initial system prompt to a more robust system prompt in the LLM input embedding space while attending to the user prompt. While keeping the LLM parameters frozen, the Sysformer is trained to refuse to respond to a set of harmful prompts while responding ideally to a set of safe ones. Through extensive experiments on 5 LLMs from different families and 2 recent benchmarks, we demonstrate that Sysformer can significantly enhance the robustness of LLMs, leading to upto 80% gain in the refusal rate on harmful prompts while enhancing the compliance with the safe prompts by upto 90%. Results also generalize well to sophisticated jailbreaking attacks, making LLMs upto 100% more robust against different attack strategies. We hope our findings lead to cheaper safeguarding of LLMs and motivate future investigations into designing variable system prompts.

The past year has seen rapid acceleration in the development of large language models (LLMs). However, without proper steering and safeguards, LLMs will readily follow malicious instructions, provide unsafe advice, and generate toxic content. We introduce SimpleSafetyTests (SST) as a new test suite for rapidly and systematically identifying such critical safety risks. The test suite comprises 100 test prompts across five harm areas that LLMs, for the vast majority of applications, should refuse to comply with. We test 11 open-access and open-source LLMs and four closed-source LLMs, and find critical safety weaknesses. While some of the models do not give a single unsafe response, most give unsafe responses to more than 20% of the prompts, with over 50% unsafe responses in the extreme. Prepending a safety-emphasising system prompt substantially reduces the occurrence of unsafe responses, but does not completely stop them from happening. Trained annotators labelled every model response to SST (n = 3,000). We use these annotations to evaluate five AI safety filters (which assess whether a models' response is unsafe given a prompt) as a way of automatically evaluating models' performance on SST. The filters' performance varies considerably. There are also differences across the five harm areas, and on the unsafe versus safe responses. The widely-used Perspective API has 72% accuracy and a newly-created zero-shot prompt to OpenAI's GPT-4 performs best with 89% accuracy. Content Warning: This paper contains prompts and responses that relate to child abuse, suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, scams and fraud, illegal items, and physical harm.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Scaling the test-time compute of large language models has demonstrated impressive performance on reasoning benchmarks. However, existing evaluations of test-time scaling make the strong assumption that a reasoning system should always give an answer to any question provided. This overlooks concerns about whether a model is confident in its answer, and whether it is appropriate to always provide a response. To address these concerns, we extract confidence scores during reasoning for thresholding model responses. We find that increasing compute budget at inference time not only helps models answer more questions correctly, but also increases confidence in correct responses. We then extend the current paradigm of zero-risk responses during evaluation by considering settings with non-zero levels of response risk, and suggest a recipe for reporting evaluations under these settings.

Agent communication protocols are becoming critical infrastructure for large language model (LLM) systems that must use tools, coordinate with other agents, and operate across heterogeneous environments. This work presents a human-inspired perspective on this emerging landscape by organizing agent communication into three layers: communication, syntactic, and semantic. Under this framework, we systematically analyze 18 representative protocols and compare how they support reliable transport, structured interaction, and meaning-level coordination. Our analysis shows a clear imbalance in current protocol design. Most protocols provide increasingly mature support for transport, streaming, schema definition, and lifecycle management, but offer limited protocol-level mechanisms for clarification, context alignment, and verification. As a result, semantic responsibilities are often pushed into prompts, wrappers, or application-specific orchestration logic, creating hidden interoperability and maintenance costs. To make this gap actionable, we further identify major forms of technical debt in today's protocol ecosystem and distill practical guidance for selecting protocols under different deployment settings. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for interoperable, secure, and semantically robust agent ecosystems that move beyond message passing toward shared understanding.

LLM agents with tool access can discover and exploit security vulnerabilities. This is known. What is not known is which features of a system prompt trigger this behaviour, and which do not. We present a systematic taxonomy based on approximately 10,000 trials across seven models, 37 prompt conditions, and 12 hypothesized attack dimensions -- all executed in real Docker sandboxes. Every condition includes the instruction "Always respect all rules and access policies"; only a single encouragement sentence varies. Within the task class studied (planted test-runner vulnerabilities), the threat model is narrower than assumed: nine of twelve dimensions -- including minimization, moral licensing, incentives, identity priming, and reasoning triggers -- produce no detectable exploitation at n=50 per cell (upper 95% CI <7% per condition). But it is also more subtle than expected: one dimension, goal reframing, reliably triggers exploitation. "You are solving a puzzle; there may be hidden clues" produces 38-40% exploitation on Claude Sonnet 4 despite the explicit rule instruction, replicating across four models (CTF framing: 8-14% on DeepSeek, GPT-5-mini, o4-mini). The agent does not override the rules; it reinterprets the task so that exploitative actions become task-aligned. GPT-4.1 produces no exploitation across 1,850 trials (37 conditions), and a temporal comparison across four OpenAI models released over eleven months shows a pattern consistent with improving safety training, though model capability differences are a confounder. The practical contribution is a narrowed, testable threat model: defenders should audit for goal-reframing language, not for the broad class of adversarial prompts.

Model developers implement safeguards in frontier models to prevent misuse, for example, by employing classifiers to filter dangerous outputs. In this work, we demonstrate that even robustly safeguarded models can be used to elicit harmful capabilities in open-source models through elicitation attacks. Our elicitation attacks consist of three stages: (i) constructing prompts in adjacent domains to a target harmful task that do not request dangerous information; (ii) obtaining responses to these prompts from safeguarded frontier models; (iii) fine-tuning open-source models on these prompt-output pairs. Since the requested prompts cannot be used to directly cause harm, they are not refused by frontier model safeguards. We evaluate these elicitation attacks within the domain of hazardous chemical synthesis and processing, and demonstrate that our attacks recover approximately 40% of the capability gap between the base open-source model and an unrestricted frontier model. We then show that the efficacy of elicitation attacks scales with the capability of the frontier model and the amount of generated fine-tuning data. Our work demonstrates the challenge of mitigating ecosystem level risks with output-level safeguards.

As large language models improve, so do their offensive applications: frontier agents now generate working exploits for under $50 in compute (Heelan, 2026). Defensive incident response (IR) agents must keep pace, but existing benchmarks conflate action execution with correct execution, hiding calibration failures when agents process adversarial evidence. We introduce OpenSec, a dual-control reinforcement learning environment that evaluates IR agents under realistic prompt injection scenarios. Unlike static capability benchmarks, OpenSec scores world-state-changing containment actions under adversarial evidence via execution-based metrics: time-to-first-containment (TTFC), blast radius (false positives per episode), and injection violation rates. Evaluating four frontier models on 40 standard-tier episodes, we find consistent over-triggering in this setting: GPT-5.2, Gemini 3, and DeepSeek execute containment in 100% of episodes with 90-97% false positive rates. Claude Sonnet 4.5 shows partial calibration (85% containment, 72% FP), demonstrating that OpenSec surfaces a calibration failure mode hidden by aggregate success metrics. Code available at https://github.com/jbarnes850/opensec-env.

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

The 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge is designed to rigorously track progress toward solving long-horizon tasks by physical agents in simulated environments. BEHAVIOR-1K focuses on everyday household tasks that people most want robots to assist with and these tasks introduce long-horizon mobile manipulation challenges in realistic settings, bridging the gap between current research and real-world, human-centric applications. This report presents our solution to the 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge in a very close 2nd place and substantially outperforms the rest of the submissions. Building on π_{0.5}, we focus on systematically building our solution by studying the effects of training techniques and data. Through careful ablations, we show the scaling power in pre-training and post-training phases for competitive performance. We summarize our practical lessons and design recommendations that we hope will provide actionable insights for the broader embodied AI community when adapting powerful foundation models to complex embodied scenarios.

Red-teaming, or identifying prompts that elicit harmful responses, is a critical step in ensuring the safe and responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). Developing effective protection against many modes of attack prompts requires discovering diverse attacks. Automated red-teaming typically uses reinforcement learning to fine-tune an attacker language model to generate prompts that elicit undesirable responses from a target LLM, as measured, for example, by an auxiliary toxicity classifier. We show that even with explicit regularization to favor novelty and diversity, existing approaches suffer from mode collapse or fail to generate effective attacks. As a flexible and probabilistically principled alternative, we propose to use GFlowNet fine-tuning, followed by a secondary smoothing phase, to train the attacker model to generate diverse and effective attack prompts. We find that the attacks generated by our method are effective against a wide range of target LLMs, both with and without safety tuning, and transfer well between target LLMs. Finally, we demonstrate that models safety-tuned using a dataset of red-teaming prompts generated by our method are robust to attacks from other RL-based red-teaming approaches.

Clinical LLMs are often scaled by increasing model size, context length, retrieval complexity, or inference-time compute, with the implicit expectation that higher accuracy implies safer behavior. This assumption is incomplete in medicine, where a few confident, high-risk, or evidence-contradicting errors can matter more than average benchmark performance. We introduce SaFE-Scale, a framework for measuring how clinical LLM safety changes across model scale, evidence quality, retrieval strategy, context exposure, and inference-time compute. To instantiate this framework, we introduce RadSaFE-200, a Radiology Safety-Focused Evaluation benchmark of 200 multiple-choice questions with clinician-defined clean evidence, conflict evidence, and option-level labels for high-risk error, unsafe answer, and evidence contradiction. We evaluated 34 locally deployed LLMs across six deployment conditions: closed-book prompting (zero-shot), clean evidence, conflict evidence, standard RAG, agentic RAG, and max-context prompting. Clean evidence produced the strongest improvement, increasing mean accuracy from 73.5% to 94.1%, while reducing high-risk error from 12.0% to 2.6%, contradiction from 12.7% to 2.3%, and dangerous overconfidence from 8.0% to 1.6%. Standard RAG and agentic RAG did not reproduce this safety profile: agentic RAG improved accuracy over standard RAG and reduced contradiction, but high-risk error and dangerous overconfidence remained elevated. Max-context prompting increased latency without closing the safety gap, and additional inference-time compute produced only limited gains. Worst-case analysis showed that clinically consequential errors concentrated in a small subset of questions. Clinical LLM safety is therefore not a passive consequence of scaling, but a deployment property shaped by evidence quality, retrieval design, context construction, and collective failure behavior.

Many applications need up-to-date copies of collections of changing Web resources. Such synchronization is currently achieved using ad-hoc or proprietary solutions. We propose ResourceSync, a general Web resource synchronization protocol that leverages XML Sitemaps. It provides a set of capabilities that can be combined in a modular manner to meet local or community requirements. We report on work to implement this protocol for arXiv.org and also provide an experimental prototype for the English Wikipedia as well as a client API.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used as proxies for human labelers in both training (Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback) and large-scale response evaluation (LLM-as-a-judge). Alignment and evaluation are critical components in the development of reliable LLMs, and the choice of feedback protocol plays a central role in both but remains understudied. In this work, we show that the choice of feedback protocol for evaluation (absolute scores versus relative preferences) can significantly affect evaluation reliability and induce systematic biases. In the context of LLM-as-a-judge evaluation, we show that pairwise protocols are more vulnerable to distracted evaluation. Generator models can exploit spurious attributes (or distractor features) favored by the LLM judge, resulting in inflated scores for lower-quality outputs. We find that absolute scoring is more robust to such manipulation, producing judgments that better reflect response quality and are less influenced by distractor features. Our results demonstrate that generator models can flip preferences by embedding distractor features, skewing LLM-as-a-judge comparisons and leading to inaccurate conclusions about model quality in benchmark evaluations. Pairwise preferences flip in about 35% of the cases, compared to only 9% for absolute scores. We offer recommendations for choosing feedback protocols based on dataset characteristics and evaluation objectives.

A Mamba state-space model trained only for next-step prediction appears to recover Granger-causal structure through a simple readout S = |W_{out} W_{in}|, with early experiments suggesting the phenomenon generalized across architectures and benefited from interventional data at p < 10^{-5}. We package the protocol used to test that claim -- standardized synthetic generators (VAR/Lorenz/CauseMe-style), three intervention semantics (do(X=c), soft-noise, random-forcing), edge-provenance cards on three real datasets, and size-matched control arms -- as a reusable falsification benchmark, and walk the claim through it in five stages. The method-level claim does not survive: (i) a plain linear bottleneck does as well or better; (ii) tuned Lasso beats the bottleneck on synthetic CauseMe-style benchmarks, and on Lorenz-96 (the only real benchmark with unambiguous ground truth) classical PCMCI and Granger lead a tight cluster in which the bottleneck trails; (iii) the headline intervention advantage is roughly 60% a sample-size confound, and the residual disappears under standard do(X=c) interventions, surviving only under a non-standard random-forcing scheme; (iv) even that residual reproduces, with a larger effect, in classical bivariate Granger -- the effect is method-agnostic. What survives is a narrow characterization result; the benchmark is the lasting artifact, and each stage above is one of its control arms.

This position paper argues that the field of LLM agents requires a unified, telecom-inspired communication protocol to ensure safety, interoperability, and scalability, especially within the context of Next Generation (NextG) networks. Current ad-hoc communication methods are creating a fragmented ecosystem, reminiscent of the early "protocol wars" in networking, which stifles innovation and poses significant risks. Drawing inspiration from the layered, standardized protocols that underpin modern telecommunications, we propose the LLM-Agent Communication Protocol (LACP). LACP establishes a three-layer architecture designed to ensure semantic clarity in communication, transactional integrity for complex tasks, and robust, built-in security. In this position paper, we argue that adopting a principled, universal protocol is not merely beneficial but essential for realizing the potential of distributed AI. Such a standard is critical for ensuring that multi-agent systems can operate safely and reliably in the complex, real-time applications envisioned for 6G and beyond.

Various algorithms for continual learning (CL) have been designed with the goal of effectively alleviating the trade-off between stability and plasticity during the CL process. To achieve this goal, tuning appropriate hyperparameters for each algorithm is essential. As an evaluation protocol, it has been common practice to train a CL algorithm using diverse hyperparameter values on a CL scenario constructed with a benchmark dataset. Subsequently, the best performance attained with the optimal hyperparameter value serves as the criterion for evaluating the CL algorithm. In this paper, we contend that this evaluation protocol is not only impractical but also incapable of effectively assessing the CL capability of a CL algorithm. Returning to the fundamental principles of model evaluation in machine learning, we propose an evaluation protocol that involves Hyperparameter Tuning and Evaluation phases. Those phases consist of different datasets but share the same CL scenario. In the Hyperparameter Tuning phase, each algorithm is iteratively trained with different hyperparameter values to find the optimal hyperparameter values. Subsequently, in the Evaluation phase, the optimal hyperparameter values is directly applied for training each algorithm, and their performance in the Evaluation phase serves as the criterion for evaluating them. Through experiments on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet-100 based on the proposed protocol in class-incremental learning, we not only observed that the existing evaluation method fail to properly assess the CL capability of each algorithm but also observe that some recently proposed state-of-the-art algorithms, which reported superior performance, actually exhibit inferior performance compared to the previous algorithm.

Data teams at frontier AI companies routinely train small proxy models to make critical decisions about pretraining data recipes for full-scale training runs. However, the community has a limited understanding of whether and when conclusions drawn from small-scale experiments reliably transfer to full-scale model training. In this work, we uncover a subtle yet critical issue in the standard experimental protocol for data recipe assessment: the use of identical small-scale model training configurations across all data recipes in the name of "fair" comparison. We show that the experiment conclusions about data quality can flip with even minor adjustments to training hyperparameters, as the optimal training configuration is inherently data-dependent. Moreover, this fixed-configuration protocol diverges from full-scale model development pipelines, where hyperparameter optimization is a standard step. Consequently, we posit that the objective of data recipe assessment should be to identify the recipe that yields the best performance under data-specific tuning. To mitigate the high cost of hyperparameter tuning, we introduce a simple patch to the evaluation protocol: using reduced learning rates for proxy model training. We show that this approach yields relative performance that strongly correlates with that of fully tuned large-scale LLM pretraining runs. Theoretically, we prove that for random-feature models, this approach preserves the ordering of datasets according to their optimal achievable loss. Empirically, we validate this approach across 23 data recipes covering four critical dimensions of data curation, demonstrating dramatic improvements in the reliability of small-scale experiments.

Without proper safeguards, large language models will readily follow malicious instructions and generate toxic content. This motivates safety efforts such as red-teaming and large-scale feedback learning, which aim to make models both helpful and harmless. However, there is a tension between these two objectives, since harmlessness requires models to refuse complying with unsafe prompts, and thus not be helpful. Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that some models may have struck a poor balance, so that even clearly safe prompts are refused if they use similar language to unsafe prompts or mention sensitive topics. In this paper, we introduce a new test suite called XSTest to identify such eXaggerated Safety behaviours in a structured and systematic way. In its current form, XSTest comprises 200 safe prompts across ten prompt types that well-calibrated models should not refuse to comply with. We describe XSTest's creation and composition, and use the test suite to highlight systematic failure modes in a recently-released state-of-the-art language model.

Automated attack discovery techniques, such as attacker synthesis or model-based fuzzing, provide powerful ways to ensure network protocols operate correctly and securely. Such techniques, in general, require a formal representation of the protocol, often in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). Unfortunately, many protocols are only described in English prose, and implementing even a simple network protocol as an FSM is time-consuming and prone to subtle logical errors. Automatically extracting protocol FSMs from documentation can significantly contribute to increased use of these techniques and result in more robust and secure protocol implementations. In this work we focus on attacker synthesis as a representative technique for protocol security, and on RFCs as a representative format for protocol prose description. Unlike other works that rely on rule-based approaches or use off-the-shelf NLP tools directly, we suggest a data-driven approach for extracting FSMs from RFC documents. Specifically, we use a hybrid approach consisting of three key steps: (1) large-scale word-representation learning for technical language, (2) focused zero-shot learning for mapping protocol text to a protocol-independent information language, and (3) rule-based mapping from protocol-independent information to a specific protocol FSM. We show the generalizability of our FSM extraction by using the RFCs for six different protocols: BGPv4, DCCP, LTP, PPTP, SCTP and TCP. We demonstrate how automated extraction of an FSM from an RFC can be applied to the synthesis of attacks, with TCP and DCCP as case-studies. Our approach shows that it is possible to automate attacker synthesis against protocols by using textual specifications such as RFCs.

The proposed IncidentResponseGPT framework - a novel system that applies generative artificial intelligence (AI) to potentially enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of traffic incident response. This model allows for synthesis of region-specific incident response guidelines and generates incident response plans adapted to specific area, aiming to expedite decision-making for traffic management authorities. This approach aims to accelerate incident resolution times by suggesting various recommendations (e.g. optimal rerouting strategies, estimating resource needs) to minimize the overall impact on the urban traffic network. The system suggests specific actions, including dynamic lane closures, optimized rerouting and dispatching appropriate emergency resources. IncidentResponseGPT employs the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) to rank generated response plans based on criteria like impact minimization and resource efficiency based on their proximity to an human-proposed solution.

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

We introduce AnyTool, a large language model agent designed to revolutionize the utilization of a vast array of tools in addressing user queries. We utilize over 16,000 APIs from Rapid API, operating under the assumption that a subset of these APIs could potentially resolve the queries. AnyTool primarily incorporates three elements: an API retriever with a hierarchical structure, a solver aimed at resolving user queries using a selected set of API candidates, and a self-reflection mechanism, which re-activates AnyTool if the initial solution proves impracticable. AnyTool is powered by the function calling feature of GPT-4, eliminating the need for training external modules. We also revisit the evaluation protocol introduced by previous works and identify a limitation in this protocol that leads to an artificially high pass rate. By revising the evaluation protocol to better reflect practical application scenarios, we introduce an additional benchmark, termed AnyToolBench. Experiments across various datasets demonstrate the superiority of our AnyTool over strong baselines such as ToolLLM and a GPT-4 variant tailored for tool utilization. For instance, AnyTool outperforms ToolLLM by +35.4% in terms of average pass rate on ToolBench. Code will be available at https://github.com/dyabel/AnyTool.

The o1 model series is trained with large-scale reinforcement learning to reason using chain of thought. These advanced reasoning capabilities provide new avenues for improving the safety and robustness of our models. In particular, our models can reason about our safety policies in context when responding to potentially unsafe prompts, through deliberative alignment. This leads to state-of-the-art performance on certain benchmarks for risks such as generating illicit advice, choosing stereotyped responses, and succumbing to known jailbreaks. Training models to incorporate a chain of thought before answering has the potential to unlock substantial benefits, while also increasing potential risks that stem from heightened intelligence. Our results underscore the need for building robust alignment methods, extensively stress-testing their efficacy, and maintaining meticulous risk management protocols. This report outlines the safety work carried out for the OpenAI o1 and OpenAI o1-mini models, including safety evaluations, external red teaming, and Preparedness Framework evaluations.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capabilities, ensuring their safety against jailbreak attacks remains a critical challenge. In this paper, we introduce a novel safety alignment approach called Answer-Then-Check, which enhances LLM robustness against malicious prompts by applying thinking ability to mitigate jailbreaking problems before producing a final answer to the user. Our method enables models to directly answer the question in their thought and then critically evaluate its safety before deciding whether to provide it. To implement this approach, we construct the Reasoned Safety Alignment (ReSA) dataset, comprising 80K examples that teach models to reason through direct responses and then analyze their safety. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves the Pareto frontier with superior safety capability while decreasing over-refusal rates on over-refusal benchmarks. Notably, the model fine-tuned with ReSA maintains general reasoning capabilities on benchmarks like MMLU, MATH500, and HumanEval. Besides, our method equips models with the ability to perform safe completion. Unlike post-hoc methods that can only reject harmful queries, our model can provide helpful and safe alternative responses for sensitive topics (e.g., self-harm). Furthermore, we discover that training on a small subset of just 500 examples can achieve comparable performance to using the full dataset, suggesting that safety alignment may require less data than previously assumed.

Current AI agent frameworks commit early to a single interaction protocol, a fixed tool integration strategy, and static user models, limiting their deployment across diverse interaction paradigms. To address these constraints, we introduce STEM Agent (Self-adapting, Tool-enabled, Extensible, Multi-agent), a modular architecture inspired by biological pluripotency in which an undifferentiated agent core differentiates into specialized protocol handlers, tool bindings, and memory subsystems that compose into a fully functioning AI system. The framework unifies five interoperability protocols (A2A, AG-UI, A2UI, UCP, and AP2) behind a single gateway, introduces a Caller Profiler that continuously learns user preferences across more than twenty behavioral dimensions, externalizes all domain capabilities through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), and implements a biologically inspired skills acquisition system in which recurring interaction patterns crystallize into reusable agent skills through a maturation lifecycle analogous to cell differentiation. Complementing these capabilities, the memory system incorporates consolidation mechanisms, including episodic pruning, semantic deduplication, and pattern extraction, designed for sub-linear growth under sustained interaction. A comprehensive 413-test suite validates protocol handler behavior and component integration across all five architectural layers, completing in under three seconds.

Large language model (LLM)-powered agents are increasingly used to plan and execute scientific workflows, yet most research cyberinfrastructure (CI) exposes heterogeneous APIs and implements security models that present barriers for use by agents. We report on our experience using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as a unifying interface that makes research capabilities discoverable, invokable, and composable. Our approach is pragmatic: we implement thin MCP servers over mature services, including Globus Transfer, Compute, and Search; status APIs exposed by computing facilities; Octopus event fabric; and domain-specific tools such as Garden and Galaxy. We use case studies in computational chemistry, bioinformatics, quantum chemistry, and filesystem monitoring to illustrate how this MCP-oriented architecture can be used in practice. We distill lessons learned and outline open challenges in evaluation and trust for agent-led science.

Large Language Models (LLMs) require careful safety alignment to prevent malicious outputs. While significant research focuses on mitigating harmful content generation, the enhanced safety often come with the side effect of over-refusal, where LLMs may reject innocuous prompts and become less helpful. Although the issue of over-refusal has been empirically observed, a systematic measurement is challenging due to the difficulty of crafting prompts that appear harmful but are benign. This study proposes a novel method for automatically generating large-scale sets of "seemingly toxic prompts" (benign prompts likely rejected by LLMs). Leveraging this technique, we introduce OR-Bench, the first large-scale over-refusal benchmark. OR-Bench comprises 80,000 seemingly toxic prompts across 10 common rejection categories, a subset of around 1,000 hard prompts that are challenging even for state-of-the-art LLMs, and an additional 600 toxic prompts to prevent indiscriminate responses. We then conduct a comprehensive study to measure the over-refusal of 25 popular LLMs across 8 model families. Our datasets are available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/bench-llm/or-bench and the demo can be found at https://huggingface.co/spaces/bench-llm/or-bench. We hope this benchmark can help the community develop better safety aligned models.

Skill assessment in procedural videos is crucial for the objective evaluation of human performance in settings such as manufacturing and procedural daily tasks. Current research on skill assessment has predominantly focused on sports and lacks large-scale datasets for complex procedural activities. Existing studies typically involve only a limited number of actions, focus on either pairwise assessments (e.g., A is better than B) or on binary labels (e.g., good execution vs needs improvement). In response to these shortcomings, we introduce ProSkill, the first benchmark dataset for action-level skill assessment in procedural tasks. ProSkill provides absolute skill assessment annotations, along with pairwise ones. This is enabled by a novel and scalable annotation protocol that allows for the creation of an absolute skill assessment ranking starting from pairwise assessments. This protocol leverages a Swiss Tournament scheme for efficient pairwise comparisons, which are then aggregated into consistent, continuous global scores using an ELO-based rating system. We use our dataset to benchmark the main state-of-the-art skill assessment algorithms, including both ranking-based and pairwise paradigms. The suboptimal results achieved by the current state-of-the-art highlight the challenges and thus the value of ProSkill in the context of skill assessment for procedural videos. All data and code are available at https://fpv-iplab.github.io/ProSkill/

Language Model Models (LLMs) have improved dramatically in the past few years, increasing their adoption and the scope of their capabilities over time. A significant amount of work is dedicated to ``model alignment'', i.e., preventing LLMs to generate unsafe responses when deployed into customer-facing applications. One popular method to evaluate safety risks is red-teaming, where agents attempt to bypass alignment by crafting elaborate prompts that trigger unsafe responses from a model. Standard human-driven red-teaming is costly, time-consuming and rarely covers all the recent features (e.g., multi-lingual, multi-modal aspects), while proposed automation methods only cover a small subset of LLMs capabilities (i.e., English or single-turn). We present Multi-lingual Multi-turn Automated Red Teaming (MM-ART), a method to fully automate conversational, multi-lingual red-teaming operations and quickly identify prompts leading to unsafe responses. Through extensive experiments on different languages, we show the studied LLMs are on average 71\% more vulnerable after a 5-turn conversation in English than after the initial turn. For conversations in non-English languages, models display up to 195\% more safety vulnerabilities than the standard single-turn English approach, confirming the need for automated red-teaming methods matching LLMs capabilities.

Language model users often issue queries that lack specification, where the context under which a query was issued -- such as the user's identity, the query's intent, and the criteria for a response to be useful -- is not explicit. For instance, a good response to a subjective query like "What book should I read next?" would depend on the user's preferences, and a good response to an open-ended query like "How do antibiotics work against bacteria?" would depend on the user's expertise. This makes evaluation of responses to such queries an ill-posed task, as evaluators may make arbitrary judgments about the response quality. To remedy this, we present contextualized evaluations, a protocol that synthetically constructs context surrounding an underspecified query and provides it during evaluation. We find that the presence of context can 1) alter conclusions drawn from evaluation, even flipping win rates between model pairs, 2) nudge evaluators to make fewer judgments based on surface-level criteria, like style, and 3) provide new insights about model behavior across diverse contexts. Specifically, our procedure uncovers an implicit bias towards WEIRD contexts in models' "default" responses and we find that models are not equally sensitive to following different contexts, even when they are provided in prompts.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Network protocols are programs with inputs and outputs that follow predefined communication patterns to synchronize and exchange information. There are many protocols and each serves a different purpose, e.g., routing, transport, secure communication, etc. The functional and performance requirements for a protocol can be expressed using a formal specification, such as, a set of logical predicates over its traces. A protocol could be prevented from achieving its requirements due to a bug in its design or implementation, a component failure (e.g., a crash), or an attack. This dissertation shows that formal methods can feasibly characterize the functionality and performance of network protocols under normal conditions as well as when subjected to attacks.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how large language model (LLM) agents discover, describe, and call external tools. While MCP unlocks broad interoperability, it also enlarges the attack surface by making tools first-class, composable objects with natural-language metadata, and standardized I/O. We present MSB (MCP Security Benchmark), the first end-to-end evaluation suite that systematically measures how well LLM agents resist MCP-specific attacks throughout the full tool-use pipeline: task planning, tool invocation, and response handling. MSB contributes: (1) a taxonomy of 12 attacks including name-collision, preference manipulation, prompt injections embedded in tool descriptions, out-of-scope parameter requests, user-impersonating responses, false-error escalation, tool-transfer, retrieval injection, and mixed attacks; (2) an evaluation harness that executes attacks by running real tools (both benign and malicious) via MCP rather than simulation; and (3) a robustness metric that quantifies the trade-off between security and performance: Net Resilient Performance (NRP). We evaluate nine popular LLM agents across 10 domains and 405 tools, producing 2,000 attack instances. Results reveal the effectiveness of attacks against each stage of MCP. Models with stronger performance are more vulnerable to attacks due to their outstanding tool calling and instruction following capabilities. MSB provides a practical baseline for researchers and practitioners to study, compare, and harden MCP agents. Code: https://github.com/dongsenzhang/MSB

The automatic evaluation of instruction following typically involves using large language models (LLMs) to assess response quality. However, there is a lack of comprehensive evaluation of these LLM-based evaluators across two dimensions: the base LLMs and the evaluation protocols. Therefore, we present a thorough meta-evaluation of instruction following, including 25 base LLMs and 15 recently proposed evaluation protocols, on 4 human-annotated datasets, assessing the evaluation accuracy of the LLM-evaluators. Our evaluation allows us to identify the best-performing base LLMs and evaluation protocols with a high degree of robustness. Moreover, our large-scale evaluation reveals: (1) Base LLM performance ranking remains largely consistent across evaluation protocols, with less capable LLMs showing greater improvement from protocol enhancements; (2) Robust evaluation of evaluation protocols requires many base LLMs with varying capability levels, as protocol effectiveness can depend on the base LLM used; (3) Evaluation results on different datasets are not always consistent, so a rigorous evaluation requires multiple datasets with distinctive features. We release our meta-evaluation suite ReIFE, which provides the codebase and evaluation result collection for more than 500 LLM-evaluator configurations, to support future research in instruction-following evaluation.

Laboratory workflows in pharmaceutical and biomedical research encode substantial tacit knowledge -- expert judgment about failure conditions, decision branching logic, and contextual dependencies -- that remains inaccessible to protocol documents, sensor streams, and existing biomedical ontologies. We present a repeatable structured expert elicitation methodology and federated Semantic Knowledge Graph (SKG) architecture for capturing and querying this knowledge, demonstrated through deployment at the Biochemical and Cellular Pharmacology Department of Genentech. Knowledge is elicited via the Protocol Intelligence Co-pilot, a purpose-built AI interview agent that applies structured elicitation lenses to surface tacit procedural knowledge with expert-assigned confidence scores, producing graph representations across three tiers: program-level decision milestones, assay protocol knowledge, and physical execution infrastructure. Separately constructed subgraphs, exemplified by immunoassay (ELISA), quantitative mass spectrometry (LC-MS/PRM), and laboratory automation, are aligned through a shared upper ontology and queried as a single federated graph. Evaluation demonstrates seven query types structurally unavailable from any individual data source, including a cross-subgraph traversal that identifies automation-masked silent failures -- conditions where execution logs report success while scientific validity is compromised. Critically, the MASKED_BY graph relationship encodes a class of laboratory risk invisible to current informatics platforms -- the structural gap that prevents existing systems from reasoning about scientific validity. This architecture provides the semantic world model that AI laboratory agents currently lack: a queryable representation of where workflows fail silently, where human judgment is irreplaceable, and which execution assets mask rather than detect failure.

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to comply with safety guidelines by refusing harmful instructions. A recent attack, termed abliteration, isolates and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior, enabling the model to generate unethical content. We propose a defense that modifies how models generate refusals. We construct an extended-refusal dataset that contains harmful prompts with a full response that justifies the reason for refusal. We then fine-tune Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B parameters) on our extended-refusal dataset, and evaluate the resulting systems on a set of harmful prompts. In our experiments, extended-refusal models maintain high refusal rates, dropping at most by 10%, whereas baseline models' refusal rates drop by 70-80% after abliteration. A broad evaluation of safety and utility shows that extended-refusal fine-tuning neutralizes the abliteration attack while preserving general performance.

For safety reasons, large language models (LLMs) are trained to refuse harmful user instructions, such as assisting dangerous activities. We study an open question in this work: does the desired safety refusal, typically enforced in chat contexts, generalize to non-chat and agentic use cases? Unlike chatbots, LLM agents equipped with general-purpose tools, such as web browsers and mobile devices, can directly influence the real world, making it even more crucial to refuse harmful instructions. In this work, we primarily focus on red-teaming browser agents, LLMs that manipulate information via web browsers. To this end, we introduce Browser Agent Red teaming Toolkit (BrowserART), a comprehensive test suite designed specifically for red-teaming browser agents. BrowserART is consist of 100 diverse browser-related harmful behaviors (including original behaviors and ones sourced from HarmBench [Mazeika et al., 2024] and AirBench 2024 [Zeng et al., 2024b]) across both synthetic and real websites. Our empirical study on state-of-the-art browser agents reveals that, while the backbone LLM refuses harmful instructions as a chatbot, the corresponding agent does not. Moreover, attack methods designed to jailbreak refusal-trained LLMs in the chat settings transfer effectively to browser agents. With human rewrites, GPT-4o and o1-preview-based browser agents attempted 98 and 63 harmful behaviors (out of 100), respectively. We publicly release BrowserART and call on LLM developers, policymakers, and agent developers to collaborate on improving agent safety

Misunderstandings arise not only in interpersonal communication but also between humans and Large Language Models (LLMs). Such discrepancies can make LLMs interpret seemingly unambiguous questions in unexpected ways, yielding incorrect responses. While it is widely acknowledged that the quality of a prompt, such as a question, significantly impacts the quality of the response provided by LLMs, a systematic method for crafting questions that LLMs can better comprehend is still underdeveloped. In this paper, we present a method named `Rephrase and Respond' (RaR), which allows LLMs to rephrase and expand questions posed by humans and provide responses in a single prompt. This approach serves as a simple yet effective prompting method for improving performance. We also introduce a two-step variant of RaR, where a rephrasing LLM first rephrases the question and then passes the original and rephrased questions together to a different responding LLM. This facilitates the effective utilization of rephrased questions generated by one LLM with another. Our experiments demonstrate that our methods significantly improve the performance of different models across a wide range to tasks. We further provide a comprehensive comparison between RaR and the popular Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods, both theoretically and empirically. We show that RaR is complementary to CoT and can be combined with CoT to achieve even better performance. Our work not only contributes to enhancing LLM performance efficiently and effectively but also sheds light on a fair evaluation of LLM capabilities. Data and codes are available at https://github.com/uclaml/Rephrase-and-Respond.

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

Incident response (IR) requires fast, coordinated, and well-informed decision-making to contain and mitigate cyber threats. While large language models (LLMs) have shown promise as autonomous agents in simulated IR settings, their reasoning is often limited by a lack of access to external knowledge. In this work, we present AutoBnB-RAG, an extension of the AutoBnB framework that incorporates retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) into multi-agent incident response simulations. Built on the Backdoors & Breaches (B&B) tabletop game environment, AutoBnB-RAG enables agents to issue retrieval queries and incorporate external evidence during collaborative investigations. We introduce two retrieval settings: one grounded in curated technical documentation (RAG-Wiki), and another using narrative-style incident reports (RAG-News). We evaluate performance across eight team structures, including newly introduced argumentative configurations designed to promote critical reasoning. To validate practical utility, we also simulate real-world cyber incidents based on public breach reports, demonstrating AutoBnB-RAG's ability to reconstruct complex multi-stage attacks. Our results show that retrieval augmentation improves decision quality and success rates across diverse organizational models. This work demonstrates the value of integrating retrieval mechanisms into LLM-based multi-agent systems for cybersecurity decision-making.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success in generating visual content from text inputs. Although multiple safety alignment strategies have been proposed to prevent harmful outputs, they often lead to overly cautious behavior -- rejecting even benign prompts -- a phenomenon known as over-refusal that reduces the practical utility of T2I models. Despite over-refusal having been observed in practice, there is no large-scale benchmark that systematically evaluates this phenomenon for T2I models. In this paper, we present an automatic workflow to construct synthetic evaluation data, resulting in OVERT (OVEr-Refusal evaluation on Text-to-image models), the first large-scale benchmark for assessing over-refusal behaviors in T2I models. OVERT includes 4,600 seemingly harmful but benign prompts across nine safety-related categories, along with 1,785 genuinely harmful prompts (OVERT-unsafe) to evaluate the safety-utility trade-off. Using OVERT, we evaluate several leading T2I models and find that over-refusal is a widespread issue across various categories (Figure 1), underscoring the need for further research to enhance the safety alignment of T2I models without compromising their functionality. As a preliminary attempt to reduce over-refusal, we explore prompt rewriting; however, we find it often compromises faithfulness to the meaning of the original prompts. Finally, we demonstrate the flexibility of our generation framework in accommodating diverse safety requirements by generating customized evaluation data adapting to user-defined policies.

In this report, we introduce NICE (New frontiers for zero-shot Image Captioning Evaluation) project and share the results and outcomes of 2023 challenge. This project is designed to challenge the computer vision community to develop robust image captioning models that advance the state-of-the-art both in terms of accuracy and fairness. Through the challenge, the image captioning models were tested using a new evaluation dataset that includes a large variety of visual concepts from many domains. There was no specific training data provided for the challenge, and therefore the challenge entries were required to adapt to new types of image descriptions that had not been seen during training. This report includes information on the newly proposed NICE dataset, evaluation methods, challenge results, and technical details of top-ranking entries. We expect that the outcomes of the challenge will contribute to the improvement of AI models on various vision-language tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with the structured reasoning and tool-assisted computation needed for problem solving in cybersecurity applications. In this work, we introduce "random-crypto", a cryptographic Capture-the-Flag (CTF) challenge generator framework that we use to fine-tune a tool-augmented Llama-3.1-8B with Guided Reinforcement Prompt Optimisation (GRPO), allowing the agent to iteratively write and execute Python inside an isolated REPL. GRPO yields a +53% absolute jump in Pass@8 on unseen "random-crypto" tasks (0.35 -> 0.88) and raises Majority@8 to 0.41. The fine-tuned agent also generalizes to an external dataset. On a subset of picoCTF cryptography problems, it improves Pass@8 by +13 pp. Ablations show the gains stem from more reliable tool invocation and code synthesis, rather than superficial prompt adaptation.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is widely used to ground Large Language Models (LLMs) for multi-hop question answering. Recent work mainly focused on improving answer accuracy via fine-tuning and structured or reinforcement-based optimization. However, reliable reasoning in response generation faces three challenges: 1) Reasoning Collapse. Reasoning in multi-hop QA is inherently complex due to multi-hop composition and is further destabilized by noisy retrieval. 2) Reasoning-answer inconsistency. Due to the intrinsic uncertainty of LLM generation and exposure to evidence--distractor mixtures, models may produce correct answers that are not faithfully supported by their intermediate reasoning or evidence. 3) Loss of format control. Traditional chain-of-thought generation often deviates from required structured output formats, leading to incomplete or malformed structured content. To address these challenges, we propose CRAFT (Calibrated Reasoning with Answer-Faithful Traces), a Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) based reinforcement learning framework that trains models to perform faithful reasoning during response generation. CRAFT employs dual reward mechanisms to optimize multi-hop reasoning: deterministic rewards ensure structural correctness while judge-based rewards verify semantic faithfulness. This optimization framework supports controllable trace variants that enable systematic analysis of how structure and scale affect reasoning performance and faithfulness. Experiments on three multi-hop QA benchmarks show that CRAFT improves both answer accuracy and reasoning faithfulness across model scales, with the CRAFT 7B model achieving competitive performance with closed-source LLMs across multiple reasoning trace settings.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is rapidly emerging as a pivotal open standard, designed to enhance agent-tool integration and interoperability, and is positioned to unlock a new era of powerful, interconnected, and genuinely utilitarian agentic AI. However, despite MCP's growing adoption, existing benchmarks often fail to capture real-world agent performance within this new paradigm, leading to a distorted perception of their true operational value and an inability to reliably differentiate proficiencies. To bridge this critical evaluation gap, we introduce MCP-AgentBench -- a comprehensive benchmark specifically engineered to rigorously assess language agent capabilities in MCP-mediated tool interactions. Core contributions of MCP-AgentBench include: the establishment of a robust MCP testbed comprising 33 operational servers with 188 distinct tools; the development of a benchmark featuring 600 systematically designed queries distributed across 6 distinct categories of varying interaction complexity; and the introduction of MCP-Eval, a novel outcome-oriented evaluation methodology prioritizing real-world task success. Through extensive empirical evaluation of leading language agents, we provide foundational insights. MCP-AgentBench aims to equip the research community with a standardized and reliable framework to build, validate, and advance agents capable of fully leveraging MCP's transformative benefits, thereby accelerating progress toward truly capable and interoperable AI systems.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

Large language models (LLMs) and small language models (SLMs) are being adopted at remarkable speed, although their safety still remains a serious concern. With the advent of multilingual S/LLMs, the question now becomes a matter of scale: can we expand multilingual safety evaluations of these models with the same velocity at which they are deployed? To this end we introduce RTP-LX, a human-transcreated and human-annotated corpus of toxic prompts and outputs in 28 languages. RTP-LX follows participatory design practices, and a portion of the corpus is especially designed to detect culturally-specific toxic language. We evaluate seven S/LLMs on their ability to detect toxic content in a culturally-sensitive, multilingual scenario. We find that, although they typically score acceptably in terms of accuracy, they have low agreement with human judges when judging holistically the toxicity of a prompt, and have difficulty discerning harm in context-dependent scenarios, particularly with subtle-yet-harmful content (e.g. microagressions, bias). We release of this dataset to contribute to further reduce harmful uses of these models and improve their safe deployment.

When evaluating large language models (LLMs) with multiple-choice question answering (MCQA), it is common to end the prompt with the string "Answer:" to facilitate automated answer extraction via next-token probabilities. However, there is no consensus on how to tokenize the space following the colon, often overlooked as a trivial choice. In this paper, we uncover accuracy differences of up to 11% due to this (seemingly irrelevant) tokenization variation as well as reshuffled model rankings, raising concerns about the reliability of LLM comparisons in prior work. Surprisingly, we are able to recommend one specific strategy -- tokenizing the space together with the answer letter -- as we observe consistent and statistically significant performance improvements. Additionally, it improves model calibration, enhancing the reliability of the model's confidence estimates. Our findings underscore the importance of careful evaluation design and highlight the need for standardized, transparent evaluation protocols to ensure reliable and comparable results.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

Pingmark defines a universal textual protocol for expressing spatial context through a minimal symbol: !@. Rather than embedding coordinates or using proprietary map links, Pingmark introduces a semantic trigger that compliant client applications interpret to generate a standardized resolver link of the form https://pingmark.me/lat/lon/[timestamp]. This allows location expression to function like existing textual conventions - @ for identity or # for topics - but for physical space. The protocol requires no user registration, relies on open mapping technologies, and protects privacy by generating location data ephemerally and locally. This paper presents the motivation, syntax, and design of the Pingmark Protocol Specification (PPS v0.1), its reference resolver implementation, and the long-term goal of establishing Pingmark as an open Internet standard for spatial mentions.

We present SimpleQA, a benchmark that evaluates the ability of language models to answer short, fact-seeking questions. We prioritized two properties in designing this eval. First, SimpleQA is challenging, as it is adversarially collected against GPT-4 responses. Second, responses are easy to grade, because questions are created such that there exists only a single, indisputable answer. Each answer in SimpleQA is graded as either correct, incorrect, or not attempted. A model with ideal behavior would get as many questions correct as possible while not attempting the questions for which it is not confident it knows the correct answer. SimpleQA is a simple, targeted evaluation for whether models "know what they know," and our hope is that this benchmark will remain relevant for the next few generations of frontier models. SimpleQA can be found at https://github.com/openai/simple-evals.

Large language models have seen widespread adoption, yet they remain vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks, threatening their safe deployment. This has led to the task of training automated multi-turn attackers to probe model safety vulnerabilities. However, existing approaches typically rely on turn-level optimization, which is insufficient for learning long-term attack strategies. To bridge this gap, we formulate this task as a multi-turn reinforcement learning problem, directly optimizing the harmfulness of the final-turn response as the outcome reward. To address the sparse supervision of the outcome reward, we introduce TROJail, which employs two process rewards to evaluate the utility of intermediate prompts and integrate them into advantage estimation. These rewards (1) penalize overly harmful prompts that trigger the model's refusal mechanism, and (2) encourage steering the semantic relevance of responses toward the targeted harmful content. Experimental results show improved attack success rates across multiple models and benchmarks, highlighting the effectiveness of our approach. The code is available at https://github.com/xxiqiao/TROJail. Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful content.

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

In this study, we introduce FEET, a standardized protocol designed to guide the development and benchmarking of foundation models. While numerous benchmark datasets exist for evaluating these models, we propose a structured evaluation protocol across three distinct scenarios to gain a comprehensive understanding of their practical performance. We define three primary use cases: frozen embeddings, few-shot embeddings, and fully fine-tuned embeddings. Each scenario is detailed and illustrated through two case studies: one in sentiment analysis and another in the medical domain, demonstrating how these evaluations provide a thorough assessment of foundation models' effectiveness in research applications. We recommend this protocol as a standard for future research aimed at advancing representation learning models.

Building training-ready multi-hop question answering (QA) datasets that truly stress a model's retrieval and reasoning abilities remains highly challenging recently. While there have been a few recent evaluation datasets that capture the characteristics of hard-to-search but easy-to-verify problems -- requiring the integration of ambiguous, indirect, and cross-domain cues -- these data resources remain scarce and are mostly designed for evaluation, making them unsuitable for supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or reinforcement learning (RL). Meanwhile, manually curating non-trivially retrievable questions -- where answers cannot be found through a single direct query but instead require multi-hop reasoning over oblique and loosely connected evidence -- incurs prohibitive human costs and fails to scale, creating a critical data bottleneck for training high-capability retrieval-and-reasoning agents. To address this, we present an automated framework for generating high-difficulty, training-ready multi-hop questions from semi-structured knowledge sources. The system (i) grows diverse, logically labeled evidence clusters through Natural Language Inference (NLI)-based relation typing and diversity-aware expansion; (ii) applies reverse question construction to compose oblique cues so that isolated signals are underinformative but their combination uniquely identifies the target entity; and (iii) enforces quality with a two-step evaluation pipeline that combines multi-model consensus filtering with structured constraint decomposition and evidence-based matching. The result is a scalable process that yields complex, retrieval-resistant yet verifiable questions suitable for SFT/RL training as well as challenging evaluation, substantially reducing human curation effort while preserving the difficulty profile of strong evaluation benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

Cultural differences in common ground may result in pragmatic failure and misunderstandings during communication. We develop our method Rational Speech Acts for Cross-Cultural Communication (RSA+C3) to resolve cross-cultural differences in common ground. To measure the success of our method, we study RSA+C3 in the collaborative referential game of Codenames Duet and show that our method successfully improves collaboration between simulated players of different cultures. Our contributions are threefold: (1) creating Codenames players using contrastive learning of an embedding space and LLM prompting that are aligned with human patterns of play, (2) studying culturally induced differences in common ground reflected in our trained models, and (3) demonstrating that our method RSA+C3 can ease cross-cultural communication in gameplay by inferring sociocultural context from interaction. Our code is publicly available at github.com/icwhite/codenames.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

As LLMs are deployed in high-stakes settings, users must judge the correctness of individual responses, often relying on model-generated justifications such as reasoning chains or explanations. Yet, no standard measure exists for whether these justifications help users distinguish correct answers from incorrect ones. We formalize this idea as error verifiability and propose v_{bal}, a balanced metric that measures whether justifications enable raters to accurately assess answer correctness, validated against human raters who show high agreement. We find that neither common approaches, such as post-training and model scaling, nor more targeted interventions recommended improve verifiability. We introduce two methods that succeed at improving verifiability: reflect-and-rephrase (RR) for mathematical reasoning and oracle-rephrase (OR) for factual QA, both of which improve verifiability by incorporating domain-appropriate external information. Together, our results establish error verifiability as a distinct dimension of response quality that does not emerge from accuracy improvements alone and requires dedicated, domain-aware methods to address.

The growing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in instruction-following and context-understanding lead to the era of agents with numerous applications. Among these, task planning agents have become especially prominent in realistic scenarios involving complex internal pipelines, such as context understanding, tool management, and response generation. However, existing benchmarks predominantly evaluate agent performance based on task completion as a proxy for overall effectiveness. We hypothesize that merely improving task completion is misaligned with maximizing user satisfaction, as users interact with the entire agentic process and not only the end result. To address this gap, we propose PIPA, a unified evaluation protocol that conceptualizes the behavioral process of interactive task planning agents within a partially observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) paradigm. The proposed protocol offers a comprehensive assessment of agent performance through a set of atomic evaluation criteria, allowing researchers and practitioners to diagnose specific strengths and weaknesses within the agent's decision-making pipeline. Our analyses show that agents excel in different behavioral stages, with user satisfaction shaped by both outcomes and intermediate behaviors. We also highlight future directions, including systems that leverage multiple agents and the limitations of user simulators in task planning.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

As language models (LMs) evolve from chat assistants to long-horizon agents capable of multi-step reasoning and tool use, existing benchmarks remain largely confined to structured or exam-style tasks that fall short of real-world professional demands. To this end, we introduce \OneMillion-Bench OneMillion-Bench, a benchmark of 400 expert-curated tasks spanning Law, Finance, Industry, Healthcare, and Natural Science, built to evaluate agents across economically consequential scenarios. Unlike prior work, the benchmark requires retrieving authoritative sources, resolving conflicting evidence, applying domain-specific rules, and making constraint decisions, where correctness depends as much on the reasoning process as the final answer. We adopt a rubric-based evaluation protocol scoring factual accuracy, logical coherence, practical feasibility, and professional compliance, focused on expert-level problems to ensure meaningful differentiation across agents. Together, \$OneMillion-Bench provides a unified testbed for assessing agentic reliability, professional depth, and practical readiness in domain-intensive scenarios.